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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with analysing the criminal law's treatment of women who 
kill their abusive partners. I developed an interest in this area as an undergraduate 
student whilst examining the criminal law defence of provocation. My general 
interest in women and the law led to the adoption of a feminist perspective which in 
turn led to an interest in gender theory. Initially, the aim of the thesis was to question 
whether women who kill should be excused or justified by the criminal law, and thus 
scrutinise the legal aspects of particular defences. However, whilst studying gender 
theory, I became increasingly interested in how queer theory, or more specifically, the 
work of Judith Butler, may contribute to the examination of the law's treatment of 
abused women who kill. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisors, Dr Gerry Johnstone and 
Dr Rachel Alsop at the University of Hull for their constant support and constructive 
criticism over the past five years. Thanks also to my former GTA colleagues and the 
many friends that I made whilst working at the University of Hull. I would also like 
to thank my friends and colleagues at Liverpool John Moores University. Special 
thanks to Dr Lorie Charlesworth, Anita Ellis and Carmel Flanagan for their continued 
support over the last year of study. Good friends Meena Kumari and Jacqueline 
Cuthbert have also provided much needed support and friendship over the years - 
thank you. 
I would like to thank Justice for Women and Sandra McNeill for inviting me to the 
attend the trial of Diana Butler. 
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Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Geoffrey and Margaret Carline, for their 
emotional and financial support over the many years that I have been a student, and 
my husband, David Evans, whose love and support has enabled me to finish this 
work. 
I would like to dedicate this work to my parents, Geoffrey and Margaret Carline, and 
to my husband, David Evans. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the criminal law's treatment of women who kill their abusive 
partners through a theoretical framework developed from queer theory and social 
justice. More specifically, in relation to queer theory, the thesis considers the work of 
Judith Butler and her notions of gender as performativity, cultural intelligibility, 
materialisation and resignification. The model of social justice used is drawn from the 
work of Iris Marion Young. One particular aspect of her model of social justice is 
considered to be pertinent: cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism maintains that 
an injustice in the form of domination and oppression is committed when inferior 
social groups are constructed from the outside by the dominant social group and 
where their particular characteristics are rendered 'Other'. 
The thesis applies the work of these two authors to a number of criminal cases in 
order to analyse the following issues: the construction of a woman's identity by the 
legal system; the existence of differences between women - particularly racial, 
cultural and ethnic differences - and the possibility of achieving justice within the 
existing criminal law. The thesis scrutinises Court of Appeal judgments and provides 
a close reading of two cases: Zoora Shah, who remains convicted for murder, and 
Diana Butler, who was, on retrial, convicted for manslaughter on the grounds of 
diminished responsibility. 
I argue that the murder/manslaughter and custody/probation distinctions are linked to 
the unintelligible/intelligible gender distinction. I further argue that in those cases in 
which a manslaughter conviction is achieved, the result can be seen to be both at once 
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just and unjust. Whereas it may be 'legally just' when compared to cases involving 
men who have killed their partners, it is also 'socially unjust' due to the cultural 
imperialistic manner in which a woman's identity is constructed. Furthermore, the 
thesis highlights that, in addition to prevailing gender scripts to which women must 
conform, there also exists racial regulatory scripts which impact upon the construction 
of a woman's identity and her perceived cultural intelligibility. Attention is also paid 
to the instability of meaning which is considered to provide an opportunity for 
subvcrsivc transformation. 
In the conclusion the thesis forwards an overview of a proposed defence, which is 
based upon a reformulation of the battered woman syndrome and the defence of 
duress. This defence is considered to offer a more socially just outcome for women 
who kill. 
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INTRODUCTION 
General Introduction 
During the 1990s two cases involving women who killed their partners received 
significant attention from the media. Both Sara Thornton' and Kiranjit Ahluwalia2 
killed their partners after suffering a tremendous amount of abuse, and were, initially, 
convicted of murder. Sara Thornton killed Malcolm Thornton by stabbing him in the 
stomach whereas Kiranjit Ahluwalia killed her husband whilst he was asleep by 
setting fire to his bedroom. He died of his injuries 6 days later. The plight of women 
such as Thornton and Ahluwalia lead to the establishment of Justice for Women in 
1991, which campaigned against their murder convictions. One of the main strategies 
adopted by Justice for Women was to highlight the discrepancies between the legal 
treatment of women and men who kill their partners. Whereas the courts usually find 
a man guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, women are 
overwhelmingly convicted of murder. 3 Additionally, it appears that a man must 
endure much less in order for his killing to be excused or partially justified. 4 Groups 
such as Justice for Women and Southall Blacksisters, which campaigned on behalf of 
Kiranjit Ahluwalia and, more recently, Zoora Shah, have played a vital role in 
highlighting the perceived injustice which women who kill their abusive partners 
receive. 
1Rv 7hornton [1992] 1 All ER 306; Rv Thornton (No. 2) [1996] 2 Cr App R 108 
2Rv Ahluwalia [ 1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
3 See for example the cases outlined in the Justicefor Women Information Pack [Justice for Women; 
London; 2ed] p. 47 and pp. 49-54 
4 Ibid. 
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Eventually the Court of Appeal heard the cases of Sara Thornton and Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia. Their convictions were quashed and retrials ordered. At the retrial the two 
women were convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. 
This indicates that the defendant's responsibility for the homicide was reduced, due to 
some abnormality of mind or mental instability, and has significant legal 
consequences, (primarily in relation to the sentence received). This may seem to be a 
just, logical, and possibly a compassionate result. A conviction for the less serious 
offence of manslaughter indicates society's disapproval of her actions, yet 
compassion is shown through the court's recognition of her unbalanced mental state, 
caused by the prolonged domestic violence suffered. Thus, in such circumstances, a 
murder conviction, which carries a life sentence, tremendous social stigma and 
condemnation, was appropriately considered to be unduly harsh. In contrast, as the 
sentence for manslaughter is discretionary, it is able to reflect the extenuating 
circumstances that the woman was placed in. Those who campaigned on behalf of 
these women considered the ultimate manslaughter convictions to be a victory, 
perhaps even a just result. This thesis, however, questions the form of justice that is 
actually achieved in such cases. It is accepted that a 'legal justice' may have been 
achieved in some cases, in the sense that 'like cases are treated alike', and the sentence 
is based upon an acceptable analysis of the blameworthiness of the offender. But, it is 
argued, a wider social injustice is perpetuated, as the women tend to be constructed in 
a negative light. Such a negative construction invariably occurs due to the continual 
reliance upon psychiatric evidence in cases involving women who kill their abusive 
partners, and thus it is argued that the women are generally defined as mentally ill, as 
other to the so called 'reasonable man' which operates as a standard within the law. 
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Moreover, it is also argued that the narrow conception of 'legal justice' also fails to 
deal adequately with those differences which exist between women. 
Generally women kill less then men. During 1999/2000 211 men and only 21 women 
were convicted of homicide. 5 Statistics also illustrate that significantly more women 
are killed by a current or former partner (92), as compared to men (27). Research also 
indicates that men who kill are more likely to receive a conviction for murder than a 
woman. Overall, for 1999/2000 54% of men received a murder conviction as opposed 
to 38% of women. 6 However, as illustrated by Justice for Women, 7 the picture 
appears to be different in relation to domestic homicides. Why is it that in the 
circumstances of domestic homicide the preferred conviction for a woman appears to 
be murder, whereas men tend to be convicted for manslaughter? This discrepancy 
between men and women has led to an immense amount of research, by academics, 
practitioners and campaigning groups. Overwhelming, this work has tended to adopt 
a comparative approach, focusing on those cases in which women have been 
convicted of murder and men have been convicted of manslaughter! A recent article 
in The Guardian illustrates this fact. 9 The article, which celebrates the 10th birthday 
5 Homicide includes murder, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter and infanticide. 
6 All statistics are taken from the Criminal Statisticsfor England and Wales - Statistics relating to 
Crime and Criminal Proceedingsfor the Year 1999 [The Stationery Office; December 2000] Chapter 4 
7 See for example the cases outlined in the Justicefor Women Information Pack p. 47 and pp. 49-54 
8 See for example Justicefor Women Information Pack; Bandalli S "Battered Wives and Provocation7' 
(1992) 142, NLJ 212-213; Bandalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note'Journal of Law and Society 
(1995) 22,398-409; McColgan A "General Defences" in Bibbings L& Nicohlson D Feminist 
Perspectives on Criminal Law [Cavendish; London; 2000] chapter 8 
9 Cooke R, "Snap Decisions" The Guardian Tuesday 30 October 2001. 
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of Justice for Women, commences with the case of Josephine Smith, who killed her 
husband on 30th July 1992 by shooting him, after years of physical, sexual and mental 
abuse. She was convicted of murder in 1993 after the jury declined to accept her 
defence of diminished responsibility. Only a couple of months later, the article 
reports, Roy Greech, who killed his wife after finding out she was having an affair, 
received a two-year suspended sentence. Whereas Smith received a life sentence, 
Greech had his freedom. (Fortunately, on November 4 2002 the Court of Appeal 
quashed Josephine Smith's conviction for murder and found her guilty for 
manslaughter on the grounds of provocation. Nevertheless, she still served 9 years in 
prison. The Court of Appeal sentenced her to 10 years, but ruled that she should be 
released immediately). 10 It can be seen that situation has not really changed much 
since 1892, when Matilda Blake reported that the 'killing of a wife was more likely to 
result in a manslaughter rather than a murder charge. "' 
This comparative approach indicates that sexism and double standards may be evident 
in the criminal justice system. Commentators 12 argue that the law (or the legal 
requirements) is male in the sense that it is based on male characteristics. Thus 
women who kill their abusive partners, many after suffering years of horrific physical, 
10 Verkaik R "Court Frees Woman who Shot Abusive Husband" The Independent 5 November 2002 
11 Cited in Mooney J, Gender, Violence and the Social Order [Macmillan; London; 20001 p. 70 
12 see for example O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women who Kill" Journal of Law and Society 
(1991) 18,219-237; O'Donovan K "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, the Battered Woman, 
and Her Syndrome" Journal of Law and Society (1993) 20,427-439; Schneider EM "Equal Rights to 
Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law" Harvard Civil-Rights-Civil Liberties Law Rev (1980) 15,623- 
647; Taylor LJ 'Trovoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion and Imperfect Self-Defense" 
U. C. LA Law Rev 33 (1986) 1679-1735 
12 
sexual and mental violence, struggle to have their experiences recognised by the legal 
machinery, and are frequently convicted of murder. This fact is clearly illustrated by 
the cases of Thomton 13 (who had to appeal against her conviction twice) and 
Ahluwalia. 14 Without the support of campaign groups who asserted that the law 
should take into account the abuse they have suffered, it is arguable that these two 
women would still be serving life in prison, with the legal system showing little 
regard or empathy for the years of abuse they have suffered. Indeed, for many, many 
years domestic violence has been at worst accepted and at best ignored by society, the 
police and the courts, and this impacts upon the perpetrator's understanding of 
domestic violence. Hearn explains: 
"[Domestic] violence has been accepted, condoned, normalized and ignored 
both by individuals and institutions. It has been seen as a 'private' matter. 
Individual men's perceptions of violence to women are themselves affected by 
the definitions and constructions produced and reproduced in agencies. " 15 
The issue of the law's treatment of women who kill their abusive partners has received 
substantial academic attention. Generally, the literature advances two different 
perspectives that are ostensibly based on the sameness (that men an women should be 
treated the same)/difference (that the differences between men and women should be 
recognised) binary. It is argued by some that the law applies double standards, in that 
it treats women differently to men, and requires women to conform to standards 
which are not required of men. 16 Alternatively, it is argued that the law is based on 
13 [199211 All ER 306; Rv Thornton (No 2) [199612 Cr App R 108 
14 [ 1993196 Cr App R 133 
15 Hearn J The Violences ofMen [Sage; London; 1998] p. 8 
16 Nicolson D "Telling Tales, Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women who 
Kill" Feminist Legal Studies (1995) IH, 185-206 p. 185 and O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered 
Women Who Kill" p. 221 
13 
male characteristics, and thus excludes the experiences of women. In relation to the 
former argument, that the law discriminates against women by applying different 
standards, historically the killing of a wife by her husband was categorised as a less 
serious offence than when a wife killed her spouse. Whereas the husband was charged 
with murder, the wife faced a charge of petty treason. 17 Such double standards are 
also evident in recent case law. Bandalli 18 examines the differences between female 
and male cases of provocation, focusing on the representation of the female. She 
argues that it is the woman, as opposed to the man, who is under scrutiny, whether she 
is the victim or the perpetrator. This argument is developed by Nicolson, 19 who 
illustrates that the recognition of female differences and experiences may take the 
form of a gender construction based on sexist stereotypes which perpetuate female 
subordination. Similar to Bandalli, Nicolson identifies that the legal construction of 
women, involves a trial of the defendant's character, and being judged against a 
societal standard of the 'appropriate femininity', which incorporates three divergent 
elements: 'domesticity, sexuality and pathology. ' 20 Nicolson contrasts the cases of 
Ahluwalia 21 and Thomton, 22 noting that whereas Kiranjit Ahluwalia was constructed 
and judged to have acted in correspondence with the societal standard, Sara Thornton 
fell outside. Hence, whereas Ahluwalia received a conviction for diminished 
responsibility, Thornton's conviction for murder (at the time the article was written) 
17 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women who Kill" p. 221 
18 Bandalli S "Battered Wives and Provocation7p. 212; Bandalli S 'Trovocation -A Cautionary Note" 
19 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women who 
Kill" 
20 Ibid., pp. 185-188 
21 [1993] 96 Cr App Rep 133 
22 [199211 All ER 306 
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remained . This gender construction 
leads to double standards. Whereas men are 
judged solely on whether they fall into legal structures, women are judged against a 
societal standard, which ensures that they are rendered either mentally abnormal, if 
they correspond, or murderers, if they do not. Hence the assertion that female 
criminals are either mad Qr bad. These articles do not, however, suggest how a 
standard that recognises both genders may be incorporated without falling liable to 
stereotypical gender construction. 
The notion that female criminals are considered to be either mad or bad can be seen to 
relate to the images of deviant women which have developed over time in both court 
cases and the media. Such images have, arguably, had a significant effect upon the 
legal treatment of women who kill their abusive partners. Women who commit crime 
are frequently constructed as being doubly-deviant. As noted above, not only have 
they violated rules of conduct, they have also contravened roles of appropriate gender 
behaviour. One particular theory which recognises that women are not considered to 
be capable of committing crime, due to their feminine nature, is the chivalry theory. 
This theory argues that women are treated significantly more leniently than men by 
the police and the courts as they considered to be less disposed to commit crime. 
Women are constructed as weak, passive and dependent upon men, and thus in need 
of protection. As Carroll explains, these stereotypes: 
"... create[] a more protective attitude toward women. In the context of the 
criminal justice system, women's weak and passive nature make them less 
attractive, if not less eligible, candidates for imprisonment. ', 24 
23 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women who 
Kill" pp. 190-194 
24 Carroll J "Images of Deviant Women and Capital Sentencing Among Female Offenders: Exploring 
the Outer Limites of the Eighth Amendment and Articulate Theories of Justice" Tex L Rev 75 (1997) 
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However, as those women who commit serious crimes, such as homicide, clearly 
contravene the chivalry theory's stereotype of femininity, they are thus seen as being 
doubly deviant, or evil. 
Heidensohn in Women and Crime 25 outlines the different images of deviant women, 
and considers how these impact upon the treatment female offenders. In particular, 
Heidensohn illustrates that, in comparison to male deviant behaviour, there exists a 
limited range of images of deviant women. Moreover, those images of women which 
do exist tend to be based upon a dichotomy. As Feinman states: 
"In the modem criminal justice system women are viewed according to 
attitudes that derive in large measure from classical Greece and Rome and 
medieval Europe. Both pagan mythology and Judeo-Christian theology 
present women with a dual nature either as madonnas or as whores. " 26 
In addition to the madonna/whore dichotomy, Heidensohn also illustrates that deviant 
women have been depicted as witches, not-woman or masculine, unfeminine women 
or as suffering from disturbed hormones. 27 Hence this has in turn lead to the image of 
the deviant women as being either bad or mad. Such a construction in turn impacts 
upon the treatment of women by the criminal justice system. A woman who is 
constructed as bad may receive an unduly harsh sentence, as she is doubly deviant, or, 
if considered to be mad, may be compelled to undergo (in)appropriate medical 
1413 p. 1417-1418 see also Keitner CI "Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in the Criminal 
Justice System"Colum. J. Gender & Law 11 (2002) 38 
25 Heidensohn F Women and Crime [MacMillan Press Ltd; London; 2 nd ed; 1996] 
26 Feinman C Women in the Criminal Justice System [Praeger; New York; 1980] p. I cited ibid., p. 90 
27 Heidensohn F Women and Crime chp 6 
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treatment. What is significant is that, unlike male offenders, there is no image of a 
'normal' delinquent woman. Heidensohn states: 
"Amongst them all, [images of deviant women] there is no conception of the 
'normal' exuberant delinquency characteristic of males. Any woman would 
be damaged by being portrayed as a witch or a whore; and while a sick female 
deviant may be less punitively treated, she will attract other stigma... ". 28 
Thus, the criminal justice system's relatively harsh treatment of women who kill their 
abusive partners can be seen to be related to the images of deviant women. Women 
who kill are constructed as either being evil and posing a potential treat to the security 
of society, or as mad and therefore needing medical treatment. 29 
The argument that the law excludes women is based on the premise that the law is 
male. ODonovan states: '[a]s a cultural artifact law is male; yet it aspires to represent 
28 Ibid., p. 95 
29 The medicalisation of women within the criminal justice system is analysed by Allen H in Justice 
Unbalance& Gender, Psychiatry and Judicial Decisions [Open University Press; Milton Keynes; 
1987]. Allen adopts a foucauldian discourse analysis in order to explore the reasons behind the 
seemingly disproportionate use of psychiatric disposals for female offenders. However, she illustrates 
that, despite the continued reliance upon psychiatric disposals, the perceived 'madness' or mental 
illness in women tends to be constructed as normal feminine behaviour. Allen states: '... the courts 
tend to go on perceiving their female offenders as 'relatively normal women', and it is often their 
apparent conformity and competence that make them so acceptable as psychiatric patients'. (p. xi). 
The issue of medicalisation, normalisation and the law is also considered by Smart C Feminism and the 
Power of Law [Routledge; London; 1989]; Hunt A& Wickham G Foucault and Law [Pluto Press; 
London; 1998] and Sumner C "Foucault, Gender and the Censure of Deviance" in Gelsthorpe L& 
Morris A ed Feminist Perspectives in Criminology [Open University Press; Milton Keynes; 1990] chp 
3 
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us all. 30 This is a criticism that has invariably arisen in relation to the defences and 
their requirements and one which has been made by many feminist academics. 31 
The law is, theoretically, applicable to both men and women, the defences are not 
prima facie gender specific, they are gender neutral, thus representing us all. On 
closer examination, however, it is apparent that the law has a male bias. It has 
developed in connection with, and thus incorporates, those characteristics and 
mannerisms that are generally considered to be masculine. Hence, whereas the veneer 
of the law is gender neutral, its essence is male. As stated by O'Donovan, it is 
frequently asserted that the legal defences correspond solely to masculine 'definitions 
and behavioural practices' whereas the women's experience is entirely disregarded. 
This male bias or formal equality discrimination 32 is partly due to the fact that 
homicide is predominately committed by men, and to the fact that the authors of law 
are generally men, 33 and this has the effect of silencing and 'othering' women who 
kill. Thus it follows that women's differences should be integrated into the law, as 
noted by Fiora-Gormally: '... until there is a set of social and behavioural norms which 
30 O'Donovan K "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and Her 
Syndrome" p. 435 
31 See for example Schneider EM "Equal Rights to Trial for women: Sex Bias in the Law" and Taylor 
LJ 'Trovoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self- 
Defense" 
32 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women who 
Kill" p. 185 
33 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 220 
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are fairly similar for men and women, it is unjust to apply identical standards to 
defendants of different sexes at trial from homicide. ' 34 
However, this so-called special treatment approach has been criticised on the basis 
that it labels women as deviant, and perpetuates stereotypes about femininity. 35 
Additionally, a difference-based approach tends to assume a homogenous experience 
and ignore differences that exist between women. 36 O'Donovan 37 appears to adopt 
this approach as, although she recognises that such differences do exist, she appears to 
advocate the 'commonality' approach, in that those differences which should be 
focused upon are those which exist between men and women, as this is what all 
women have in common. A similar approach is adopted by Nicolson 38 in his 
comparison of Sara Thornton and Kiranjit Ahluwalia. Ifis analysis of how Thornton is 
'othered' by standards of appropriate femininity could also take into account the 
significant racial and cultural differences which exist between the two women, and 
how Ahluwalia could potentially be constructed as 'other' to white women. Adopting 
an approach which tends to represent women as an homogenous group may 
marginalize women such as Zoora Shah, who, as an Asian woman and one who is 
34 Fiora-Gormally N "Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard in? " 
Law and Huntan Behaviour 2 (1978) 133-165 pg 164, cited in Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic 
Homicides" Int J of the Sociology of Law (1997) 25,203-229 p. 213 
35 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" pp. 222-223 
36 Ibid. 
37 O'Donovan K "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and Her 
Syndrome" p. 435 
38 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women who 
Kill" 
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unable to speak English, will still remain 'Other' given a standard which concentrates 
solely on one particular form of femininity. 
Hence, much of the literature has concerned itself with the sameness/difference issue: 
either the law should treat women the same as men, or recognise their specific 
differences. The sameness approach, however, encounters significant criticism, in that 
it is phallocentric, according supremacy to masculinity, and presents a double-edged 
sword for women. If a woman corresponds to this standard she is likely to be labelled 
a 'masculine woman', 39 however, if she does not correspond, she is likely to be 
convicted of murder. The difference approach is equally problematic in that it 
assumes commonality, ignores differences between women, and can lead to the 
adoption of stereotypical and harmful constructions of femininity, which may in turn 
lead to a greater discrimination against women who kill. Furthermore, both the 
approaches can be criticised on the grounds that they tend to be essentialist, as they 
adopt the universalising categories of 'Man' and 'Woman'. Chan 40 suggests the way 
in which to avoid the conflict between equality and difference is to cease presenting 
them as dichotomous, and reveal the power relationships that exist when they are 
placed as such. She concurs with Scott 41 in an approach which requires an 'analysis 
of gender categories which serve as the normative statements organizing cultural 
understandings of social difference' to accompany any declaration of difference. 42 
39 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" pp. 221-222 
40 Ibid. 
41 Scott J Gender and the Politics of History [Columbia University Press; New York; 1988] 
42 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" pp. 223-224 
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This thesis aims to provide an analysis of gender and questions whether justice for 
battered women is attainable under the present criminal law by scrutinising the 
identity categorieS43 adopted by the courts in cases involving women who kill their 
violent partners. Importantly, significant attention is paid to the differences that exist 
between women. The research provides a contribution to knowledge via an analysis of 
the legal responses to battered women who kill their abusers through a new theoretical 
framework. My framework is developed from concepts of justice and queer theory 
and will be used to scrutinise specific cases and the battered woman syndrome. I will 
highlight how the existing legal structure both achieves justice and continues an 
injustice. The work of two authors in particular is used to develop this framework. In 
relation to justice the work of Iris Marion Young in Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, 44is used to show how and why the present legal approach leads to wider 
social injustice. Such theories will also be used to suggest how a law that 
accommodates plurality and difference may be created and justified. In relation to 
queer theory the work of Judith Butler, in particular, is applied. Specifically, the thesis 
draws upon two aspects of Butler's work: the notions of perforinativity and intelligible 
genders as discussed in Gender Trouble 45 and Bodies That Matter. 46 Butler, while 
advocating the recognition of difference, calls for a deconstruction of categories and 
43 The term identity categories is preferred to gender categories as the latter arguably presumes that 
gender is the most important form of identity and thus tending to relegate the importance of other axis 
of identity. Additionally, it can also lead to the assumption that different axis of identity are separate as 
opposed to intertwined. For example, all gender is raced, and all race is gendered. 
44 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference [Princeton University Press; Princeton, New Jersey, 
1990] 
45 Butler J Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity [Routledge; London; 2 ed 1999] 
46 Butler J Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex [Routledge; London; 1993] 
21 
binary oppositions, and thus argues against the use of universalising labels such as 
'man' and 'woman'. The difficulty with universal labels lies in their assumption of an 
experience and subjectivity that is universal to all women or men. This has the 
disadvantage of denying or devaluing other differences, such as race, culture, class 
and sexuality. The case of Zoora Shah provides a contemporary and controversial 
example. A significant factor was Shah's race and culture, issues that may not be 
recognised in a universalising category of woman, which, it could be argued, is based 
on the particular experiences of white, middle class women. As the thesis provides a 
close reading of two cases, Zoora Shah and Diana Butler, the contribution made is 
also empirical. The reading adopts a queer theory perspective and provides a detailed 
and critical analysis of the identity categories used in these two cases. 
The main argument of the thesis is that the comparative approach that is invariably 
adopted by feminist academics and campaigners perpetuates the impasse which has 
developed in relation to the sameness/difference debate. It is argued that the analysis 
should be shifted or expanded to focus upon comparing women with women and to 
consider the different outcomes of cases and to further analyse the way in which 
identity is constructed by the judiciary. The thesis will argue that the recognition of 
differences between women is vital to understanding why one woman may receive a 
conviction for murder whereas another will be convicted for manslaughter. An 
interest in the existence of differences between women developed into examining a 
deconstruction of the category 'woman', and questioning its ontological nature. This 
approach precipitated examining the existence of a female experience or a female 
voice, one that the law could reflect. Consequently, the thesis is concerned with law 
as a 'gendering practice': how the law creates subjectivity and gender; how the law 
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constructs identity. The concept of law as a gendering practice is premised on 
postmodem and poststructural theories that reject law as a homogenous and static 
concept. 
Chunn and Lacombe 47 outline how the postmodern approach differs from the one 
taken by sameness and difference feminists. Both sameness and difference strategies 
adopt 'the 'modem' instrumentalist view of law, s48 which depicts law as either the 
liberator (liberal feminism) or the oppressor (radical feminism). However, as Chunn 
and Lacombe illustrate, this depiction of law fails to encapsulate its true complexities 
and adopts a rather trans-historical and universal notion of law and the state, thus 
failing to recognise how their meaning and influence can and does alter through time 
and place. They state: '[flar from being fixed and immutable, state, law and patfiarchy 
are historically and culturally specific relations, and they assume new forms with 
different content over time. '49 Furthermore, for postmodernists, law is a discourse 
that can be deconstructed and altered through the existence of counter-discourses, 
which can have an uneven effect, sometimes liberating, some times oppressing. Law 
becomes a site of struggle, a site where struggles over meaning are played out. In 
addition, this postmodcm notion of law also adopts a view of the subject as 
constructed as opposed to natural and innate. A succinct definition of concepts of 
subject and subjectivity is provided by Weedon, who states '[s]ubjectivity is used to 
refer to the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotion of the individual, her 
47 Chunn D. E and Lacombe D Law as a Gendering Practice [Oxford University Press; Oxford; 2000] 
48 Ibid., p. 2 
49 Ibid., p. 9 
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sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world. '50 In contrast 
to the humanist view of the subject as unique, fixed and coherent, a 
postmodem/poststructuralist approach conceives the subject as socially constructed, 
fragmented, conflicting and continually in process. The subject is constituted through 
different identity categories and law is considered to be a discourse that produces 
these categories and subject positions. As opposed to merely reflecting different 
experiences and identities, the law actually creates them. Thus in relation to the 
women who kill their abusive partners, their subjectivity is constituted through the 
identity categories generated by the legislature and the courts. Hence the subject is 
not an autonomous, free agent, but, rather, is constituted by the law. Law is amongst 
a number of discourses through which 'woman' is constructed, however, as Chunn 
and Lacombe argue '... understanding the role of law in the construction of gender is 
all the more important today because law is so pervasive, having penetrated almost 
every minute comers of our lives. 51 Hence, the law and the courtroom become the 
site of struggle over the battered woman's identity. The identity categories used by 
the courts are identified and scrutinised in order to investigate how identities are 
negotiated, and which identities appear to lead to manslaughter as opposed to a 
murder conviction. This in turn permits an evaluation as to whether or not justice has 
been achieved - in the sense of a social justice that is concerned with representation. 
Moreover, when considering law reform proposals, it is also important to recognise 
that every identity category or subject position is based on exclusions. An identity is 
defined by what it is not. Hence all reform proposals will effectively exclude some 
categories of women. In addition, an identity category will also have effects beyond 
50 Weedon C Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory [Blackwell; Oxford; 1987] p. 32 
51 Chunn D. E and Lacombe D Law as a Gendering Practice p. 17 
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its initial intention. For example, whereas the battered woman syndrome was 
developed with good intentions (to assist the woman who suffers abuse) it has been 
used in a negative manner, a manner which constructs women as mentally unstable. 
Thus any reform project needs to constantly re-examine the identities that it produces, 
the effects of those identities, and whom is excluded. 
In addition to presenting an overview of the thesis' chapters, this introduction also 
provides an insight into the wider picture of domestic violence in order to locate its 
arguments. In particular, an insight into the social and legal attitudes towards 
domestic violence highlights an historic acceptance of such behaviour, which 
undoubtedly impacts on the opinions a judge and jury may hold of a woman who kills 
her abusive partner. If domestic violence is considered to be acceptable, or at least an 
action not worthy of a serious criminal sanction, it is unlikely that the courts will 
consider a killing to be an understandable or even an excusable response. Prior to 
outlining the legal acceptance of domestic violence, an overview of the definitions of 
such abuse will be provided in order to provide some insight into the types of violence 
women suffer. 
Definitions of Domestic Violence 
The Law Commission, in its report on domestic violence (which eventually lead to the 
Family Law Act 1996) states: 
"The term "violence" itself is often used in two senses. In its narrower 
meaning it describes the use or threat of physical force against a victim in the 
form of an assault or battery. But in the context of the family, there is also a 
wider meaning which extends to abuse beyond the more typical instances of 
physical assaults to include any form of physical, sexual or psychological 
molestation or harassment which has a serious detrimental effect upon the 
luniversaly 
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health and well-being of the victim, albeit there is no "violence" involved in 
the sense of physical force. " 52 
It is important to recognise that violence suffered by women is not just restricted to 
physical violence, but also includes a range of other activities that are not so readily 
associated with the word 'violence'. This is also the approach taken by Article 2 of 
The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
1993, which states that violence against women includes the following: 
"... physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry- 
related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional 
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to 
exploitation. " 53 
Such a definition clearly covers the range of domestic violence suffered by women 
who kill their abusive partners. This definition is also important as it highlights that 
abuse can also include sexual and psychological violence. One major issue with 
domestic violence is the familial or intimate aspect. For a woman to be a victim of 
domestic violence must she be living with her abuser? The manner in which the 
United Nations Declaration is limiting is that it states that it is violence 'occurring in 
the family'. Although non-spousal violence is also included, it does potentially 
exclude violence inflicted upon women who are separated from their partner, or not 
living with their partner. This in particular could be seen to be problematic in relation 
to the case of Zoora Shah, as she was abused by a man she was neither married to, nor 
living with. 
52 Law Commission No 207 Family Law: Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home 
[1992; London; HMSO] para 2.3 
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The perceptions of the victim of domestic violence are seen to be very important 
when trying to provide a definition. Dobash and Dobash 54 comment that male 
perpetrators tend to understate their actions, describing their actions as trivial, and not 
really violence. What has been recognised by survivors, activists and researchers is 
that the abuse often included activities '-which was [not] immediately recognisable 
as violence - but which was intended to dominate and control an abused woman's 
behaviour and choices. ' 55 Women's Aid defines domestic violence as 'physical, 
psychological, sexual or financial violence that takes place within an intimate or 
family type relationship and forms a pattern or coercive and controlling behaviour. 56 
This second definition has the advantage of including intimate relationships, hence it 
may apply to women such as Zoora Shah, 
Legal Acceptance of Domestic Violence 
During the Eighteenth Century, the law condoned the use of violence by men in order 
to ensure his authoritarian position within the family. Blackstone's Commentaries 
held family life to be within the private sphere, and thus outside the legitimate scope 
of the law, as opposed to public acts which may cause damage to society. This 
position was heavily criticised by JS Nfill, in The Subjection of Women, 57 which is 
stated to be the '-first significant document to spark the raising of public 
53 United Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women; General Assembly Resolution 
48/104; 20 December 1993 
54 Dobash RE et al Changing Violent Men [Sage; Thousand Oakes, California; 20001 see chapter 2 
55 www. womensaid. org. uk 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mill jS The Subjection of Women [Longmans; London; 1869] 
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consciousness about the plight of battered wives. '58 Nevertheless, Nineteenth Century 
Common Law still permitted a husband to beat his wife, the only restriction being the 
'Rule of Thumb', which stated that the instrument used must be a rod no larger than 
his thumb, and this rule remained in force until 1878. The Nineteenth Century did see 
a number of legislative challenges to 'wife abuse, such as the Better Prevention and 
Punishment of Aggravated Assault Upon Women and Children Act, passed in 1853, 
which introduced new penalties for wife beating. In addition, legislation introduced in 
this period provided women more rights in relation to separation and divorce, such 
examples include the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878. This Act allowed women to 
obtain a separation order from the magistrates on the grounds of cruelty provided that 
there was evidence of a specific physical assault incident. Women were gradually 
granted more rights over their property 59 and the courts also had the power to grant 
and enforce maintenance orders . 
60 Furthermore, the end of the Nineteenth Century 
also witnessed that abolition of a husband's right to imprison his wife if she refused 
sexual intercourse. However, as noted by Hearn, the advances in the legal arena were 
not mirrored in the family sphere: 
"[B]y the end of the Nineteenth Century in practice very little had shifted the 
nature of men's authority relations over women in marriage. Men's day-to- 
day domination and authority was routinely reinforced by the state, for 
example, the avoidance of intervention in 'marital disputes' by the police. " 61 
Legal reform concerning regarding domestic violence largely disappeared until the 
1970s and it is suggested that this was due to the absence of a strong women's 
58 Dutton DC The Domestic Assault of Women: Psychological and Criminal Justice Perspectives 
[UBC Press; Vancouver; 1995] p. 21 
59 Married Woman's Property Act 1870 
60 Summary Jurisdiction (Married Woman) Act 1895 
61 Hearn J 7he Violences ofMen p. 10 
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movement during this period. 62 Mooney states that '[a]fter 1970 the women's 
liberation movement grew rapidly and feminists began to examine and speak of their 
experiences of violence and provide support for other women who had been subject to 
abuse by men. 963 Erin Pizzey opened the first women's refuge in 1971. 
Since the 1970s a number of legislative provisions have been enacted enabling the 
courts to grant an abused woman an injunction against the perpetrator. 
64 Such legal 
interventions, however, tend to be civil remedies, and the criminal justice system has 
consistently failed women who have suffered domestic violence. Domestic violence 
has overwhelmingly been perceived as a private issue (hence the use of family law 
remedies) as opposed to a public issue (hence the reluctance on behalf of the state to 
intervene). The most recent law reform is provided by section IV of the Family Law 
Act 1996,65 which aims to increase the effectiveness and accessibility of civil law 
remedies. Under the Act a woman who suffers domestic violence may obtain an 
occupation order, which relates to the occupation of the family home, or a non- 
molestation order which prohibits further violence and abuse. Significantly, these 
orders are not ancillary orders, hence they do not have to be attached to any other 
form of proceedings such as divorce. Advances in criminal law have not been 
deliberate. For example, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides some 
criminal law protection for women who are continuously harassed and stalked by their 
abusive partners, however the act was not actually created to be used to address the 
62 Mooney J Gender Violence and the Social Order p. 73 
63 Ibid., p. 74 
64 Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 
65 The Family Uw Act 1996 was the end result of the Law Commission's report No 207 Family Law: 
Domestic Violence and Occupation of the Family Home 
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problem of domestic violence but to prevent 'stalking. Sections I and 2 of the act 
make it an offence for a person to pursue a course of conduct that amounts to 
harassment of another. Section 4 of the Act introduces the more serious offence of 
engaging in a course of conduct that causes another person to fear that violence will 
be used against them. The Act defines a course of conduct as at least two incidents. 
In addition to the Prevention of Harassment Act 1997, some aspects of domestic 
violence also -fall under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and sexual violence 
is prohibited by the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (as amended). However, although in 
theory these Acts should provide a sufficient remedy, in practice they generate 
unsatisfactory results. Generally, the courts and the police have shown little 
sympathy for women who suffer domestic violence and little mercy for women who 
kill their abusive partners. It was not until the 1990s that proactive police measures 
were adopted by the introduction of Domestic Violence Units, and these units were 
developed in part in response to the criticisms that the state does little to intervene in 
domestic violence cases. It is stated that the units: '... aim ... to help ensure the safety 
of women and children by intervening with offenders and supporting victims. That is, 
to protect specific abused women as well as potential victims. ' 66 Despite the changes 
in police responses, evidence indicates that the criminal justice system still considers 
domestic violence to be less serious than other comparable assaults. 
Disproportionately, the charges in domestic violence cases tend to be reduced from 
s47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm) to s39 (assault), additionally, such cases 
66 Lewis R, Dobash R, Dobash R and Cavanagh K "Law's Progressive Potential: The Value of 
Engagement with the Law for Domestic Violence. " Social and Legal Studies (2001) 10(l), 150-130 p. 
108 
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tend to be confined to the magistrates courts. 94% of domestic assault cases are dealt 
with by a magistrate, as opposed to 79% of non-domestic assault cases. 67 
Additionally, the sentences passed in domestic cases are disproportionately more 
lenient than non-domestic cases. Overwhelmingly, perpetrators of domestic violence 
are likely to receive a conditional discharge or a small fine. Such sentences fail to 
protect the victim and construct domestic violence as 'trifling and non-criminal. 1 68 
Hence it can be seen that a woman who is charged with the murder of her abusive 
partner immediately faces a difficulty within the criminal justice system due to the 
historical acceptance of domestic violence and the reticence shown by both the courts 
and police towards accepting such violence as a serious issue. Although attitudes are 
now changing, it is not difficult to understand why, on the whole, the law has been 
fairly reluctant to show sympathy and mercy towards women who kill their abusive 
partners. 
Chapter Overview 
Gender theory and, in particular, the work of Judith Butler, is considered in chapter 2. 
The chapter provides an overview of feminist and gender theory in order to trace the 
development of postmodern feminism and queer theory. Attention is paid to sameness 
feminism, difference feminism and the impact of black and post-colonial feminism. In 
relation to Judith Butler's work, her ideas of gender as performativity, materialisation 
and cultural intelligibility are considered. The chapter also deals with criticisms of 
67 Cretney A and Davis A 'Trosecuting Domestic Assault: Victims Failing Courts, or Courts Failing 
Victims. " The Howard Journal (1997) May 36(2), 146-157 p. 149 
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Butler's work and argues that adopting such a deconstructive approach does not 
necessarily entail the complete elimination of the category 'woman'. 
The main thrust of the third chapter on theories of justice is to identify and critique the 
idea of justice which is frequently appealed to by those academics and campaigners 
concerned with highlighting the plight of women who kill: 'legal justice'. The chapter 
commences with an overview of a number of different theories and continues to 
provide a detailed and critical analysis of formal or legal justice, which can be defined 
as 'treating like cases alike'. This overview includes an examination of the concepts 
of equality and impartiality. The appeal to legal justice is critiqued via Iris Marion 
Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference. 69 In particular, Young argues that 
impartiality is based upon a logic of identity that creates and maintains hierarchical 
binaries and works to suppress and 'other' differences. Young argues that the view 
which is considered to be impartial is, conversely, very much partial, as it is based on 
the perspectives and experiences of the dominant' group within society. The chapter 
argues that an approach which continues to appeal to a 'legal justice', which compares 
women who kill with men who kill, operates in a negative manner, a manner which 
perpetuates the silencing and 'othering' of women. 
In order to move away from maintaining the male/female binary and the associated 
power relations, it is argued that the focus should shift to an alternative form of 
justice. The contention here is that Young's conception of social justice enables an 
68 Ibid., pp. 146-157 p. 152 Edwards S Policing Domestic Violence: Women, the Law and the State, 
[Sage; London; 1987] p. 232 
69 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference 
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evaluation of legal rules, procedures and outcomes. Young argues that domination 
and oppression are the cornerstone of social injustice and that they are produced and 
perpetuated via five different elements: exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism and violence. In particular, it is considered that cultural 
imperialism, which argues that women are defined from the outside, and violence, as 
the criminal justice process arguably condones violence against women, are the main 
fonns of domination and oppression suffered by women who kill. The chapter 
concludes by applying queer theory to Young's notion of social justice, particularly 
the issue of cultural imperialism. In so doing this critique addresses in particular the 
problems with Young's assertion that oppressed groups should construct their own 
identity. 
Chapter 4 provides an examination of the existing defences available to women who 
kill their abusive partners and of the literature which has provided a critical analysis 
of the law. The three main defences that are examined are: Provocation, Diminished 
Responsibility and Self Defence. Whereas the former two defences are partial, 
leading to a conviction for the lesser offence of manslaughter, the latter is a full 
defence, and thus if successful will lead to an outright acquittal. In relation to 
provocation, the chapter examines the legal requirements of the defence and how they 
have affected women who kill their abusive partners. Provocation requires the 
existence of three elements: 1) provocative conduct, 2) loss of self-control, and 3) the 
requirement that a reasonable person should react in the same manner as the 
defendant. One of the main feminist arguments regarding provocation is that its 
requirements are based on masculine characteristics and this serves to silence and 
'other' women. In particular, this is considered to be the case in relation to a sudden 
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and temporary loss of self-control. The chapter outlines the arguments forwarded by 
commentators that women tend to have a slow bum anger, and that the law should be 
amended in order to recognise this. Amongst others, the cases of Thomton 70 and 
Ahluwalia 71 are considered. Another related issue, which is identified as problematic, 
is the law's recognition of cumulative provocation and the effect that this has on the 
battered woman and her self control. Although it is recognised that the law has 
developed to consider the whole history of the violence suffered, particularly in the 
case of Rv Humphreys 72 the requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self- 
control remains a formidable barrier to the success of the defence. 
The objective requirement that a reasonable person must react in a similar manner is 
also analysed and identified as posing considerable difficulties. Much discussion has 
focused on the extent to which a defendant's characteristics should be attributed to the 
reasonable person, and, until recently, the law has drawn a distinction between the 
level of self control expected and the gravity of the provocation. Chapter 4 focuses 
specifically on the issue of the level of self-control, whereas the problem of 
characteristics relevant to the gravity of the provocation is considered in the chapter 
on the battered woman syndrome (chapter 5). It is recognised that this distinction 
between self-control and gravity is now somewhat legally irrelevant due to the House 
of Lords'decision in Rv Smith. 73 This judgment is also considered in detail in chapter 
5. 
70 [1992] 1 All ER 306 and Rv Thomton (No. 2) [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 108 
71 [1993196 Cr App Rep 133 
72 [199514 All ER 1008 
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In relation to diminished responsibility, which is contained within S2 of the Homicide 
Act 1957, it is argued that despite the general success of this defence, its continued 
use is exceptionally problematic as it focuses upon the woman's mental state as 
opposed to the violence she has suffered. Finally the chapter scrutinises the issue of 
self-defence. This defence permits defensive action that is deemed necessary. This 
has led to the establishment of a number of requirements: imminency, belief in serious 
harm, proportionality and (in some jurisdictions) a duty to retreat. The chapter 
provides a detailed and critical examination of these requirements and it is noted that 
this defence is the one least likely to be accepted by the courts. As with provocation, 
it is argued that the requirements are based on masculine characteristics and this 
excludes the battered woman who kills. The chapter outlines the advances that have 
been made, specifically in relation to the requirement that the defensive force must be 
reasonable. The American case of State v Wanrow, 74 and related commentaries are 
considered. In this case the Supreme Court recognised that in addition to adopting a 
subjective viewpoint as to whether or not harm was threatened, the courts should 
judge the reasonableness of the force used subjectively. Hence, when evaluating 
whether or not a woman acted in self-defence, a purely subjective approach is 
adopted. This enables the jury to consider all the relevant circumstances leading to 
the fatal act, not just the moments immediately preceding. It is argued that this 
approach is significantly more progressive than the one adopted presently in England 
and Wales. The recent case of Rv Martin 75 is analysed. In this case the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed that whereas whether or not the force was necessary would be 
73 [200013 VvIR 654 
74 88 Wash. 2d 221,559 P. 2d 548 (1977) 
75 [2002] 1 Cr App R 27 
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judged from the perspective of the defendant, the reasonableness of the amount of 
force used is to be judged objectively. 
Overall, the chapter illustrates through a detailed and critical examination of the 
existing law defences and academic commentary that the law, both as it presently 
stands and how it is applied, fails to deal adequately with women who kill their 
abusive partners. 
Chapter 5 examines the development and the application of the battered woman 
syndrome. A detailed and critical analysis of the two constitutive elements of the 
concept - learned helplessness and the cycle theory of violence - is provided along 
with a discussion as to why the syndrome was developed, to provide an answer to the 
question 'why do women remain in violent relationships' and secondly to aid the 
defence of women who kill their abusive partners. It is recognised that in both 
America and Canada the syndrome has had some success in helping to achieve 
complete acquittals for women who kill when argued in relation to self-defence. 
In relation to provocation, it is recognised that the major area of contention is the 
extent to which the battered woman syndrome amounts to a relevant characteristic, 
which affects the gravity of the provocation in relation to the objective test. A 
number of cases are discussed including Ahluwalia '76 HumphreyS, 
77 Rv Morhall 78 
76 [1993] 96 Cr App Rep 133 
77 [199514 All ER 1008 
78 [ 1995) 3 All ER 659 
36 
and Luc Thiet Thuan v R. 79 In addition the academic arguments surrounding this issue 
are also scrutinised. This section is concluded with an assessment of the impact of the 
80 House of Lords'decision in Smith. 
One of the most radical judicial acknowledgements of the battered woman syndrome 
and its legal application was provided in the Canadian case of Lavallee v R, 81 the 
judgement of which is examined. In this case the Supreme Court of Canada 
recognised the applicability of the syndrome and it was used successfully to argue that 
the woman acted in self-defence when she shot her abusive partner in the back. The 
case recognises that the syndrome operates to bring the perspectives of battered 
women into the legal arena, and thus counters those requirements which are based 
upon and reflect the male experience. The court held that Lavallee believed that she 
would be killed that night and therefore she acted in self-defence. This approach is 
very progressive, as it challenges the meaning of imminence. However, the syndrome 
has not been used in other jurisdictions to execute such a fundamental change in 
perception. 
The chapter continues to question the necessity of the syndrome and to discuss the 
comments that it has attracted. The syndrome has received significant criticism from 
feminist and other academics in relation to three elements: its methodology, its 
ideology, and the judicial application. The chapter concludes by recognising the 
dilemma for feminist academics and campaigners: the use of the syndrome is 
79 [199612 All ER 1035 
so [200013 WLR 654 
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problematic as it constructs women in a negative manner, however, it does appear to 
bring about results, in the sense that it can either lead to a conviction for manslaughter 
as opposed to murder, or a complete acquittal. 
The chapter on Critique and Construction provides an analysis of the feminist critique 
of the law and the law's construction of women who kill their abusive partners. One 
of the major criticisms of the existing law is that it is inherently male and works to 
silence, exclude and 'other' women, especially battered women who kill. 
Additionally, many feminist academics argue that the law employs double standards, 
in that women are treated differently to men. Through comparing cases involving 
women who kill with men who kill, it transpires that the law, in both scenarios, 
invariably blames the woman. These two arguments: that the law is male and that the 
law employs double standards; can be seen to reflect two different approaches within 
feminist theory, approaches which advocate that women should be treated equally to 
men; and approaches which emphasise difference, thus maintaining that differences 
between men and women should be recognised. The chapter then commences the 
examination of the law's construction of identity. Twelve Court of Appeal cases are 
subjected to scrutiny, and particular attention is paid to the defences of provocation 
and self-defence, the use of expert evidence in general and the battered woman 
syndrome in particular and the factors which have affected the sentence a woman has 
received when convicted of manslaughter. 
Chapters 7 and 8 develop the examination of identity categories by providing a close 
reading of the cases of Zoora Shah and Diana Butler. Chapter 7 deals with the Court 
81 [199011 SCR 852 
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of Appeal judgment concerning Zoora Shah. Amongst other crimes, Shah was 
convicted for the murder of Mohammed Azam, whom she poisoned with arsenic. The 
reading of the case adopts a queer theory perspective. In particular, it draws upon the 
work of Judith Butler and her notions of performativity and intelligible genders. The 
reading traces the construction of Zoora Shah from the first trial through to the Court 
of Appeal and argues that the dismissal of her appeal turned upon the construction of 
Shah as an unintelligible gender. The chapter engages in a detailed examination of the 
case presented at the first trial and investigates the grounds on which the appeal was 
dismissed. The appeal argued for the admission of fresh evidence, much of which 
was presented in a report prepared by Southall Black Sisters, alleging that 
Mohammed Azam and others had physically and sexually abused Zoora, and also 
outlining that the defence presented at the first trial was based on lies. Under s23 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 the Court of Appeal had a discretion to allow fresh 
evidence to be adduced. The chapter focuses on two elements which the Court had 
taken into account: 1) whether the evidence is capable of belief and 2) whether there 
is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in the first trial. It is 
noted that these issues are pertinent to the appellant's character, as the main question 
is whether or not Shah can be believed. 
Through an investigation of the court's evaluation of these two issues, the chapter 
argues that the Court of Appeal constructs Zoora Shah as an unintelligible gender. 
Three factors in particular are emphasised: 1) the court's misgivings regarding the 
lack of any 'suspicious bruising', and how the body is considered to tell the truth of 
Zoora's situation; 2) Zoora's contravention of racial as well as gendered scripts and 2) 
the naming of Zoora as an 'unusual woman'. It is argued that this is a powerful 
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interpellation which works to silence and subordinate Zoora. When analysing the 
judgment particular attention is paid to the issues of race, ethnicity and culture. 
Chapter 8 provides a close reading of the appeal and re-trial of Diana Butler, who was 
initially convicted for the murder of her partner, Roger Carlin. The chapter examines 
both the Court of Appeal judgment and the re-trial, and scrutinises how Diana Butler 
is given an identity, or placed within an identity category by the court; an identity 
which is negotiated by the defence and prosecution lawyers and the judge (but not the 
jury); an identity which is constructed for her, but not by her, but which she must 
internalise in order to achieve some sense of justice. A number of theoretical 
arguments are used in order to provide a detailed analysis of the case and the 
construction of Diana's identity. In particular, the chapter looks at the concepts of 
narrative, materialisation, resignification and the formation of the psyche. The 
discussion highlights how the different narratives which are evident in both the appeal 
and the retrial go someway to construct Diana's identity, and how narrative can also 
be subject to a powerful resignification, a resignification which impacts upon the 
construction of Diana's identity to such an extent that she is eventually convicted for 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. 
The shift in the focus of the case from the first trial, appeal and retrial is commented 
upon and it is argued that this change in time focus is accompanied with a change in 
the meaning of the historical narrative and this in turn impacts upon the construction 
of Diana. The section on the retrial discusses a number of issues, including how the 
dialogues between Diana and Roger materialise on the body of Diana and thus have a 
real impact on her behaviour. A comparison with the Zoora Shah case is provided, 
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which focuses upon the issue of intelligibility and ethnicity. Particular attention is 
paid to the resignification of an event which occurred between Diana and her former 
husband, John Butler and the role of the defence and prosecution in negotiating this 
change in narrative, and how the defence transform the meaning of this event from a 
negative to a positive, in order to construct a very different woman. 
Chapter 9 offers conclusions and also forwards a suggested refonn proposal, which is 
based upon the defence of duress of circumstances and a re-working of the battered 
woman syndrome. In order to reach such conclusions, however, I will begin by 
discussing one element of the theoretical framework which forms the basis of this 
thesis: gender theory or, more specifically, queer theory. 
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GENDER THEORY 
From Liberalism to Postmodernism: The development of Queer Theory 
Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis is to scrutinise the law's treatment of women who kill 
through a new theoretical framework, one developed from theories of justice and 
gender. This chapter explores key debates within gender theory and how they might 
have significance for legal understandings of women who kill their abusive partners. 
Specifically, the chapter explores the work of queer theorist Judith Butler. In addition 
to examining the main aspects of Butler's work which are employed in the thesis, the 
chapter will trace the genealogy of feminist theory/gender theory in order to facilitate 
an insight into three issues: the evolution of queer theory and Judith Butler's 
arguments; the distinctions between Judith Butler and other gender theorists; and the 
criticisms of Judith Butler's work. 
The influence of queer theory and Judith Butler has not been limited to gender theory. 
Increasingly, those legal scholars who are concerned to explore how the law interacts 
with issues of gender and homosexuality, are turning to this theoretical approach to 
provide new insights into a diverse range of issues. A queer theory approach has been 
used to analyse and deconstruct cases concerning the legal rights and status of lesbian, 
gay and transgendered persons; ' to 'explore the relationship between property and 
1 see Beger NJ "Queer Readings of Europe: Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation and the (1m)Potency of 
Rights Politics at the European Court of Justice" Social and Legal Studies (2000) 9(2) 249-270; Moran 
L, Monk D and Beresford S ed Legal Queeries: Lesbain, Gay and Transgender Legal Studies 
[Continuum Publishing Group; London; 19981; Sharpe A "Transgender Performance and the 
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personality through the lens of sexuality' 2 to consider the US Supreme Court's refusal 
to recognise the right of an Irish-Gay collective to march and communicate their pro- 
gay message. 3 In relation to feminist issues, queer theory and the work of Judith Butler 
has been used to investigate how the law produces sex and gender. 4 These writings 
generally draw upon Butler's notion of gender as performativity and consider how 
identity categories and binaries can be disrupted. 
In relation to this thesis, the adoption of queer theory and Butler's work developed due 
to an interest in the perceived differences which exist between men and women, and 
between women. The issue of female or feminine difference has taken a central place 
in feminist/gender theory and has had significant impact on all areas of feminist 
theory, politics and philosophy, including law reform, epistemology, ontology and 
moral theory. The manner in which difference is recognised and conceptualised, 
however, depends significantly upon the strand of theory which one adopts. It is 
generally recognised that, over the years, three varying approaches have developed. 
Discriminating Gaze: A Critique of Anti-Discrimination Regulatory Regimes" Social and Legal Studies 
(1999) 8(1), 5-24 
2 Davies M "Queer Property, Queer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond" Social & Legal Studies 
(1999) 8(3), 327-352 
3 Yalda CA "Walking the Straight and Narrow: Performative Sexuality and the First Amendment after 
Hurley" Social & Legal Studies (1999) 8(l), 25-45 
4 see for example: Chunn DE and Lacombe D Law as a Gendering Practice; Keywood K "More than a 
Woman? Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Medical Law" Feminist Legal Studies (2000) 8(3), 319- 
342, Loizidou E"The Trouble with Rape: Gender Matters and Legal 'Transformations... Feminist Legal 
Studies (1999) 7(3), 275-297 
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5 Labelled as Sameness, Difference and Postmodemism. by Hekman' and Inclusion, 
Reversal and Divergence by Squires, 6 these three different approaches are also 
evidenced within feminist conceptions of law and approaches to law reform. Smart 
7 
categorises these to be 1) law is sexist, 2) law is male and 3) law as gendered . 
The conceptions of difference advanced by these theories is, overwhelmingly, reflected 
by the respective label. Sameness, or inclusion, is to a large extent epitomised by 
liberal feminism/gender theory which argues that any differences which do exist 
between men and women should not be used to justify any divergence of treatment. 
Liberal feminists state that women should be subject to the same standards and laws as 
men. They call for equal and impartial treatment. Conversely, difference or reversal 
feminism calls for a recognition and, in some cases, a celebration of feminine 
difference. As opposed to rendering such differences as inconsequential or irrelevant, 
this strand argues that liberation for women would not be achieved by ignoring 
women's difference and requiring women to act the same as men, but via laws and 
theories which recognise the specificity of feminine characteristics and women's 
experience. Such an approach either argues that female and male characteristics 
should be given equal weight or that femininity should be placed in a superior position 
to masculinity. 
The approach taken by postmodern or displacement feminists is altogether different. It 
argues that both sameness and difference maintain the masculine/feminine and 
5 Hekman SJ Future of Differences: Truth and Method in Feminist Theory [Polity Press, Cambridge; 
1999] 
6 Squires J Gender in Political 7heory [Polity Press; Oxford; 1999] 
7 Smart C Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism [Sage Publications; London; 1995] chp 11 
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male/female binary. This is shown to be problematic as it tends to focus on gender 
difference at the expense of other differences, such as race, class and sexuality. 
Postmodernism, however, acknowledges that the experience of white middle class 
women, those whom have generally been the foundation for feminist theory, fails to 
recognise significant differences between women. Moreover, it is argued that adopting 
a stance which fails to acknowledge the diverse experiences of women obscures the 
power relationships between women (and between men), and also ignores the white 
woman's role in imperialism. Taken to its extreme, this approach completely 
deconstructs the category 'woman', suggesting that it cannot be used as the foundation 
of feminist or gender theory. It argues that the concept of a natural woman is a 
linguistic and also a normative construct and it challenges the notion of an autonomous 
subject, a concept which is generally relied upon in the other two approaches. 
Postmodem feminist theorists argue that maintaining the male/female binary retains 
the power relationships which construct the oppressive gender identities which 
feminists are fighting against and also exclude and repress different gender identities. 
Within this approach the main focus of inquiry shifts from analysing how feminism 
should represent women in the law, to examine both how the law is gendered and how 
it creates gendered identitieS. 8 It is within this category that queer theory can be 
placed. 
The emphasis of the thesis is to examine how identity, and therefore the differences 
between women, are constructed and constituted by the legal system itself. The 
analysis draws on the experiences of women who kill their abusive partners and their 
8 see for example Conaghan J "Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law" Journal of Law 
and Society (2000) 27(3), 351-3 85 
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treatment by the legal system. Some may argue that, instead of working within the 
present political and legal system, we should change the system, (as it has a causal role 
in the problems faced by these women) or work entirely outside it. Nevertheless, 
refiguring politics and the criminal justice system is not the focus of this piece of work. 
The aim of this project is to provide insights into the way in which the present system 
creates identity and to scrutinise the form of justice which is achieved in some cases. 
Social Constructionism and Liberal Feminism 
Within feminist theory the argument that some aspects of identity, such as femininity 
and masculinity, are socially constructed, can be traced back to the liberal or sameness 
feminism. Within the 20th Century, liberal or sameness feminism is generally 
associated with the work of Simone de Beauvoir who, amongst others, draws upon the 
social constructionist movement which developed significantly in the 1960s. Drawing 
upon the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, and specially his work Being and Nothingness, 9 de 
Beauvoir (in The Second Sex)10 argued that women are not biologically determined, 
rather, they learn to become women: they are socially constructed, hence her famous 
quote: 'One is not bom, but rather becomes, a woman. "' This social constructionist 
approach is generally contrasted to biological essentialism. 12 As Diana Fuss explains: 
9 Sartre JP Being and Nothingness an essay on Phenomenological Ontology [Methuen; London; 1969] 
10 de Beauvoir S 7he Second Sex [Picador; London; 1989] 
11 Ibid., p. 295 
12 Essentialism is defined by Grosz E as '... the existence of fixed characteristics, given attributes, and a 
historical functions which limit the possibilities of change and thus of social reorganisation'. Biologism 
is seen to be a specific form of essentialism '... in which women's essence is defined in terms of their 
biological capacities. ' Grosz E "Conclusion: A note on essentialism and difference" in Gunew S ed 
Feminist Knowledge: Critique and Construct [Routledge; London; 1990] pp. 332-344 p. 334. 
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'Essentialism is classically defined as a belief in true essence-that which is most 
irreducible, unchanging, and therefore constitutive of a person or a thing. ' 13 Thus a 
constructionist within the liberal feminist camp would reject such biological 
determinism and regard femininity and masculinity to be products of society. 
Constructionism is underlined by the sex/gender distinction. This binary, which is 
considered to reflect the nature/culture binary, considers that whereas sex 
(male/female) is natural, gender (masculinity/femininity) is completely social. 
de Beauvoir also developed the discussion of Woman as Other to Man's One, and 
relies upon the binary of Self/Other, which corresponds to Man/Woman binary. 
Whereas Man is characterised by subjectivity, autonomy, rationality and 
transcendence, Woman is defined as opposite to this, she is bound by her immanence 
and lacks subjectivity. Moreover, although the masculine is the positive side of the 
dichotomy, it is also seen to be neutral - the standard that defines humanity: 'She is 
defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she 
is incidental; the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is 
Absolute - she is Other. ' 
14 This, for de Beauvoir, forms the basis of women's 
oppression. In order to be liberated, they must become the SelL They must exceed 
their immanence and achieve transcendence, adopting those characteristics associated 
with the masculine. Positioning Man as the One or Self, and Woman as the Other was 
adopted by those working within feminist jurisprudence. Due to the male biased 
nature of the 'objective' standards of humanity which were embedded within the law, 
Biologism is just seen as one form of essentialism. Essentialism can take many different forms, such as 
biological, social or linguistic. 
13 Fuss D Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference [Routledge; London; 1989] p. 2 
14 de Beauvoir S 7he Second Sex p. 16 
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women were judged against a masculine criteria. Hence women becomes Other to the 
law. 
The way for women to escape this situation is, however, not to rejoice in their 
otherness and turn it into a positive attribute, an approach which de Beauvoir did 
recognise, but to throw off their shackles of Otherness. Hence it is argued that, as 
gender is social it can be changed, women can develop those characteristics generally 
associated with masculinity. Moreover, because the differences between men and 
women are socially constructed the sex of an individual cannot be used to justify 
differential treatment. Hence, the political project of liberal feminism aims to abolish, 
the differences between men and women, or, in the very least, render these differences 
irrelevant. In relation to feminism and feminist legal theory, the advantages of such an 
approach are self-evident. Sex discrimination has frequently, especially within the 
realm of employment law, emanated from the notion that women are different to men, 
and thus should not be given the same work opportunities or the same wages. By 
adopting a policy of assimilation such a stance is quickly dismissed. 
This approach to equal treatment and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex can be 
seen to be enshrined in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, which states: 
"T'he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. " 
As this Article illustrates, the plea to equal treatment is not just limited to sex, but also 
to other perceived 'differences, and thus in addition to the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, this requirement of non-discrimination is also contained within the Race 
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Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Non-discrimination 
against women is also specifically addressed in the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Womcn. Articlc I dcfines discrimination as: 
66 ... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing of nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise of women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of 
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social , cultural, civil or any other field. " 
There are, however, many criticisms of this approach. Firstly, it is considered to be 
essentialist, which may seem to be rather surprising due to the constructionist accounts 
of femininity. This criticism stems from the fact that liberal/sameness feminism still 
posits that there is a universal, ahistoric biological woman, and posits Man and 
Woman to be natural, ontological categories. Whereas femininity is considered to be a 
social construct, the existence of two, natural, biological sexes is taken as a given. As 
Nicholson argues: 
"Many of those who accept the idea that character is socially forined and thus 
reject the idea that it emanates from biology do not necessarily reject the idea 
that biology is the site of character formation. ... They still view the 
physiological self as the "given" upon which specific characteristics are 
"superimposed"; it provides the location for establishing where specific social 
influences are to go. " 15 
Such an approach leads to a 'coat-rack' view of identity, where 'the body is viewed as 
a type of rack upon which differing cultural artifacts ... are thrown or superimposed. ' 
16 
In addition, in its belief in transcendence and objectivity, the liberal feminist approach 
clearly believes that one can obtain a view-point outside the cultural world, a position 
which postmodern social constructionists would negate. The other well rehearsed 
argument against this liberal approach is that it requires women to be like men. The 
15 Nicholson L "Interpreting Gender" in Nicholson L and Seidman S Social Postmodernism: Beyond 
Identity Politics [Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1995] pp. 39-67 p. 41 
16 Ibid., p. 41 
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standards and laws which are to be applied to women are not universal and objective, 
but are male. As Young explains, with assimilation women arrive to the scene after 
the standards have been set, and these standards have been set by the dominant group 
in society (male). Furthermore, this assimilation approach also allows the dominant 
group to disregard their own specificity. 17 Secondly, promoting sameness can lead to 
the devaluing or the rejection of feminine specificity. This has caused some liberal 
feminists to denigrate femininity, one of the most extreme examples of this is Simone 
de Beauvoir's vilification of motherhood and the female body. Adopting a stance 
which is criticised by other liberal feminists, 18 motherhood for de Beauvoir is, like 
other feminine characteristics, a social construct, and a construct which must be erased 
in order for women to gain equality. 19 Although such a position is an extreme, it 
illustrates how liberal/sameness necessarily entails the rejection of feminine 
characteristics, in favour of supposedly objective (read: masculine) characteristics, a 
position which is rejected by many difference feminists. Finally, evidence also suggest 
that there is a significant divergence between the letter of the law stating that women 
and men should be treated equally and its practical application. One example is that of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. In relation to equal pay research indicates that men 
are generally paid more for the same job as their female counterparts. An Equal Pay 
Task Force, which was established in 1999 by the Equal Opportunities Commission, 
reported that with regards to full time work, women earn 18% less then men, and on a 
pan time basis, women earn 39% lesS. 
20 
17 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference pp. 164-165 
18 See Hekman S The Future of Differences Truth and Method in Feminist Theory p. 9 
19 Ibid., pp. 9-10 
20 Equal Pay Task Force; Equal Opportunities Commission; 27 February 2001 
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In contrast to this sameness/liberal approach which suggests the erasure of feminine 
difference, sexual difference theorists argue for a recognition and at times a celebration 
of femininity. It is to this particular strand of theory I now turn. 
Sexual Difference 
Luce Irigaray commences her bookje, tu, nous Toward a Culture of Difference 21 with 
a discussion of Simone de Beauvoir's The Second SeX 22 arguing that, as opposed to 
escaping their female body and motherhood, women should find a value in these 
attributes, and indeed this is considered to be essential if women are to demand and 
secure 'equivalent sexed rights', rights which are necessarily different. In stark contrast 
to liberal feminism, equality, for Irigaray, requires a recognition of sexual difference: 
"Equality between men and women cannot be achieved without a theory of 
gender as sexed and a rewriting of the rights and obligations of each sex, qua 
different, in social rights and obligations. ts 23 
As sexual difference is posited as the cause of women's oppression, Irigaray argues 
that liberation will only be achieved via sexual difference. The eradication of 
oppression requires not that difference be erased but that the values of each gender 
should be defined. In Irigaray's view the grip which patriarchal and phallocentric 
models have had on civilisation work as a significant impediment to determining such 
gender values. 24 The importance of recognising and accepting differences as opposed 
to considering them to be irrelevant is also accepted by Iris Marion Young. Young 
argues that the liberatory nature of the politics of assimilation was challenged by 
'movements of the oppressed. ' As opposed to striving for justice as equal treatment 
21 Irigaray Lje, tu, nous Toward a Culture of Difference [Routledge; London; 19931 
22 de Beauvoir S The Second Sex 
23 Irigaray Lje, tu, nous Toward a Culture of Difference p. 13 
24 Ibid pp. 12-13 
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oppressed groups argue that 'a positive self-definition of group difference is in fact 
more liberatory. ' 25 
Much of Irigaray's work is based on the premise that woman's identity is repressed 
and silenced by the patriarchal nature of the symbolic order - that which produces the 
speaking subject. This argument is premised on, and also critiques, Lacan's adoption 
of Freud's Oedipus complex to show how a subject is constituted through language. 
She argues that women cannot talk as women, as language is male, due to the phallus 
being placed as the transcendental signifier. Within the patriarchal symbolic order not 
only do women have to 'speak like men' but also any representations of them are 
inevitably masculine: 
"To claim that the feminine can be expressed in the form of a concept is to 
allow oneself to be caught up again in a system of 'masculine' representations, 
in which women are trapped in a system of meaning with serves the 
autoaffection of the (masculine) subject. 9s 26 
This differs significantly from other difference feminists, especially standpoint 
feminists, who believe that the woman can speak the truth about her experience and 
can develop their own representations of femininity. Working from Irigaray"s premise 
such representations are masculine - they do not uncover the real feminine, hence they 
continue to be oppressive. 
Irigaray argues that women need to develop their own language, to be able to 'speak 
(as) woman, as opposed to speaking of woman and speaking (as) man. ' 27 This, 
25 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 157 
26 Irigaray L This Sex Which is Not One (Comell University Press; New York; 1985] pp. 122-3; see also 
Weedon C Feminism, Theory and the Politics of Difference [Blackwell; Oxford; 19991 p. 90 
27 Irigaray L This Sex Which is Not One pp. 135-136 
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however, entails the development of a feminine subjectivity. She argues that we do not 
know woman as feminine feminine, but only as masculine feminine, the phallic 
feminine. What is required, in contrast to a male defined female otherness, is a 
maternal feminine subjectivity, which necessitates the development of a female 
imaginary, and this for Irigaray lies in the theorising of women's sexuality. In stark 
contrast to male sexuality, which is unified, female sexuality is fluid, plural and 
multiple - signified by the existence of two lips. The two lips are used in a figurative 
sense, or, as Diana Fuss argues, in a metonymic manner. Irigaray argues that, due to 
the two lips, female sexuality cannot be reduced to a unity, but rather is both singular 
and double: 'Thus, within herself, she is already two-but not divisible into one(s). s28 
Hence, Irigaray asserts that there is, inside every woman, a true female subjectivity, 
which needs to be uncovered, via the female imaginary, in order for women to develop 
their own voice, and escape oppression. 
Despite recognising that women's subjectivity is repressed by the phallic symbolic 
order, and that what we know as women now is constructed by masculine discourse, 
she argues, unlike Simone de Beauvoir, that we are bom women: 
"Your/mY body doesn't acquire its sex through an operation. Through the 
action of some power, function or organ. 
29 
Without any intervention or special 
manipulation, you are a woman already. " 
She states that 'by our two lips we are women' from the start - but we are women 
confined by the 'fatherland', arguing: 
28 Ibid., p. 24 see also Fuss D Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference p. 58 
29 Irigaray L 7his Sex Which is Not One Ibid., p. 211 
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"It's not that we have a territory of our own; but their fatherland, family, home, 
discourse, imprison us in enclosed spaces where we cannot keep on moving, 
living, as ourselves. Their properties are our exile. " 30 
Hence, for Irigaray women do already exist, but what we know about them, and how 
they speak, is constructed by masculine discourse, and in contrast to the social 
constructionist position adopted by the sameness/liberal feminists, Irigaray advocates 
the discovery and recognition of a feminine subjectivity. 
In connection with the recognition of a distinct feminine subjectivity, Irigaray develops 
her notion of Sexuate Rights, which lays down specific legal rights and duties for 
women, which should be distinct from the specific legal rights and duties of men. She 
states that it is essential to define women's civil identity, because without their own 
identity: 
"... it is to be expected, unfortunately, that they will conform to the only 
existing models, supposedly neutral, but in fact male. Hence the need to 
redefine the objective content of civil rights as they apply to men and women, - 
since the neutral individual is nothing but a cultural fiction - and to attempt to 
,, 31 establish the legal bases of possible reciprocity between the sexes. 
In relation to women, she includes the following Sexuate Rights: The right to human 
dignity, the right to human identity, mutual mother-child duties, a civil right for 
women to defend their lives and the lives of their children, and the right to equal 
representation in all places where civil or religious decisions are taken. 32 
30 Ibid., p. 212 
31 Irigaray L Thinking the Difference, transl, Montin K [Athlone; London; 1994] p. 75 cited in Lacey N 
Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory [Hart Publishing; Oxford; 1998] p. 
213 
32 Irigaray Lje, tu, nous Toward a Culture of Difference pp. 78-90 
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One of the major difficulties with an approach which emphasises female difference, 
however, is that it can be used in a negative manner, a manner which justifies 
discrimination against women, as opposed to a recognition of their particular 
circumstances. One case which is generally cited to illustrate this problem is Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v Sears Roebuck & Co. 33 The U. S. Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision to dismiss ten charges of sex discrimination against Sears. 
The charges related to the perceived unequal rate at which women were hired for sales 
position when compared to men. Statistics illustrated that '... although two-thirds of the 
applications and promotion candidates for commission sales positions were women, 
women constituted only one-fourth of those actually hired or promoted. v34 Sears 
justified this practice by using expert evidence to effect that the character traits 
generally associated with men, for example, competitive and work-centred, as opposed 
to those generally associated with women, such as nurturing, selflessness and relation- 
centred, were more suited to a sales position. Hence, the existence of female 
difference was used in a negative manner to justify unequal employment opportunities. 
A similar argument has been used in connection to Irigaray's sexuate rights. Nicola 
Lacey states that the rights forwarded '... recapitulates stereotyped and disempowering 
visions of femininity, and fixes women within "a feminine culture" as valued and 
defined by men in a heterosexist world. ' 35 
This recognition of some kind of true female identity or subjectivity is also recognised 
by standpoint feminism, although, as mentioned above, standpoint feminism adopts a 
rather different approach to the one offered by Irigaray. Standpoint theory turns to the 
33 839 F. 2d 302 (7h Circular 1988) 
34 Frug MJ Postmodern Legal Feminism [Routledge; London; 1992] p. 12 
35 Lacey N Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory p. 216 
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views and perspectives of oppressed and subordinated people in order to develop 
knowledge claims. It argues that, although knowledge and reality is in a sense socially 
constructed, generated via material life and experiences, women can access a view 
which '... exposes the real relations among human beings. ' 36 As opposed to the 
dominant group in society, whose view is considered to be '-partial and perverse, ' 37 
women have an epistemological privilege which stems from their oppression. 
According to standpoint feminists, those who are in a subordinated position advance a 
, 38 perspective that is '... less partial and distorted, and therefore more reliable, than 
those in a dominant position. The main criticism, however, of both Irigaray and 
standpoint feminism is their use of 'woman' as a signifier which represents all women, 
The arguments presented by both sameness/liberal feminism and those feminists who 
advocate the acceptance of female difference has been criticised as focusing on white, 
middle class women. In particular, black women have argued that their experiences 
are excluded by this universal woman. 39 
36 Hartsock N "The Feminist Standpoint: Developing a Ground for Specifically Historical Materialism" 
pg 153 in Kemp S and Squires J Feminisms: an Oxford Reader [Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1997] 
152-160 
37 Ibid. 
38 Jagger A "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology" in Kemp S and Squires J 
Feminisms pp. 188-193 p. 192 
39 The work of Sandra Harding, however, forwards a theory of standpoint feminism which not only 
recognises the different experiences of women, but also attempts to deconstruct the essentialist/relativist 
dichotomy. Harding in 7he Science Question in Feminism [Cornell University Press; New York; 19861 
maintains that the diverse situations of women means that it is impossible to develop only one feminist 
standpoint, and therefore advocates a move away from a single coherent theory. In Whose Science? 
Whose Knowledge? Harding develops '... the logic of standpoint theory in ways that more vigorously 
pull it away from its modernist origins and more clearly enable it to advance some postmodemist goals. ' 
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Black Feminism 
bell hooks in Ain't Ia Woman 40 examines the development of the women's movement 
and those which it represents and argues that the feminism has overwhelmingly 
presented the experiences of white middle/upper class women as the experience of all 
women, thus excluding the experiences of non-white women and working class 
women, who remain unrepresented. In addition to excluding the black women's voice, 
hooks argues that the women's movement is based on racist foundations. She states: 
'[for] black women the issue is not whether white women are more or less racist than 
white men, but that they are raciSt, 41 The racism of feminism is not, however, overt 
but exists in the exclusion of black women's voices and the adoption of racial 
stereotypes . 
42 She is highly critical of the woman-black men slave analogies which the 
women's movement made during the 1800's, stating that their experiences bear little, 
(p. 106). She advances the notion of 'strong objectivity' which, whilst recognising that all knowledge is 
socially situated, maintains that some '-social situation tends to generate the most objective knowledge 
claims. ' (p. 142) Thus, Harding argues that feminist research should '... start from the situations of 
women in devalued and oppressed races, classes and cultures', as she argues that this will enable 
researchers to '... learn even more about the social and natural orders.... (p. 179-180). Hence, 
Harding's work aims to reconcile standpoint theory with postmodernism, a project which is continued in 
Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminism and Epistemology [Indiana University Press; 
1998] in order to recognise the diverse situations of women, without descending into relativism. Such 
an approach therefore potentially enables the experiences of marginalised groups to be acknowledged 
without resorting to essentialist notions. 
40 hooks b Ain't Ia Woman: Black Women and Feminism [Pluto Press; London; 19821 
41 Ibid., p. 124 
42 Ibid., p. 137 
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if any, similarities. Although she recognises that women were legally considered to be 
property during this period, '-she was in no way subjected to the de-humanization 
and brutal oppression that was the lot of the slave. ' She states that the women's 
movement was '... simply appropriating the horror of the slave experience to enhance 
their own cause' 
43 
By using the term 'woman' to represent all women, white feminists ignore their own 
racial specificity. In an argument very similar to that presented by Young in relation to 
white middle class men, bell hooks notes that, in a 'racist imperialist society, ' it is only 
the dominant race who is in the privileged position to dismiss their racial identity, to 
present their experiences as universal. 44 As explained by Weedon '[r]ather than being a 
racially marked category, whiteness signifies an absence of colour. 945 and thus it is 
only non-white people who are racially marked. hooks suggests that the use of a 
universal 'woman' served white women in two ways, firstly, it enabled them to 
distinguish themselves from white men, indicating that they did not share their racist 
ideology, and secondly, that it allowed them to disguise their racism, classism, and 
their role as oppressors, as it represented, falsely, that all women were united. 46 
However, due to the failure of white women to confront their racism and the division 
between black and white women, the feminist dream of 'sisterhood' was not 
achieved. 
47 
43 Ibid., p. 126 
44 Ibid., p. 138 
45 Weedon C Feminism, 7heory and the Politics of Difference p. 154 
46 hooks b Ain't Ia Woman: Black Women and Feminism pp. 140-141 
47 Ibid., p. 121 
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The perceived difficulty with a feminism which fails to recognise racial difference, is 
that it fails to distinguish between different levels of oppression and discrimination. 
Although it is recognised that white middle class women are discriminated against, 
hooks argues that they do not face the same level of oppression as other women, she 
states that '... as a group they are not oppressed as poor white, black or yellow 
women. 48 White feminism failed, she argues, to acknowledge that some women are 
more oppressed than others, some women are privileged in terms of their class, race 
and education, and this alienated many black women . 
49 Moreover, the common 
oppression was termed in women's exclusion from work, power and economic 
independence. Hence, as opposed to fighting against white capitalist patriarchy, this 
was what feminism aspired to, this was the key to their liberation, an approach which, 
in the opinion of hooks, illustrates the '... totally narcissistic, classist and racist... ' 
nature of white feminism. 50 Furthermore, with its acceptance of white capitalism, 
feminism was not engaged with abolishing sexist oppression, but strove for women to 
become 'surrogate men', 51 an argument which is frequently presented against liberal 
feminism. Thus the feminist fight was concemed with opening up access to those 
institutions and structures from which they had thus far been excluded. It did not, 
however, fight against the sexist nature of these institutions and structures. Such a state 
of affairs led hooks to predict that the future for feminism was bleak. What was 
necessary was a feminism which countered its racist and classist presumptions, and 
presented a politics and ideology which represented the interests of all women, not just 
a privileged group. hooks considered that the responsibility of feminism extended 
48 Ibid., p. 145 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 192 
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beyond securing women's equality with men, to also include overthrowing all forms of 
oppression in socie y. 52 
It seems that hooks presented feminism with an almost impossible task. She was 
against separate groups which focused solely on the issues faced by black women, as 
this was divisive and reinforced racism. She required feminism to present a united 
front of women but, at the same time, to recognise that all women do not suffer the 
same oppression. In addition to fighting for all women's rights, she also states that 
feminism should eradicate all forms of oppression in society. hooks does not present 
any idea of what such a movement would look like, and how it should handle clashes 
in interests, which would surely arise if feminism were to fight against every form of 
oppression. Although it is important to recognise that women are not all the same, and 
are oppressed in different ways, it is difficult to see how feminism could do this and 
still present, at all times, a united front. Moreover, she does appear to suggest that it is 
black women who hold the key to the real oppression of all women, she states: 
"Individual black feminists despaired as we witnessed the appropriation of 
feminist ideology by elitist, racist white women. We were unable to usurp 
leadership positions within the movement so that we could spread an authentic 
,, 53 message of feminist revolution. 
This argument appears to adopt the position that black women are the '... keepers of 
the holy grail... 954 as they suffer triple oppression (race, class and gender). But just 
what is this authentic message? And, furthermore, whose interests and perspectives is 
it based upon? Undoubtedly, feminism has, in the past, failed to hear the voices of 
52 Ibid., pp. 194-195 
53 Ibid., p. 189 
54 Mirza HS ed Black British Feminism: A Reader. [Routledge; London; 19971 p. 9 see also Weedon C 
Feminism, 7heory and the Politics of Difference pp. 168-169 
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black women, but presuming that there is an true feminism will undoubtedly exclude 
some other group of women. Although hooks emphasises the existence of non-white 
and working class women, she pays no regard to disabled or lesbian women, and how 
their oppression may be ignored in an authentic feminism, which is premised upon the 
experiences of black women. 
The issue of black women and abusive relationships is considered by Ammons in 
relation to African-American women. Ammons" argues that African-American 
women tend to feel that shelters for abused women only serve the interests of white 
women. This being due to the connection between the development of shelters and the 
women's movement, which tends to be based on white women. Within the UK, the 
specific situation of Asian women and their responses to domestic violence is 
emphasised by Southall Black Sisters. 56 However, although such work emphasises 
differences between women, there remains a commitment, perhaps due to political 
necessity, to retain some form of alliance with other feminist groups dealing with 
domestic violence issues. 57 The main issue in which racial and cultural differences 
between women have been considered crucial is in relation the laws response to female 
genital mutilation. One of the main criticisms of white western legal feminism is that 
it tends to view such practices with 'Westem-eyes'. In particular, Gunning argues: 
55 Ammons L "Mules, Madonnas, Babies. Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African- 
American woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome" Wis. L Rev (1995), 1003 
56 see for example Patel R "Southall Black Sisters and Alliances across the Divisions of Race, Gender 
and Class" in Hanmer J and Itzin C ed Home Truths about Domestic Violence, Feminist Influences on 
Policy and Practice. A Reader [Routledge; London; 20001 pp. 197-184 
57 Patel mentions the development of a temporary alliance with the Townswomen's Guild and Women's 
Institute in relation to the issue of the law of provocation. Ibid., p. 171 
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"In addition to the caution and care that the legacy of imperialism requires 
Western feminists to take in appreciating and participating in truly egalitarian 
relationships with women in non-western cultures, the general air of superiority 
and self-righteousness must wither upon reviewing where we have come from 
,, 58 and how far we still have to go within our own cultures. 
Gunning emphasises that, just as Western women may consider genital surgery as 
'culturally challenging', non-western women view practices such as breast 
enlargement in the same light. 59 
Overwhelmingly, however, the criticisms advanced by non-white women have tended 
to lead legal feminism into a more postmodem approach. 
Postmodernism 
The arguments of feminists who have sought to illustrate the gendered nature of 
supposedly universal and gender neutral concepts, and the arguments of black 
feminists, which illustrate the exclusivity of the universal notion of 'woman', 
highlights a move towards the acceptance of different perspectives and different truths, 
an approach which is significantly developed by postmodern feminism. 
Postmodernism disputes the Enlightenment claims of universality, transcendental 
reasoning and the objective notions of Reality and Truth. Hence, there is no truth 
which is ahistoric, acultural or representative of all human beings regardless of 
sex/gender, race, class, ethnicity etc. This leads to the argument that the modernist 
views present false generalisations and false universals. To some extent, however, this 
postmodern turn brings significant difficulties for feminism. Feminism, similar to 
58 Gunning I "Arrogant Perception, World-travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female 
Genital Surgeries" cited in Bridgeman J and Millns S Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law's Engagement 
with the Female Body [Sweet & Maxwell; London; 1998] p. 592 
59 Ibid., 
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modernism, has come under criticism for being totalizing, essentialist, reductionist, 
and presenting false generalisations and universals. Modernist strands of feminism 
attempt to reveal women's experience and perspective, women's view of the world and 
to identify the factor which causes women's oppression. This view has been criticised 
as representing the experiences and perceptions of white, middle class, western, 
heterosexual women, thus excluding the voices of many different women. The 
difficulty lies in the definition of a woman. What is woman, or who are women? 
Women are not one homogeneous group with the same experiences, but a diverse 
group, with a multitude of experiences. There are differences between women, such as 
race, class, ethnicity, sexuality. Feminism amounts to an essentialist politics due to its 
presentation of a unitary theory which relies upon an essential woman. In addition, 
similar criticisms have been made against black feminism, which generally assumed a 
fixed identity. These criticisms led to the development of theories which recognised 
and explored a notion of subjectivity which was fluid and contingent, as opposed to 
innate and fixed. In particular this work has been carried out by postcolonialist and 
queer theorists. 
With the growing influence of postmodernism, black feminism moved away from the 
notion of a fixed identity and to recognise that the subject is multiple and changing. 
Such approaches take a genealogical view and examine how bodies are constructed 
through discourses of race and gender. Attention to the construction of third world 
and black women has been undertaken by postcolonial feminism, which charges 
western feminists with discursively colonialising third world women, due to their 
assumption that third world women amount to an homogeneous category. Hence, 
whereas bell hooks criticised feminism for ignoring black women, postcolonial 
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feminists argue that, although western feminism does now pay attention to third world 
women, it tends to assume that all such women suffer the same form of struggles and 
oppression, and fails to place such women in their specific historical and cultural 
location. 60 Such insights gain significant importance when considering cases such as 
Zoora Shah. 
hooks in her later work Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics 61 recognises the 
positive nature of postmodemism when theorising race and ethnicity. As with gender, 
such an approach disputes essentialist notions of race, thus opening up multiple black 
identities, an approach which was not recognised in Ain't Ia Woman, 62 which 
overwhelmingly presented black women as an homogenous category, despite 
criticising the women's movement for assuming that the term woman could represent 
the experiences of all women. The importance of postmodemism. for race and 
ethnicity lies in its counter to white imperialism, as hooks explains: 
"It ... challenges colonial imperialist paradigms of black identity which represent blackness one-dimensionally in ways that reinforce and sustain white 
supremacy. This discourse created the idea of the 'primitive' and promoted the 
notion of an 'authentic' experience, seeing as 'natural' those expressions of 
black life which conform to a pre-existing stereotype" 63 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty in "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarships and 
Colonial DiscourseS,, 64 traces the way in which western feminists discursively 
60 Conversely, however, it could be argued that post-colonial feminists homogenise the ideas of western 
feminists. 
61 hooks b Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics [Turnaround: London; 199 11 p. 28 
62 hooks b Ain't IA Woman? 
63 hooks b Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics p. 28 
64 Mohanty CT "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" in Padimi Mongia 
Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader' [Arnold: London; 1996] pp. 172-197 
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construct third world women, and how third world women are colonialised by this 
construction. Mohanty examines a number of western feminist texts which analyse the 
third world woman in an number of different social contexts, these are: women as 
victims of male violence, women as universal dependants, married women as victims 
of the colonial process, women and familial systems, women and religious ideologies 
and women and the development process. 
In all of these different contexts western feminism assumes a singular monolithic third 
world woman which exists prior to her entry into specific social relations, and thus her 
material and historical specificity is ignored. Women are characterised first and 
foremost by their gender. Gender identity is considered to be over and above ethnic 
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and social identity, which presumes a 'monolithic notion of sexual difference'. This 
notion assumes that sexual difference equates with female subordination, and that all 
women are subordinated in the same manner by men. As Mohanty explains: 'Men 
exploit, women are exploited. 966 She argues against this on the basis that '... such 
simplistic formulations are historically reductive; they are also ineffectual in designing 
strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is reinforce divisions between men and 
women. ' 67 In order to develop effective political strategies which challenge oppressive 
social structures, it is important to recognise differences between third world women, 
and how the same practice may have a divergent meaning in different cultures. When 
western feminists analyse the situation of third world women they simply add on 'third 
world difference' to 'sexual difference'. This 'third world difference', that which 
65 Ibid., p. 183 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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oppresses women in the third world, is assumed to be the same for all women. 
Mohanty considers that it is through such methods that power is exercised over third 
world women, as they are constructed ' ... as a homogeneous powerless group-'68 This 
is significant when one considers Western feminist self-presentation. Western women 
are discursively constructed as '-secular, liberated and having control over their 
lives' . 
69 and Mohanty argues that this self-presentation would become problematic in 
the absence of a homogeneous powerless third world woman. Hence, although western 
feminist theory has acknowledged the criticism advanced by hooks in 'Ain't Ia 
Woman 70 and has commenced to recognise that the white female experience is not the 
experience of all women, it has tended to apply its universalising tendencies to the 
experiences of third world women. There are social, cultural and ideological 
differences between third world women which must be recognised. 
Queer Theory 
Queer theory is usually contrasted with identity politics and indeed is very critical of 
the approach adopted by identity politics. As Fuss explains, the tenn identity politics is 
generally used to refer to a form of politics which is premised '... on a sense of 
personal identity', 71 and shared characteristics. Although feminism and the women's 
movement could be described as a classic example of identity politics as it is based on 
the sense of what it means to be a 'woman', identity politics tends to move away from 
69 Ibid., p. 177 
69 Ibid., p. 192 
70 hooks b Ain't Ia Woman? 
71 Fuss D Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference p. 97 
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the '... homogenizing tendencies of second wave feminism, 72 as it allows a 
recognition of differences between women. As Hekman states: 
"Identity politics offers a plethora of identities from which women can choose. 
Instead of being limited to one general and necessarily hierarchical category of 
'woman', women can choose an identity that fits them, one that resonates with 
their particular situation. vq 73 
However, queer theorists argue that a politics based on identity tends to produce an 
identity which a) becomes fixed within the group, thus requiring conformatity if 
individuals are to be accepted within the group and b) becomes fixed outside the 
group, thus becoming '... a vehicle by which state power is extended rather than 
limited. 974 A queer theory approach problematises the use of identity categories and 
develops the postmodern notion of an unstable, fluid and constructed subject. 
In relation to ferninist theory it is the work of queer theorist Judith Butler which 
appears to have had the most profound effect. Butler commences her deconstruction 
of fen-ýinist theory in her book Gender Trouble 75 and develops her arguments further 
in Bodies that Matter. 76 In addition to problematising the use of the term 'woman' as 
the foundation of a feminist politics, Butler also deconstructs the sex/gender distinction 
and advances the notion of gender as perfonnativity. As outlined above, liberal 
feminists argue that gender is socially constructed, as opposed to being naturally 
determined by sex. Butler questions the assumption that the sex/gender binary reflects 
the nature/nurture binary. She argues that, if gender is not presumed by sex, then there 
72 Hekman S "Feminism, Identity and Identity Politics" Feminist Theory (2000) 1(3), 289-308 p. 290 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid p. 297 
75 Butler J Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
76 Butler J Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" 
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is no reason to assume that there are only two genders. Insisting that there are only two 
genders leads to the inference that gender is premised on sex. As Butler argues: '[t1he 
presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic 
relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by i t., 77 
Butler reverses the sex/gender distinction, arguing that gender precedes sex. She 
argues that gender, as a discursive creation, constructs sex as prediscursive and natural: 
"Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of 
meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate 
the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are created. ... [g]ender is ... the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed nature' or 'a 
natural sex' is produced and established as 'prediscursive, ' prior to culture, a 
political neutral surface on which culture acts. 9978 
Hence, it is the binary gender system which generates the idea that there are two 
natural sexes. This leads Butler to criticise feminists, such as de Beauvoir, who insist 
on the sex/gender distinction, as this maintains the binary gender system, which in turn 
reinforces compulsory heterosexuality. She argues that: 
"[t]he institution of a compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality requires and 
regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is 
differentiated from a feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished 
through the practices of heterosexual desire. , 79 
Thus, the sex/gender distinction retains the male/female binary, which many feminists 
have strove to displace. 
One of Butler's important insights is her insistence that there is no actor behind the 
mask of gender. Whereas some postmodernists may put forward a 'weak' form of 
77 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 10 
78 Ibid., p. II 
79 Ibid., p. 30 
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postmodernism, recognising that the subject is situated in discourse '80 Butler takes the 
argument a step further, stating that I is constituted by these discourses: '... it is clearly 
not the case the "I" presides over the positions that have constituted me, shuffling 
through them instrumentally. ... The '1' who would select between them 
is always 
already constituted by them. '81 Moreover, these positions are not just discourses, but 
are '-fully embodied organizing principles of material practices and institutional 
arrangements... '. 82 Whereas some social constructionist approaches appear to 
recognise that the reality of women differs due to the existence of other differences, 
they still seem to hold on to some pre-discursive or natural concept of woman. Queer 
theory, on the other hand, completely deconstructs the notion of woman (and man) as 
a natural construct, stating that woman is nothing but a linguistic concept, a concept 
which is embedded in power relationships. This approach has been seen to call for the 
'The Death of Man': 
"Postmodernists wish to destroy all essential conceptions of human being or 
nature... In fact Man is a social, historical or linguistics artifact, not a nournenal 
or transcendental Being. .. Man is forever caught in the web of fictive 
meaning, in chains of signification, in which the subject is merely another 
position in language. " 83 
In stark contrast to the modernist notion of the self as essential and fixed, Butler argues 
that there is no autonomous self behind gender, and develops the notion of gender as 
80 see for example Benhabib S "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism" in Giddens A et al 
Polity Reader in Gender Studies [Polity Press; Cambridge; 1994] 76-92 
81 Butler J"Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodemisne' in Butler J and 
Scott JW Feminists Theorize the Political [Routledge: London; 19921 pp. 3-21 p. 9 
82 Ibid. 
83 Flax J Psychoanalysis, Feminism and Postmodemism in the Contemporary West [University of 
California Press, Berkeley, California; 1990] p. 32, cited in Benhabib S "Feminism and the Question of 
Postmodernism" p. 76 
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performativity. It is the performance of gender which constitutes an individual's 
subjectivity or identity. 'There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; 
that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be 
its results. ' 84 Gender is consider to be the '... repeated stylization of the body, a set of 
repeated acts within a rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. 85 This latter quote draws attention 
to two important facets of Butler's notion of gender as performance. 
Firstly, the performance is not a one off single action, but a repetition, as 
'-performative 'acts' must be reproduced to become efficacious. ' 86 This concept of 
gender identity as a repeated performance draws upon Derrida's notion of iterability, 
which recognises that words and terms have meanings which are cited when they are 
used. When one uses the term'woman', one is citing its previous meaning. However, 
these meanings are unstable and an utterance may not necessarily reproduce the same 
meaning. Hence, in relation to gender, gender is a repeated performance which cites 
previous performances, and has meaning due to those previous performances: 
"... performativity cannot be understood outside a process of iterability, a regularized 
,, 87 and constrained repetition of norms. However, as meaning is unstable, the effect of 
two performances may not necessarily be the same. 
Secondly, one is compelled to perform one's gender due to regulatory regime of 
compulsory heterosexuality. The repeated performance is not performed by a subject 
84 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 33 
85 Ibid., pp. 43-44 
86 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 107 
87 Ibid., p. 95 
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voluntarily, as the subject is only constituted through the repeated performance: '... this 
repetition is not performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and 
constitutes the temporal condition for the subject. 988 Butler refutes the suggestion that 
one chooses which gender to perform. Performativity does not mean that '... one woke 
in the morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, 
donned the gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night. 89 
According to Butler, gender is a compelled performance, compelled by the threat of 
punishment. Under the regulatory regime of compulsory heterosexuality, certain 
genders are rendered intelligible: .. Intelligible" genders are those which in some sense 
institute and maintain relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual 
practice, and desire. "90 Those genders which distort this coherence are culturally 
unintelligible, hence there are certain identities which cannot exist. 91 It is only through 
a repeated compelled performance that gender is produce as natural and unified. 
Once it is recognised that gender is a compelled 'effect', the arguments for retaining a 
feminist politics which is based on some stable notion of identity, such as woman, 
begin to diminish. Some commentators have expressed concern that the 
deconstructive approach of queer theory may actually lead to the death of feminism. 
Weedon states: 
"What it means to be a woman is a social and historical phenomenon. This 
move away from any fixed or essential qualities of women or femininity, which 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., p. x 
90 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 23 
91 Ibid. 
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might be thought to unite all women, is often seen as a betrayal of women and 
the feminist cause. " 92 
With such an approach, it is clear how some feminists feared the complete destruction 
of a feminist movement which posits 'woman' as its foundation. Benhabib 93 argues 
that such an approach can, however, be reconciled with postmodernism if we adopt a 
what she labels a 'weak-version'. This approach maintains that there is a pre- 
discursive I, an I which is possessed with autonomy and rationality, but it is an I which 
is 'radically situated', as opposed to transcendental and objective. The subject is 
situated within a context of various social, linguistic and discursive practices, which 
mediate and frame an individual's experiences. Hence the self is to be seen within its 
historical and cultural context. It does appear that the concept of an essential or natural 
&woman' is compatible with this 'weak-version' of postmodern. Under such an 
approach it appears that 'woman' does exist, but we have to ensure that we view her in 
her specific historical and cultural context. The problem with this approach, however, 
from a queer theory perspective, is that it retains the sex/gender distinction. Benhabib's 
notion of 'weak-postmodernism' is an example of what Nicholson labels biological 
foundationalism. Sex is used as a coat rack upon which gender (as culturally and 
historically constructed) is thrown upon. 94 
Moreover, from a queer theory perspective, the subject of feminism is actually 
produced by feminism. As Butler explains in the beginning of Gender Trouble: 
"... the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as 
'the subject' of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given 
version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be 
92 Weedon C Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist 7heory p. 175 
93 Benhabib S "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism" 
94 Nicholson L "Interpreting Gender" p. 41 
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discursively constituted by 5 the very political system that 
is supposed to 
facilitate its emancipation. "9 
Feminism actually produces the subject which it seeks to represent. Moreover, this 
woman will always be based on exclusions, some women will remain abject to the 
subject of feminism. Thus, in contrast to creating unity, separation within the 
movement occurs. Butler questions: 'Through what exclusions has the feminist subject 
been constructed, and how do those excluded domains return to haunt the 'integrity' 
and 'unity' of the feminist 'we' ? t96 Hence, whenever feminism speaks on behalf of 
women, it is at once constructing that subject and excluding other identities. Such an 
argument has significant ramifications when considering law reform proposals, as it 
needs to be recognised that every use of the term 'woman', or 'battered woman , is, 
firstly, only created by that very discourse which names it, and secondly, works to 
exclude some other women who suffer abuse. 
Butler argues that the project for feminism is to uncover the excluded subjectivities 
which the woman of feminism is based upon: '... the task is to inteffogate what the 
theoretical move that establishes foundations authorizes, and what precisely it excludes 
or forecloses. *97 Butler does, however, recognise that the use of the term 'woman' is 
politically necessary and efficacious. Nevertheless, feminism also needs to accept that 
'... the minute that the category of women is invoked as describing the constituency for 
which feminism speaks, an internal debate invariably begins over what the descriptive 
content of that term will be. ' 98 This appears to require the necessity to firstly be 
95 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 4 
96 Butler J "Contingent Foundations" p. 14 
97 Ibid., p. 7 
98 Ibid., p. 15 
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aware of the exclusionary nature of any identity category and secondly, to constantly 
revisit the description of 'woman', which has been constructed. 
In response to the work of Judith Butler, attempts have been made to reconcile the 
constructed and constituted nature of woman and the need for a feminist politics which 
actually represents women. One such attempt is provided by Iris Marion Young. She 
advances the notion of 'Gender as Seriality'99 which adopts Sartre's concept of 
seriality 100 in order to solve the following perceived dilemma in feminist politics: 
'[w]e want and need to describe women as a group, yet it appears that we cannot do so 
without being normalizing and essentialist. '101 This argument proposes a conception 
of gender which is anti-essentialist, in that it avoids the requirement that women must 
share common characteristics and does not rely on self-identity. In particular, she 
distinguishes between a social group and a series. Whereas a group is composed of 
individuals who are knowingly united towards a collective aim or goal, a series is a 
number of individuals, a social collective, who are brought together or united passively 
due to the existence of some objective material fact which orientates their actions. 
They are not united through some shared identity, but due to their relation with a 
material object, or what Sartre calls pratico-inert objects. A very simplistic example 
used by Young is that of a queue of people waiting for a bus. Whereas they do not 
identify which each other or share some essential commonality, they are passively 
linked by their actions towards an objective materiality - the bus. This approach can be 
99 Young IM "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective" in Nicholson L and 
Seidman S Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics pp. 187-215 
100 see Sartre, J-P 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' Trans Smith A S, ed Ere J [New Left Books; London; 
1976] cited Ibid. 
101 Young IM "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective" p. 197 
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applied to women who suffer domestic violence, and those women who kill their 
abusive partners. Women who suffer violence are passively connected by the actions 
of the abusers, the existence of agencies which offer help, the police and the courts. 
Some women may form a self conscious group in order campaign about this issue, but 
many women will remain in the series. In relation to women who kill their abusive 
partners, a series is formed due to the objective materiality of their actions, their 
treatment by the courts and the conviction they receive. In this sense, two series 
emerge: those who are passively connected by a conviction for manslaughter and those 
who are passively connected by a conviction for murder. However, the women who 
are part of these series may have very little in common apart from the objective 
materiality of killing their abusive partners and their treatment by the legal system. 
From these series self-conscious groups emerge: such as Justice for Women and 
Southall Black Sisters. 
Although Butler's work has had a major impact on feminist and gender theory, it has 
also been strongly criticised by both feminist and other academics. Arguments 
presented against Butler are summed up in an article by Nussbaum. 102 In addition to 
criticising Butler's writing style, which is described as teasing and exasperating, she is 
very critical of Butler's use of parody as political action and her '-proud neglect of 
the material side of life. ' 103 For Butler, one of the aims of feminism is to produce 
subversive gender identities. This is to be achieved through the use of parody, Butler 
states that '[t]he task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat. "04 And such a 
102 Nussbaum M C"The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler: The Professor of Parody" (1999) (Feb) 22 The 
New Republic 1999 (Feb), 37-45 
103 Ibid p. 43 
104 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 189 
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parodic repetition would work to expose the '... illusion of gender identity as an 
intractable depth and inner substance. "05 However, as Nussbaum states: 
"[P]arodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful tenured 
academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the 
symbolic, her proud neglect for the material side of life, becomes a fatal 
blindness. For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, 
raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however parodically, the conditions 
of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating and rape. " 106 
I would agree with Nussbaum on this point. It is very difficult to see how parodic 
performance of gender can be of any assistance to those women who eventually kill 
their partners after suffering years of horrific abuse. However, such a criticism should 
not be taken to suggest that Butler's work has no relevance to the concrete situation of 
women. In her insistence that gender is a performance (which is illustrated by the 
potential of parody) Butler makes it possible to question the forms of femininity and 
masculinity which are constructed as natural by the law and the judiciary. If gender is 
a performance, any stereotypical reaction to abuse is also a performance, it is not a 
natural reaction as such, and thus one can question the law's insistence on requiring 
women (and men) to react in a certain manner. Such an approach also cautions 
feminists when producing law reform proposals. As many reform proposals relating to 
women who kill suggest that certain reactions should be either excused or justified, 
they also appear to construct some reactions as 'natural' and therefore correct. Butler 
states: 
"... feminism ought to be careful not to idealize certain expressions of gender 
that, in turn, produces forms of hierarchy and exclusion. In particular, I 
[oppose] those regimes of truth that stipulate[] that certain kinds of gendered 
expressions were found to be false or derivative, and others, true and 
original. "107 
105 Ibid., p. 187 
106 Nussbaum M C"The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler: The Professor of Parody" p. 43 
107 Butler J Gender Trouble p. viii 
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Nussbaum also argues that parody and subversive performances can be used in a 
manner which may wield harmful consequences. It may be used by those within 
positions of privilege to perpetuate oppression and discrimination and this is due, she 
argues, to Butler's failure to advance '... a normative theory of social justice and 
human dignity. ' 108 Butler fails to provide any indication as to which performance will 
have a positive subversive effect, a requirement which Nussbaum seems to demand. 
Butler, however, addresses this issue in her preface to the second edition of Gender 
Trouble. 109 She states that her project is not a prescription along the lines of 
6 ... subvert gender in the way that I say, and life will be good. '110 Indeed 
for Butler, a 
judgement which delineates the subversive from the non-subversive performances is 
bound to fail as, firstly, any judgement would be made out of context, and secondly, 
such judgements would fail to survive over time: 'U]ust as metaphors lose their 
metaphoricity as they congeal through time into concepts, so subversive performances 
always run the risk of becoming deadening cliches through their repetition... '. 1' 1 
Hence, for Butler, the aim is not to indicate the subversive value of any performance, 
as its very subversive nature may wane over time. Butler states that her main concern 
is to expose what constitutes '... an intelligible life, ' and '... how... presumptions about 
normative gender and sexuality determine in advance what will qualify as the 'human' 
and the 'liveable', 112 a project which has been continued in her recent work on 
Violence, Mourning and Politics. 113 
log Nussbaum MC "The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler: The Professor of Parody" p. 42 
109 Butler J Gender Trouble 
110 Ibid., p. xxi 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid p. xxii 
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Butler is also criticised for failing to adequately deal with the body. Within feminist 
and gender theory two polarised views of the role played by the biological body in the 
construction of gender identity have emerged. On the one hand, gender identity is 
considered to be an effect of our biological bodies, an approach which is generally 
considered to be essentialist. On the other hand, any link between the body and 
identity or subjectivity is severed, and identity is considered to be socially constructed 
as opposed to biologically constructed. This latter approach regards bodies '... as 
blank sheets which either via social practices of segregation or the operation of layers 
of cultural meaning, are turned into gendered subjects. " 14 In relation to Butler, it is 
through the repeated performed acts of gender that the body is styled as either male or 
female. The sex of the body is not a natural phenomenon, from which gender identity 
flows, it is, rather, the gender identity which constitutes the sex of the body. The body 
is regulated and produced by discourses. Additionally, we can only view bodies 
through the lens of existing discourse, we can not view them or think about them in 
their 'natural' state. An approach which presents the body as a social construct, 
however, fails to comprehend the reality of the body, that we are embodied beings. 
We are both enabled and limited by our bodies. In particular, the body has a 
significant role for the abused woman. In addition to psychological violence, women 
suffer bodily injury, both physical and sexual. The pain and injuries they suffer are not 
constructions, but a reality. Butler recognises the existence of this issue, as she 
acknowledges the query: '... surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep, feel pain, 
pleasure; endure illness and'violence; and these facts ... cannot be dismissed as mere 
113 Butler J Violence, Politics and Mourning Paper presented at UCL 8 March 2002 
114 Alsop R et al Theorising Gender [Polity Press; Oxford; 200 1]p. 214 
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construction. ' 115 When one is considering the construction of a woman's identity who 
is abused, it is important to remember that she suffers real bodily injury, although the 
abused body can only be viewed via regulatory norms. The body is always mediated. 
Butler, in Bodies that Matter, 116 addresses the issue of bodies through the notion of 
materialization, as she attempts to 'link the question materiality of the body to the 
performativity of gender'. ' 17 When analysing the materiality of the body, Butler 
focuses on sexual difference, which is considered by many to be a natural biological 
fact. Butler however, drawing upon Foucault, argues that sex is never a '-simple fact 
, 118 or static condition of the body... . Sex is also a regulatory ideal, a nonn, which 
actually '-produces the bodies it governs..., 119 and bodies are compelled to 
materialize the norms of sex, a process which is never complete. Bodies are always in 
the process of materializing, they are an effect of power. Power produces the body: 
"What constitutes the fixity of the body, its contours, its movements, will be 
fully material, but materiality will be rethought as the effect of power, as 
power's most productive effect. And there will be no way to understand 
"gender" as a cultural construct which is imposed upon the surface or matter, 
understood either as "the body" or its given sex. Rather, once "sex" itself is 
understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable 
apart from the materialization of that regulatory norm. "120 
Hence, although the body is material, it is a real thing, not just a construct, the body 
itself, its shape and movements, are produced by power, through the regulatory ideal of 
sex which impacts upon the body, and bodies are always in the process of 
115 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. xi 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., p. I 
118 Ibid., p. 2 
119 Ibid., p. 1 
120 Ibid. 
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materialising the norm of sex. The body is not a site or surface which simply bears 
constructions, such as gender, but is actually itself socially constructed. And as the 
body is in a process of materialization, the regulatory regime of sex produces some 
bodies which are culturallY intelligible, and some bodies which are not. 
The main concern for Butler, through her notion of gender as performativity and 
materialization, is to uncover which lives are constructed as culturally intelligible, and 
those which are not. This is a concern which is carried forward to this thesis, and 
whilst examining the identity categories used by the courts, attention will be paid to 
which identities are considered or constructed as intelligible, and which identities are 
excluded. 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced one of the underlying theoretical premises for the thesis: 
gender theory, or more specifically, queer theory and the work of Judith Butler. The 
concept of gender as perfonnativity is central to the close reading of the Zoora Shah 
case the retrial of Diana Butler. Moreover, the chapter on Zoora Shah will also 
consider issues relating to post-colonial theory, race and performativity. The 
discussion regarding to the use of identity categories, and their potential to be 
exclusionary and essentialising are particularly relevant to the next chapter on Theories 
of Justice and will be developed in more detail in the relevant chapters. 
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THEORIES OF JUSTICE 
Iris Marion Young and the Law: Towards a Theory of Social Justice 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the theory of justice which will be used as part of the 
theoretical framework to scrutinise the law's treatment of women who kill their 
abusive partners. In particular, a distinction is drawn between 'legal justice', which 
tends to be concerned with the correct and equal application of the law, and 'social 
justice', which provides an evaluative standard by which to assess the defences to 
murder and the judicial construction of women who kill. It is argued that an appeal to 
legal justice retains the sameness/difference impasse which has been reached within 
feminist theory, both legal and otherwise. Legal justice is based upon a comparison 
between men who kill their partners and women who kill their partners, and hence 
tends to focus on the perceived differences, or otherwise, between men and women. It 
is argued that whereas this focus has been vital to emphasising the diversity in the 
law's treatment of men and women, what is needed now is a consideration of the 
wider issue of social justice, and a recognition of the differences which exist between 
women. To this end, the chapter draws upon Iris Marion Young's concept of social 
justi ce, I but also submits Young's approach to a critique from the perspective of queer 
theory. 
Justice is a term that frequently arises in literature concerning women who kill their 
abusive partners. For example, an article which discusses the law's treatment of 
Emma Humphreys, and questions the differential treatment men and women who kill 
1 See Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference 
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their partners receive, leads with the headline 'A Gender Scale of Justice. ' 2 In relation 
to the case of Zoora Shah another newspaper article reported that the foreman of the 
jury which convicted Zoora for murder, stated that fresh evidence indicated that her 
3 conviction was 'unjust'. I argue that the main approach which has been adopted by 
feminists and those who campaign on behalf of battered women is a comparative 
approach. Natasha Walter, writing in The Independent, 4 presented an argument 
highlighting the injustice suffered by Zoora Shah. This was accomplished with 
reference to the case of David Hampson, who was convicted of manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility, and was imprisoned for six years. In contrast, 
Zoora Shah is serving a life sentence for murder. Hampson killed his wife due to her 
'nagging', indeed she is described by the judge as a 'nagging bitch' and the judge 
stated that he had been provoked by her 'calculated' behaviour. Zoora Shah, on the 
other hand, suffered sexual, physical and mental abuse for a number of years, and the 
Court of Appeal branded her a liar, who had no self respect. One cannot doubt the 
claim that this affronts our sense of justice, and cases such as this suggest that the 
judiciary and the criminal justice system tend to be both sexist and racist. The 
argument that the law and the criminal justice system is sexist is based upon the 
consideration that the treatment and outcome of cases involving battered women who 
kill is at variance with cases involving men who kill their partners. Hence it is 
considered that the law is applied unequally and inconsistently and this amounts to an 
2 Campbell D, "A Gender Scale of Justice" 77ze Guardian, 9 March 1998 G2 p. 2 
3 Wainwright M, "Verdict against abused Asian Woman was 'Unjust'. " The Guardian, 30 September 
1998 p. 12 
4 Walter N '7hey both killed their partners. But which one got life? " The Independent I November 
1999, p. 5 
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injustice. I argue that this perceived injustice is based on an appeal to a narrow notion 
of 'legal'justice which excludes a consideration of a wider 'social justice'. 
Legal Justice 
Although the term legal justice may be open to a number of different interpretations, 
this thesis adopts a construction which maintains that legal justice is achieved when 
the law is applied correctly. Such a concept of legal justice is based upon the natural 
law requirement that like cases are treated alike and therefore thus requires equality. 
Lloyd formulates this requirement into three principles: 
"1. That there shall be rules laying down how people are to be treated in given 
cases; 
2. that such rules shall be general in character, that they shall provide that 
everyone who qualifies as falling within the scope of the rule shall be 
governed by it; 
3. justice requires that these general rules shall be applied impartially, applied 
without discrimination, or fear or favour, to all those whose cases fall within 
the scope of the rules. "5 
It is generally considered that the necessity of impartiality flows from the requirement 
of equality. In order for judges to apply the law equally and treat like cases alike, they 
must be impartial and disregard personal emotions. Thus justice is considered to be a 
cold virtue. Justice is impartial, dispassionate, impersonal, and unemotional. As 
stated by Perelman: '... the machine is without passion. ' 6 The judge may only 
justifiably take into consideration those characteristics/circumstances which are 
determined to be legally relevant to the case in question. 7 This is clearly represented 
by the allegory of justice: a blindfolded woman holding the scales of justice. Heller 
5 Lloyd D The Idea of Law [Penguin; London; 199 1] pg 121 
6 Perelman CH The Idea ofJustice and the Logic ofArgument p. 62 
7 see Buchanan and Mathieu 'Philosophy and Justice' in Cohen ed Justice: Views from the Social 
Sciences [Plenum Press; London; 19861 pp. 11-45 p. 16 
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contrasts this with the image of dynamic or substantive justice, which is represented 
by Gitto in the chapel of Arena: 
"Justice appears here as a queen holding a statute in both hands, the angel of 
war and the angel of peace, the latter being heavier that the former. And the 
figure is not blindfolded; her eyes look forward, into the future. " 8 
The requirement of impartiality is, furthermore, associated with the search for a 
universal, objective, transcendental standpoint, 'a view from nowhere', which can be 
obtained by any rational person. 9 Hence, the ability to judge impartially is seen to be 
the 'hallmark of moral reason'. 10 
Thus, legal justice, is objective, impartial, and is concerned solely with the equal and 
correct application of the law. This can be linked with the rule of law which eschews 
subjectivity, as noted by Douzinas and Warrington, '... the main requirement of the 
rule of law in its contemporary version of legality is that all subjective and relative 
value should be excluded from the operation of the legal system. "' Furthermore, the 
law dictates the relevant characteristics or circumstances which are used to categorise 
individuals. The defence of provocation provides an example of this. The defence 
requires the existence of three elements: i) provocative conduct ii) loss of self control 
on the part of the accused; and iii) the provocation must be sufficient so as to cause a 
reasonable person to act in the same manner. Any defendant charged with murder 
who displays such attributes should be subject to this defence. If the rules are applied 
8 Heller A Beyond Justice p. 10 
9 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 112 
10 Ibid., pg 99 
11 Douzinas C and Warrington R Justice Miscarried Ethics and Aesthetics in Law [Harvester 
Wheatsheaf; London; 1994] p. 150 
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impartially, then legal justice is achieved. This form of justice requires the law to be 
objective and universal, as it must be applicable to all. Thus problems arise when the 
defence is, in reality, based on male characteristics. 
In appealing to legal justice when considering cases of battered women who kill, the 
major concern is with the application of the law. In comparing women and men who 
kill their partners, and claiming that an injustice has been committed, the accusation is 
that there is a lack of equality between the two. In cases in which the battered woman 
receives a conviction for manslaughter it appears that justice has been achieved, due 
to the equal application of the law. This approach suggests that battered women share 
the same essential characteristics as those men who kill their partners, and hence they 
should be subject to the same criminal defences. They fall within the same group, and 
thus different treatment, for example when a woman receives a murder conviction and 
a man is convicted for manslaughter, amounts to double standards. The essential 
characteristics, or perhaps properly referred to as circumstances, can be classified as a 
domestic homicide which takes place after severe or prolonged provocation or in 
mitigating circumstances. In a legal context, this, it is suggested, places the female 
and male defendant in the same group, and hence requires equality of treatment. Like 
cases should be treated as alike. There are a number of cases which do indicate that 
battered women are receiving similar treatment to their male counterparts, and thus 
legal justice. In the cases of Rv Gardner, 12 Rv Grainger 13 and Rv Howell, 14 for 
example, the women were convicted for manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, 
12 [1992] 14 Cr App R (S) 364 
13 [ 199711 Cr App R (S) 271 
14 [ 199811 Cr App R (S) 229 
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a partial defence which is generally used for, and indeed was developed to deal with, 
cases in which husbands kill their wives on finding that she is or has been unfaithful. 
There is also a plethora of cases in which a battered woman has received a conviction 
for manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility (which is based upon 
mental impairment) one such case is that of Rv Hobson. 15 
Arguments based on equality of treatment are undoubtedly valid, and when one 
considers the difference between Zoora Shah and David Hampson, appealing to 
justice in its legal sense sends a clear message about the bias of the criminal justice 
system. A problem arises, however, on three levels. Firstly, this conception is very 
narrow, due to its exclusive interest with procedure and legal application. This 
conception which has received criticism from some feminists, as presenting itself as a 
universal view, while it is, in reality, a masculine conception of justice. Secondly, this 
conception does not itself criticise the law or offer any guidance as to the construction 
of relevant differences, and thirdly, it does not enable us to evaluate those cases in 
which this legal justice is achieved. 
In relation to the first criticism, some feminists assert that there are different male and 
female conceptions of justice. One of the main proponents of a female conception of 
the justice is Carol Gilligan, 16 who argues that women have a different style of moral 
15 [ 1998] 1 Cr App R 31 
16 Gilligan C In A Different Voice, Psychological Theory and Women's Development [Harvard 
University Press; London; 19961. Gilligan's theory was developed from the moral judgements of two 
eleven year old children, a boy named Jake and a girl named Amy. Gilligan presented them with the 
same moral dilemma, the dilemma of a man named Heinz who can not afford to buy a drug which is 
needed to save the life of his wife. Both are asked whether Heinz should steal the drug. Gilligan 
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reasoning to men. The resulting different standpoints are then related to formulations 
of justice. legal justice, with its insistence on impartiality, neutrality and objectivity, is 
based on masculine attributes. In contrast to this, a more female centred concept of 
justice focuses upon notions of responsibility, care and connection. 17 The ideal of 
impartiality is scrutinised by Young, 18 in her attempt to provide a notion of social 
justice which can be utilised by social groups fighting against oppression. The 
requirement of equality necessitates the judge focusing on those factors which are 
legally deemed to be relevant. All other considerations are immaterial, thus requiring 
an impartial application of the rules. Young argues that this approach denies or 
represses difference in three ways. 19 Firstly, impartiality requires a situation to be 
reduced to a common essence, which entails a rejection of particularity. Secondly, it 
denies multiple forms of feeling, as dispassion rejects desire or affection. In order to 
be impartial, the reasoner must disassociate the entity from the particular concrete 
situation, this requires '... abstracting from the particularity of bodily being, its needs 
and inclinations, and from the feelings that attach to the experienced particularity of 
things and events. ' 20 Thirdly, subjectivity is reduced from a plural to a single essence, 
as the impartial reasoner is searching for a universal, transcendental point of view, 
which is attainable by any rational individual, hence denying the individuality of the 
reasoner. Furthermore, Young argues that impartiality is impossible '... because the 
argues that their answers (Jake, yes; Amy, no) were reached via very different moral reasoning. The 
two forms of moral reasoning are then presented as 'male' and 'female'. 
17 Daly K 'ýCriminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions 
about Justice" Int Journal of the Sociology of Law (1989) 14,1-18 pg I 
18 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference 
19 Ibid., pg 100-101 
20 Ibid., pg 100 
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particularities of context and affiliation cannot and should not be removed from moral 
reasoning. ' 21 Every situation is placed within a specific social and historical context, 
and these need to be understood before a moral judgement can be made. 22 
Furthermore, it is argued that moral judgements are only made by those who have an 
interest in the outcome of a situation. 
Young argues that impartiality relies on a logic of identity, that is premised on a 
construction of reason which amounts to '... an urge to think things together, to reduce 
them to unity. s23 In order to attain this unity a commonality is searched for: '[fleason 
seeks essence, a single formula that classifies concrete particulars as inside or outside 
a category, something common to all things that belong in the category. ' 24 One can 
clearly observe the connection between this construction of reason and the notion of 
formal justice as equality discussed above. An observation which is unsurprising, due 
to the connection made between justice and reason or rationality. 25 The logic of 
identity constructs stable categories and aims to bring within this category a number 
of entities or situations by focusing on their similarities. One can compare this to the 
law, especially the criminal law, which constructs certain actions or circumstances as 
either a criminal act or a defence, and then, through the process of the impartial judge, 
judges those which fall within such categories. This approach, however, denies the 
situatedness and particularity of the specific situation. As Young states: '... the urge to 
21 Ibid., pg 97 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., pg 98 
24 Ibid. 
25 see Perelman CH Justice Law and Argument 
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bring [situations or entities] into unity under a category or principle necessarily entails 
expelling some of the properties of the entities or situations. ' 26 
The aim of the logic of identity is necessarily unsuccessful due to its failure to 
recognise that, in reality, situations and entities as well as being different, share 
similarities, and thus they are neither completely identical nor opposed. Moreover, 
difference is vital to the understanding and the definition of concepts: '[n]o utterance 
can have meaning unless it stands out differentiated from another. ' 27 Hence the 
meaning of the term man is dependent on the term woman. Thus differences should 
not be rendered Other by a'process which is a fiction. As opposed to creating unity, 
the logic of identity is seen to create dichotomies and binary oppositions. Whilst 
attempting to bring within a category all those subjectivities which contain a common 
essence, the logic of impartiality turns those that are merely different into an absolute 
Other. 'Difference thus becomes a hierarchical opposition between what lies inside 
and outside the category, valuing more what lies inside than what lies outside. ' 28 In 
order to compensate for this failure, the logic of identity rejects differences which 
cannot be assimilated with the impartial ideal. Thus differences are constructed as 
'Other' to the impartial ideal. 
This masculine concept of the rule of law and legal justice is considered to have failed 
to '-fulfil its promise of equality. P29 Indeed there is now much discussion on 
26 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 99 
27 Ibid., p. 98 
28 Ibid., p. 102 
29 O'Donovan K 'Engendering Justice: Women's Perspectives and the Rule of Law' Uni of Toronto 
Law Journal (1989) 39,127-148 
89 
whether the law can, in its present form, provide a solution to the problems of sex 
discrimination. Iaw is seen to both advance and deny women's claims to equality. It 
is argued that law, under the guise of neutrality, actually maintains the status quo. 
This is achieved through its ability to define the boundaries and state which 
characteristics or circumstances are relevant or irrelevant. 30 Young categorises this as 
one of the '... ideological functions of the ideal of impartiality... ' 31 which works to 
reproduce relations of domination and oppression. Law is considered to be impartial, 
in that it corresponds to the general interest of a society and has equal application. 
Law is not based on one particular standpoint. Hence, for justice to be achieved, the 
judge merely has to apply the law impartially. This is, however, a fallacy. 
Impartiality involves a universalisation of the particular. The privileged groups in 
society constructs their standpoint and characteristics to be normal and impersonal. 
Young states: 
'The situated assumptions and commitments that derive from particular 
histories, experiences, and affiliations rush to fill the vacuum created by 
counterfactual abstraction; but now they are asserted as "objective" 
assumptions about human nature or moral psychology. " 32 
In addition, insistence on the possibility of impartiality enables the privileged group to 
deny that their characteristics and standpoint are, in fact, situated and particular, as 
opposed to objective and nonnal. 33 
This in turn silences and oppresses those who are different. This can be seen to be 
extremely prevalent in case of women who kill their abusive partners. Via the 
30 Ibid., pp. 129-130 
31 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 112 
32 Ibid., p. 115 
33 Ibid., p. 116 
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'objective' definitions of provocation and self defence, law denies the woman's claim 
that she acted under either severe provocation or in fear for her life, and instead labels 
her as a murderer or as suffering from a mental disorder. The legally relevant 
circumstances silence her perception of the situation. Through such approaches we 
can identify the power relations hidden inside the concept of justice. If a conviction 
for manslaughter requires the court to construct a female defendant her actions as 
based on mental instability or mental illness, this 'legal justice' perpetuates the 
domination and oppression of women, by reinforcing negative stereotypes of gender. 
It is not without significance that these difficulties arise due to the fundamental role 
played by the notions of equality and impartiality in the concept of 'legal' justice. 
Furthermore, the difficulties are reinforced by the comparative approach taken by 
some legal feminists 34 when analysing the achievement of justice for battered women 
who kill. As mentioned above, although such a comparative approach is strategically 
useful for highlighting the sexist nature of the law and the criminal justice system, it is 
based on an assimilationist approach, which requires the denial of difference. In order 
for the law, however, to construct the battered woman's experience to fit within the 
existing defence categories, thus achieving equal application of the law and treating 
like cases as like, recourse to psychiatric evidence is made. In this sense the 
achievement of justice involves a negotiation. 
By maintaining that battered women should receive equal treatment to men who kill 
their partners, feminists who adopt this position are neglecting the specific nature of 
34 See for example Justice for Women Information Pack 2ed; Bandalli S "Battered wives and 
provocation", Bandalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note" McColgan A "General Defences" 
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the battered woman's situation. Focus needs to be placed solely on cases of women 
who kill. With the law at present, the battered woman is in a perpetual state of 
Otherness. On a conviction of murder, she becomes Other to those to whom she is 
compared - male defendants who kill their partners - as she falls outside the defence 
categories which are considered to be objective and universal, whereas he falls within. 
Or she receives a conviction for manslaughter with the aid of psychiatric evidence, 
and thus becomes Other as she falls outside the universal categories of rationality and 
reason. What is required is a substantive notion of justice which enables the existing 
legal defences to be criticised and which provides assistance for constructing law 
reform and new defences. Thus, although in one sense justice is seen to exist in 
conformity to the law, it also needs to be recognised that the law itself can, and 
perhaps should, be subjected to other external and independent methods of evaluation. 
The standard of the law itself must also be just, as Perelman cites , '[t]rue 
justice ... consists not in the correct application of a rule, but in the correct application 
of a just rule. ' 35 In addition to this, it is also necessary to have a notion of justice 
which offers guidance on the relevant and irrelevant characteristics. As stated by 
Campbell 'A theory of justice must...., be able to identify and connect the reasons for 
differential treatment which have distinctively to do with justice. 36 
Social Justice 
Perhaps the most famous theory of social justice is that forwarded by Rawls. 37 Rawls' 
conception of justice is based on a social contract. The basic rules of justice are those 
35 Perelman CH The Idea ofJustice p. 45 
36 Campbell T Justice p. 34 
37 Rawls JA Theory ofJustice 
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which would be agreed to by those in the original position when placed behind a veil 
of ignorance. This veil would prevent the individuals from knowing their individual 
characteristics and their position in society. Hence the subsequent rules would, 
theoretically, have the greatest benefit to those who have the least, or, as explained by 
Richards '... the best worst result is secured: the minimum is maximized. *38 Without 
considering in the detail the criticisms of Rawls' theory, 39 it might suffice to state that, 
as his theory concentrates invariably on the distribution of social and economic goods, 
it offers little assistance for the present project. Indeed the majority of the theories 
which deal with social justice concentrate on the distribution of material goods, and 
hence cannot be used to evaluate the requirements of legal defences or the use of 
psychiatric evidence in relation to women who kill their abusive partners. To this 
end, Young's approach to social justice will be adopted. 
Iris Marion Young's Conception Of Social justice 
Young examines the claims of injustice which are forwarded by subordinate social 
movements, noting how the contemporary theories of social justice have little to offer 
these groups. As argued above, notions of impartiality and equality, in fact, lead to 
the assimilation with the dominant groups construction of objective reality, and thus 
render 'Other' those social groups with different characteristics. Furthennore, 
Young notes that the majority of social justice theories are based on the distribution of 
38 Richards DJA "Justice and Equality" in Regan and Van Deveer And Justice For All: New 
Introductory Essays in Ethics and Public Policy [Rowman and Littlefield; Totowa; 1982] 241-263, p. 
250 
39 see for example Barry B The Liberal Theory of Justice [Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1973] Daniels N 
ed Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls'A Theory of Justice [Blackwell; Oxford; 19751 Wolff R 
P Understanding Rawls [Princeton University Press; Princeton, NJ; 1977] 
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material goods, and this fails to evaluate critically the context and structure of 
institutions and society. 40 Young 41 recognises that there are some theories of social 
justice which do consider the distribution of non-material goods, such as: 'prestige 
and self-respect'. 42 and 'productive tasks, opportunities for development, citizenship, 
authority and honour', 43 however, these tend to be misleading and inadequate. 
Applying the logic of distribution to such non-material effects overextends the 
principle of distribution, as it constructs as 'things' those aspects which are better 
described as relations and rules, hence yielding a deceptive image of those issues with 
which justice is concerned. This can be explained through the notion of rights. Young 
explains: 
"[r]ights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions. Rights are relationships 
not things; they are institutionally defined rules specifying what people can do 
in relation to one another. Rights refer to doing more than having, to social 
relationships that enable or constrain actions. , 44 
From this example, it can be seen how such an approach shifts the analysis from those 
processes which generate rights and the distribution of rights, to the outcome of this 
distribution. 45 In order to understand how rights, opportunities and power are 
distributed among the society one must be able to analyse and evaluate the processes 
and rules which have an impact on their patterns of 'distribution'. Moreover, this 
distributive idea of social justice tends to construct individuals as 'atoms', who 
develop their characteristics and capacities independently of the social context, as 
40 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference pp. 21-22 
41 Ibid., p. 24 
42 Miller D Social Justice [Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1976] 
43 Galston W Justice and the Human Good [University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1980] 
44 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 25 
45 Ibid., p. 28 
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opposed to recognising that individuals are also a product of the social rules and 
processes. Hence it is necessary to have a concept of social justice which evaluates 
processes in addition to, but not excluding, outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, substantive justice is generally concerned with outcomes, and 
formal or legal justice is concerned with the correct application of rules and 
procedures. What Young develops is a notion of justice which enables one to 
evaluate the production of those rules and procedures and the outcomes which ensue. 
Domination and Oppression 
Young argues that social justice should be able to deal with issues of domination and 
oppression, as opposed to solely concentrating on distribution of social and economic 
goods. The general concept of justice on which she bases her analysis is premised on 
a communicative ethic, in that the concern of justice focuses upon participation in 
decision making. She argues for a fully participatory democracy, where all 
individuals are able to be involved in the political decision making processes. The 
main regard of social justice is, in Young's conception, enabling. Justice is concerned 
with the '... institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of 
individual's capacities and collective communication and cooperation" 46 in addition 
to distribution. Domination and oppression are cited as the two main 'disabling 
constraintst, 47 and thus amount to injustice. It is this definition of injustice that 
provides a substantive theory which can be used to criticise the existing law, legal 
procedures and case outcomes. If the approaches adopted in cases of battered women 
46 Ibid., p. 39 
47 Ibid. 
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who kill lead to the existence of domination and oppression, then they can be seen to 
perpetrate an injustice, despite the achievement of legal justice. It is clear how these 
cases have a significant impact on women as a whole, as they enhance the barriers 
against women's full participation in society. 
Young recognises that oppression extends beyond those societies which are ruled by 
tyranny, but also refers to the '... everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal 
society. 48 Oppression, in addition to being structural and institutionalised, also 
manifests within '... unquestioned norms, habits and symbols. '49Hence injustice can 
flow from the '... unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in 
ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes.. in short, the normal processes of 
everyday life. 950 In adopting this 'extended structural' definition of oppression, Young 
embraces a Foucauldian conception of the relationship of oppression, recognising that 
it does not necessarily require a 'dyadic relationship' between the oppressor and the 
oppressed. 51 Injustice can be perpetuated by those who simply go about their 
everyday life, and who do not see themselves as 'agents of oppression. ' 52 Hence it is 
stated that oppression and injustice will not simply be eradicated merely by reforming 
the law. This is a significant point, which understands that change other than legal 
change is necessary, a point which is agreed upon within this research. Although it is 
important to provide an adequate legal response to cases involving women who kill, it 
is also necessary to deal with the problem of domestic violence outside, as well as 
48 Ibid., p. 41 
49 Ibid., p. 41 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., pp. 41-42 
52 Ibid. 
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inside, the criminal justice system. A major factor is changing society's perception of 
and response to women who suffer domestic violence, as is being tackled by women's 
groups such as Zero Tolerance. 
Young argues that all oppressed social groups share a common essence, in that they 
are restricted or unable to express their feelings or needs and are unable to enhance 
adequately and employ their abilities. Nevertheless, it is recognised that locating a 
common source of oppression or domination is unfeasible, and indeed any such search 
has invariably developed into '-fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more 
fundamental or more grave. ' 53 With this in mind, Young develops a five-fold 
conception of social justice: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, which relate 
primarily to the social division of labour, and cultural imperialism and violence, 
which concern other social relations. In particular, it is the latter two notions which 
are of relevance to this thesis. Cultural imperialism refers to the process by which the 
dominant or privileged group within society construct their specific characteristics, 
standpoints and perspectives as normal, neutral and universal, whilst at the same time 
essentialising, stereotyping, 'Othering' and rendering invisible the perspectives of 
other social groups. The dominant group use their own perspectives as an objective 
norm which social groups are measured against and those who differ are 
6 reconstructed largely as deviant and [inferior]'. 54 Hence the oppressed group: 
"... find themselves defined from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network 
of dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those 
,, 55 with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them. 
53 Ibid., p. 40 
54 Ibid., p. 59 
55 Ibid. 
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Such cultural imperialism is reinforced by the ideal of impartiality, as it also involves 
'... the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture, and its 
establishment as the norm. ' 56 The ideal of impartiality is based on the characteristics 
of the dominant group. 
Violence as a form of social injustice refers not simply to an act of violence itself, but 
also includes its social context and the manner in which it is frequently justified (she 
asked for it) and tolerated. Furthermore, it is systemic, as it is directed towards 
certain individuals simply because they are member of a specific social group. Young 
relates this form of oppression to cultural imperialism, asserting that violence 
frequently occurs due to an attempt on behalf of the oppressed group to 'assert their 
own subjectivity' through rejecting the construction imposed upon them by the 
dominant group. 57 
The main argument is that the experiences and reactions of battered women are 
constructed within the law from an outside perspective, a perspective which draws 
upon stereotypes of women as mentally unstable or mentally ill. This is achieved 
primarily through the use of defences such as diminished responsibility and the use of 
expert evidence, especially the use of the battered woman syndrome. This can be seen 
to be a form of cultural imperialism. In such a situation, although a battered woman 
may receive justice in the form of 'treating like alike', a wider social injustice has 
been perpetrated. In addition to cultural imperialism, the social injustice of violence 
occurs when a woman who kills her abusive partner and receives a conviction for 
56 Ibid., p. 61 
57 Ibid., pp. 61-63 
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murder. This can be seen as legitimating and justifying the domestic violence she 
suffered. 
The Possibility of a Postmodern Social justice? 
Although adopting a model of social justice provides a framework with which to 
scrutinise the existing law, it arguably contradicts the deconstructive tendencies of 
queer theory, as examined in the last chapter. As argued by Naussbaum, 58 Judith 
Butler appears to abandon a concern with universal notions such as rights, equality 
and justice. This abandonment is not, however, particular to queer theory, but a 
symptom of the influence of postmodernism and poststructuralism. More generally, 
as Harvey states: '[t]he effect of the poststructuralist critique of universalism has been 
to render any application of social justice problematic. '59 Harvey recognises that the 
application of any universal standard to a range of heterogeneous situations will 
necessarily amount to injustice in some particular circumstances. However, there also 
appears to be a reluctance to abandon an appeal to some form of normative or moral 
standard, as the complete rejection of any such standards may lead to the situation 
where 'anything goes'. Nevertheless, as Conaghan recognises, the fear of using any 
normative or moral value has crept into the domain of legal feminism, and this has 
had negative repercussions for the transformative aspect of feminist work. Conaghan 
notes with surprise the: 
66 ... coyness demonstrated by many feminists confronted with the normative impulses which fuel their scholarly efforts. There is a detectable lack of 
enthusiasm in contemporary feminism for critical self-reflection about the 
58 Nussbaum MC "The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler: The Professor of Parody" 
59 Harvey D "Class Relations, Social Justice and the Politics of Difference" p. 95 
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moral or ethical values lurking in the shadows of feminist theoretical 
engagement. , 60 
Conaghan locates this reticence in the postmodern notion that any norm or standard 
necessarily amounts to a coercive regulatory ideal. Legal feminism is reluctant to use 
normative values which tend to conflict with postmodern tendencies. Thus it has to 
be questioned whether a deconstructive project can also employ norms, such as social 
justice. 
In relation to feminist legal theory, 61 it has been argued that deconstruction alone is 
insufficient, as projects always necessarily involve a normative element. This point is 
forwarded by Ahmed, who argues that legal feminism is concerned with changing, as 
well as describing and deconstructing, social and legal arrangements. Legal feminism 
is concerned with '-prescribing and effecting transformation, informed by a range of 
normative ideals. ' 62 Legal feminism is a practical project as well as a theoretical 
project, it is generally aimed at improving the situation of women. Such an argument 
is clearly applicable to this thesis. 
Over recent years, with the growing influence of postmodernism, it is felt that the 
once close connection between feminist politics and feminist theory, has almost 
vanished. As Conaghan states '[t]he contention emerging is that this symbiotic 
60 Conaghan J "Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law" p. 376 
61 The terms feminist legal theory and legal feminists are used generally to represent those who 
approach law from any one of the many varied feminist perspectives. For detailed overview of the 
diverse approaches adopted by legal feminist see Conaghan J "Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical 
Project in Law" 
62 Ahmed S "Deconstruction and Law's Other: Towards a Feminist Theory of Embodied Legal Rights" 
Social & Legal Studies (1995) 4,55-73 p. 75 
100 
relationship is breaking down as feminist theory moves in a direction in which 
practical politics cannot/will not follow. ' 63 In relation to this thesis, although a 
deconstructive approach is used, and indeed considered to be necessary, due to the 
concern with the legal andjudicial construction of identity, the concern goes beyond 
deconstructing identity categories and stretches to changing the actual law, and the 
construction of an identity which is considered to be socially just. Although this does 
appear to conflict with Butler's criticism of identity categories, as noted in the 
previous chapter, Butler herself recognises that a feminist politics may necessarily 
need to retain a notion of woman -a normative identity. However, this needs to be 
accompanied with a constant deconstruction of the proposed identity or reform 
proposal. Such an approach has been labelled 'affirmative postmodemism', as it does 
not necessitate the complete rejection of norms and values. 64 This approach is 
adopted by Balkin who argues that: '[d]econstruction is not a denial of the legitimacy 
of rules and principles, it is an affirmation of human possibilities that have been 
overlooked or forgotten in the privileging of particular legal issues. 65 
Significantly, Young's conception of social justice can be located within a 
postmodem approach to subjectivity, as it is based on a politics of difference. 66 A 
politics of difference is generally asserted to be the opposite to assimilation in that it, 
63 Conaghan J "Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law" p. 356 
64 McCoubrey H& White ND Textbook on Jurisprudence [Blackstone Press Ltd; London; 3 rd ed; 
1999] p. 261 
65 Balkin "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory" Yale Law Journal (1987) 96,743 p. 763 
66 Squires J "Representing Groups, Deconstructing Identities" Feminist Theory (2001) 2(l), 7-27. 
Squires states that a Politics of Difference, and is an '... auempt to explode the dichotomy between 
'equality and difference. ' p. 17 
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in contrast to a unified and objective public, calls for the recognition of group 
divergences and the existence of plural and multifaceted cultures and norms. The 
politics calls for the retention of the idea of social groups and categories (a position 
that is dismissed to some extent by queer theory) as it is argued that society is 
constructed by social groups some of which are dominant and some of which are 
oppressed. Moreover, the retention of some form of group autonomy or solidwity is 
recognised by Young to be an '... important vehicle for empowerment and the 
development of a group specific voice'. 67 The main aim of a politics of difference is 
to reconstruct group identities and the meaning of differences in a positive manner. 
This subsequently provides the oppressed social group with a standpoint from which 
the 'norms' of society can be scrutinised. Whereas assimilationist politics are 
considered to be oppressive, a politics based on the positive recognition of difference 
is argued by Young to be emancipatory and liberating. This is due to the insistence 
that the identities of different social groups should, in the very least, be valued, and at 
times arc to be considered to be more valuable than those associated with the 
dominant group. There is, however, a real danger connected to the assertion of group 
difference, as it may provide the grounds for discriminatory treatment, as Young 
explains: '... any admission by oppressed groups that they are different from the 
dominant group risks justifying anew the subordination, special marking, and 
exclusion of those groups. ' 68 This fear is justified, and is exemplified by the 
American case of Equal Employment Opportunity v Sears, Roebuck & C0.69 as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Such an argument is also applicable to the battered 
67 Young IM Justice and 77ie Politics of Difference p. 168 
68 Ibid., p. 168 
69 839 F. 2d 302 (7oCir. 1988) 
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woman syndrome. Although the syndrome has brought about, in some cases, an 
advantageous result in the court room, it is clearly a double edged sword. The 
specificity of the battered woman is allowed, but only in a manner which reaffirms her 
negative characteristics: passivity and mental instability. Her difference has not been 
constructed in a positive light. 
Furthermore, the call for the recognition of differences appears to militate against 
years of political activism which argued that all human beings are of equal moral 
worth. Young cites Boxill in order to illustrate this predicament: '[o]n the one hand, 
we must overcome segregation because it denies the idea of human brotherhood; on 
the other hand, to overcome segregation we must self-segregate and therefore also 
deny the idea of human brotherhood. 970 In order to overcome such an impasse, Young 
asserts that social groups need to reclaim the meaning of difference, and this is to be 
done by distinguishing between an oppressive meaning of difference and an 
emancipatory meaning of difference. The oppressive meaning of difference is 
considered by Young to be essentialist. Submitting to the logic of identity, this 
approach measures differences against a supposedly objective norm and defines them 
as '... absolute otherness, mutual exclusion, [and] categorical opposition. 71 In 
contrast to this, differences in the emancipatory meaning are defined as '-specificity, 
variation, [and] heterogeneity. 972 Moreover, difference is considered to be a relation 
as opposed to a specific attribute. Hence, differences only appear when some 
comparison between groups is undertaken and this highlights the specificity of all 
70 Boxill B Blacks and Social Justice [Rowman and Alanheld; Totowa, N. J.; 1984] p. 174; see Young I 
M Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 169 
71 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference p. 169 
72 Ibid., pg 171 
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groups, including the don-ýinant group in society. To quote Young: '[d]ifference thus 
emerges not as a description of attributes of a group, but as a function of the relations 
between groups and the interaction of groups with institutions. 73 
In addition, in contrast to being defined by the dominant group, the emancipatory 
version places the meaning of difference within the hands of the oppressed group. 
They define their own positive identity, and this identity is created and constructed as 
opposed to innate. Hence, an emancipatory meaning of difference leads to the 
recognition that membership to a social group is not through fixed attributes or a 
common identity, as this would be essentialist, but through a shared affinity. Young 
explains: 
"Affinity names the manner of sharing assumptions, affective bonding, and 
networking that recognizably differentiates groups from one another, but not 
according to some common nature ..... 
Group identity is constructed from a 
flowing process in which individuals identify themselves and others in terms 
of groups, and thus group identity itself flows and shifts with changes in social 
,, 74 process. 
A group's identity is not fixed nor innate, but relational, fluid and open to change. To 
further explain the emergence of social groups, Young forwards the notion of 
seriality, (as examined in the previous chapter) in order to illustrate how social groups 
come into being. Once a social group comes into being, they should have the power 
to define their own identity. However, to avoid falling into the trap of an essentialist 
identity politics, whereby constructed identities become fixed and determined, it must 
be recognised that the identity proposed is, firstly, based on exclusions and secondly, 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., pg 172 
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may be used in a manner which is unforeseen and may have negative consequences. 75 
The exclusionary foundations must be recognised and constantly deconstructed. Such 
an approach has been labelled 'double movement feminism. 76 This form of feminism 
draws upon Butler's notion of a double movement which is to: 
"... invoke the category and, hence, provisionally to institute an identity and at 
the same time to open the category as a site of permanent political contest. 
That the term is questionable does not mean that we ought not to use it, but 
neither does the necessity to use it mean that we ought not perpetually to 
07 interrogate the exclusions by which it proceeds. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined and critiqued the concept of justice which is 
conventionally appealed to in cases involving women who kill their abusive partners: 
the concept of legal justice. It is argued that although the appeal to a legal justice, 
based on treating like cases alike, has emphasised the divergence of legal treatment 
between men and women who kill their partners, it limits the examination to the 
sameness or difference between men and women, and ignores the differences between 
women. A move towards a social justice, which is based upon a notion of a relational 
and non-essential social group, permits an evaluation of the legal treatment of women 
beyond that offered by legal justice. It provides a standard by which the actual legal 
construction of identity may be evaluated. Moreover, this move away from a strict 
75 Young argues against claims by some commentators, such as Elshtain JB Democracy on Trial 
[Basic Books; New York; 1995], that her position amounts to an identity politics, see Young IM 
'Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication' in Boharn. J& Rehg W eds Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1997] 383-407 cited in 
Squires J "Representing Groups, Deconstructing Identities" 
76 Sandland R "Seeing Double? Or, Why "IFo Be or Not To Be'is (Not) the Question for Feminist 
Legal Studies" Social Legal Studies (1998) 7(3), 307-338 
77 Butler J Bodies that Matter pp. 221-2 
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legal justice enables one to recognise the differences between women, and how 
different women are treated. This conception of social justice can be utilised not just 
to compare women with men, but also women with women. Whereas some women 
may receive a socially just result, other women may not. 
I argue that Young's concept of social justice can be reconciled with the 
deconstructive tendencies of queer theory, as identity is considered to be socially 
constructed and open to constant change. Additionally, Young recognises that women 
will, necessarily, fall into more than one social group, which may result in conflict, 
and some women may suffer cultural imperialism at the hands of other women. Any 
feminist notion of woman will, unavoidably, involve cultural imperialism. However a 
constant deconstruction of the identity adopted will, arguably, avoid some of the 
essentialising tendencies of identity politics. The next chapter will commence the 
examination of the existing criminal law defences to murder. 
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THE DEFENCES 
The Limitations of the Existing Criminal Law Defences to Murder 
Introduction 
This chapter details the existing criminal law defences which might be available to 
women who kill their abusive partners: provocation, diminished responsibility and 
self defence. In addition to examining the requirements of each defence, the chapter 
includes a discussion of the relevant existing literature on criminal law defences for 
women who kill. This literature is not limited to articles specifically discussing 
women who kill, but also considers those which have discussed the legal requirements 
of the defences in general. In addition, the chapter adopts a comparative stance. 
Hence defences and relevant literature from a number of different jurisdictions are 
also scrutinised, in particular, American and Canada. 
Criminal law defences arc distinguished by some legal scholars to be either an excuse 
or a justification, both recognising that the defendant is not entirely blameworthy. ' 
This distinction, despite an absence of official legal recognition, achieves significance 
when determining which defence should apply, as it attempts to explain the battered 
woman's actions. Excusatory defences recognise that the defendant has committed a 
wrongful, illegal act. Nevertheless, they exonerate the defendant on the basis that she 
was not entirely responsible for her actions, due to incapacity or some other 
mitigating factor. Her inability to engage adequately in free will renders the 
1 See for example Robinson P "Criminal Law Defences: A Systematic Analysis" Cot LR (1982) 82, 
199 and Williams G"The Theory of Excuses" Crim LR (1982) 732 
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application of criminal liability inappropriate. 2 Justification, on the other hand, 
legitimises the defendant's actions. The final result is considered to transcend the 
harm which has been committed, thus amounting to socially justifiable or even 
commendable behaviour. 3 Another possible explanation is to recognise that the 
defendant's course of action is identical to that which would have been adopted by 
any other reasonable person faced with such circumstances. 
On the whole, the distinction between excuses and justification relates to the focus of 
the inquiry. Whereas the former concentrates on the mental state of the defendant, the 
latter is concerned with her actions. 4 Furthermore, defences are either full or partial. 
A successful plea of a full defence will lead to an outright acquittal, a complete 
exoneration, whereas a partial defence will lead to a conviction of a less serious 
offence. Thus a successful partial defence to the crime of murder can lead to a 
conviction of manslaughter. 
Provocation 
Provocation amounts to a partial defence to murder which submits to a compassion 
for human frailty, enabling a jury to find the accused guilty of manslaughter when it is 
shown that they killed in the heat of passion due to the victim's provocative conduct. 5 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the defence recognises the reduced culpability of 
2 Robinson P "Criminal Law Defences: A Systematic Analysis" p. 221. 
3 see Ibid. and Williams G "The Theory of Excuses" 
4 Robinson P "Criminal Law Defences: A Systematic Analysis" p. 229. 
5 Greene J "A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill? " Adelaide LR (1989) 12,145-163 
p. 145; Taylor LJ "Provoked Reason in Men and Women; Heat of Passion Manslaughter and 
Imperfect Self-Defense" p. 1684 
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the accused as the victim is also to blame, as he or she precipitated the killing. 6 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 states that the presence of provocation is a 
question of fact, to be decided by the jury, who will be directed by the judge as to the 
legal definitions. A successful plea of provocation requires the satisfaction of three 
requirements: firstly, there must be provocative conduct; secondly the accused must 
have suffered a loss of self-control, which is the subjective, factual requirement; and, 
thirdly, it is questioned whether a reasonable person would have reacted in a similar 
manner, this amounts to the objective, evaluative requirement. The wording in section 
3 and the Court of Appeal in Rv Doughty 7 clearly established that words as well as 
acts may amount to provocation. Furthermore, the fact that the provocative conduct is 
lawful will not exclude the defence. These requirements are generally reflective of 
the defence in jurisdictions other than England and Wales. 
An overview of the historical development of the defence is provided by Taylor. 8 
Crucially, she argues that provocation has developed in relation to masculine 
emotions and reactions, protecting masculine interests, thus consequently excluding 
the female experience. This biased development is considered to be due to two 
factors. Firstly criminal defendants are, overwhelmingly, men and, secondly, the 
authors, enforcers and interpretators of the criminal law: judges, legislators, police 
officers and juries; have also historically been men. 9 This has lead to the contention 
that it is generally from a '... male-centred perspective that the reduction of an 
6 Greene J "A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill? " p. 145 
7 [1986] 83 Cr App R 319 
8 Taylor L J'Trovoked Reason in Men and Women; Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self- 
Defense" 
9 Ibid., p. 1681 
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intentional killing from murder to manslaughter is capable of being regarded as a 
compassion to human infirmity. "O 
By 1707, the English courts established a number of circumstances which were 
considered sufficiently provocative to warrant mitigation. Such situations included an 
assault on the accused or a friend, illegal arrest and the accused's wife being caught in 
the act of adultery. 11 Indeed this latter situation is often cited to be the 'traditional 
example of extreme provocation' 12 thus condoning men's sexual jealousy, 
rationalising the consequent acts of violence and excusing male killing of women. 13 
Hence, it is argued that: 
"[flrorn a feminist perspective the existence of such mitigation simply 
reinforces in the law that which public institutions ought in fact to be seeking 
to eradicate, namely, the acceptance that there is something natural, inevitable, 
and hence in some [legal] sense to be recognised forgivable about men's 
violence against women, and their violence in general. " 14 
Thus it is contended that the experiences of women in general, and battered women in 
particular, are excluded by the defence of provocation as it is based on male reactions 
and masculine behaviour. 
10 Horder J Provocation and Responsibility [Clarendon Press; Oxford; 19921 p. 194 
11 Taylor LJ "Provoked Reason in Men and Women; Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect 
Self-Defense" p. 1685 
12 Smith and Hogan Criminal Law [Butterworths; London; 1988] p. 335 
13 Beri S "Justice for Women Who Kill: A New Way? " Vie Australian Feminist Law Journal (1997) 
8,113-125 p. 121 
14 Horder J Provocation and Responsibility p. 194 
110 
Sudden and temporary loss of self-control 
The loss of self control suffered by the accused must be sudden and temporary, as 
held by the House of Lords in Rv Duffy. 15 Indeed, the judgement of Devlin J in this 
case is generally considered to provide the authoritative definition of provocation: 
"Provocation is some act or series of acts, done by the dead man to the 
accused, which would cause in any reasonable man, and actually causes in the 
accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self control, rendering the accused so 
subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his 
mind. " 16 
The requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self control has proved to be a 
major hurdle for women who kill their abusive partners. Evidence of a time lapse 
between the provocative act and the fatal act is taken to indicate that the accused was 
able to recover her self control and therefore militates against a successful pleading of 
the defence. This is arguably due to the court's endeavour to police the barrier 
between provocation and private revenge. As noted by Lord Chief Justice Taylor in R 
v Ahluwalia: 
17 
"Time for reflection may show that after the provocative conduct makes its 
impact on the mind of the defendant, he or she kept or regained self control. 
The passage of time following the provocation may also show that the 
subsequent attack was planned or based on motives, such as revenge or 
punishment, inconsistent with the loss of self control and therefore with the 
defence of provocation. " 18 
15 [194911 All ER 932 
16 Ibid. as cited by Lord Goddard 
17 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
'a Ibid. p. 138 
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It is argued by some that this requirement of suddenness reflects masculine reactions 
to provocation, whereas women tend to have a slow bum anger. 19 A provoked killing 
occurs in the 'heat of the moment' with a build up of anger, culminating in a loss of 
control. The provocative conduct 'lights a fuse which can ignite violence. ' 20 Young 
suggests 'Ulust as the lighting of fuses and exploding bomb are tropes which feature 
in male action movies which exclude the perspectives of women, this characterisation 
of anger does not include the emotions experienced by many battered women. '21 In 
contrast to a sudden loss of control which occurs immediately after provocative 
conduct, some battered women kill their abusers after a significant time lapse, thus 
falling outside the legal definition of provocation. Hence, the requirement of 
suddenness encompasses the male reaction and anger, a predominately male emotion, 
but ignores the different emotions, such as fear and despair, and the reactions of some 
women. 22 
To a limited extent, the Court of Appeal in Ahluwalia 23 recognised the existence of a 
female slow bum anger as they categorised a time delay as evidential. Hence, the 
19 see for example Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of 
Ahluwalia" Crim LR (1993), p. 730; Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A 
Comparative Analysis" Osgood Hall LJ 31 (1991) 761 p. 771 
20 Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis" p. 771 
21 Ibid. see also Bed S "Justice for Women Who Kill: A New Way? " p. 121-122 
22 Donnelly M "Battered Women Who Kill and the Criminal Law Defences" Irish Criminal LJ (1993) 
161-172 pp. 168-169; Edwards S "Battered Women - In Fear of Luc's Shadow" Denning LJ (1997) 
75-105 p. 90; Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of 
Ahluwalia" p. 730; Wannop AL "Battered Woman Syndrome and the Defence of Battered Women in 
Canada and England" Suffolk Transnational L Rev (1995) 19,251-272 pp. 256-257. 
23 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
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longer the delay the stronger the evidence that the accused regained her self-control. 
A time lapse will not, however, as a matter of law, exclude the defence of 
provocation. 24 Numerous commentators have viewed the Court of Appeal's 
categorisation as a judicial acceptance of slow bum anger and thus advantageous to 
the plight of battered women who kill. 25 Nevertheless, one must remember that in 
Ahluwalia 26 the conviction for manslaughter was eventually decided on the basis of 
diminished responsibility, and the Court of Appeal in Rv Thomton 27 reiterated that 
the loss of control must be sudden and temporary. Categorising a time lapse as 
evidentiary, rather than a legal rule, is only one small step towards accepting a female 
slow bum anger reaction to provocation. Battered women still contend with the 
discrimination which is inherent in a male formulation and application of the law. 28 
The perceived injustice of excluding a slow bum anger is further exacerbated when 
one recognises that battered women have usually endured years of physical abuse. 
This may lead to a continual build up of anger/emotion which is finally lost on a 'last 
straw' basis. A killing in these circumstances relates to the notion of cumulative 
provocation, which is defined by Waisk to involve: 
24 see Edwards S "Battered Women - In Fear of Luc's Shadow" p. 90 
25 Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of Ahluwalia" p. 
73 1; Yeo SHM "The Role of Provocation in the Law of Provocation" Anglo-American Law Review 
(1997), 431-460 p. 437 
26 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
27 [ 199211 All ER 306 
28 see Horder J Responsibility and Provocation and Horder I "Provocation and Loss of Self Control" 
LQR 108 (1992) 191-193 for the argument that the Court of Appeal's insistence of retaining the 
suddenness requirement has no legal basis. 
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6 ..... a course of cruel or violent conduct by the deceased, often in a violent 
setting, lasting over a substantial period of time, which cumulates in the victim 
of that conduct ... intentionally killing the tormentor. , 
29 
The House of Lords initially considered evidence of cumulative violence to be 
irrelevant to a plea of provocation. Devlin J stated '... the further removed an incident 
is from the crime the less it counts. ' 30 The question of self control would therefore be 
judged solely in relation to the provoker's final act. Hence, if a battered woman 
finally lost control and killed in response to a relatively trivial act, after years of 
constant provocation, a murder conviction is invariably likely to follow, although it 
could still be open for the jury to find provocation. Furthennore, a long-standing 
history of abuse was held to connote circumstances of revenge killing. Thus in the 
case of Rv Ibrams 31 the Court of Appeal concurred with the trial judge in holding 
that a killing committed 5 days after the provocative act was not a case of 
provocation, despite the years of abuse she had suffered. Instead, it was held that the 
circumstances denoted a revenge killing. This narrow time framc adopted by the law 
has received substantial criticism. Wasik argues: 
"It seems unrealistic and unfair to impose a heavier sentence on a defendant 
who has struggled, perhaps for years, to cope with a bullying and tyrannical 
husband or father, and who has one day snapped under objectively trivial or no 
immediate provocation than on one who has reacted spontaneously to strong 
provocation received on an isolated occasion. The former is certainly not 
more obviously blameworthy than the latter. , 32 
For a while the judiciary appeared to be undecided as to whether cumulative 
provocation should offer mitigation or connote a revenge killing. 33 This confusion 
29 Waisk M "Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing" Crim LR (1982) 29-37 p. 29 
30 Rv Duffy [ 194911 All ER 932 
31 [ 1982174 Cr App R 154 
32 Waisk M "Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing" p. 36 
33 Ibid. 
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has, however, now been resolved. The Court of Appeal in Rv HumphreyS 34 held that 
the whole history of provocative conduct between the accused and her victim was 
relevant to the question of self control. Furthermore, to enable a jury to fully 
comprehend the importance of long term abuse, it was stated that a trial judge should 
deliver an in-depth analysis of the past incidents. 35 The relevance of cumulative 
provocation was also emphasised by the Privy Council in Luc Thiet Thuan v R. 36 
Lord Goff stated: 
"... it may be open to a defendant to establish provocation in circumstances in 
which the act of the deceased, though relatively unprovocative if taken in 
isolation, was the last of a series of acts which finally provoked the loss of 
self-control by the defendant and so precipitated his extreme reaction which 
led to the death of the deceased. v937 
Despite these auspicious developments, battered women still struggle to fulfil the 
requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. As O'Donovan observes, 
"[t]he very nature of prolonged violence, the apparent initial tolerance by the 
victim, and her failure to respond violently immediately is contrary to the 
'heat of the moment' quality which is required by the current definition of 
provocation. " 38 
Recognition of fear? 
Although fear is generally considered to be the emotion connected to self-defence 
there has been some judicial acceptance that it may also be the emotion underlying a 
provoked killing. The Australian High Court has stated: 
34 [ 199514 All ER 1008 
35 see Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "More Justice for Battered WomeW'NLJ (1995) 146,1122-1124 
36 [ 199612 All ER 1033 
37 Ibid., p. 1047 
38 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 223 
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"No doubt it is true to say that primarily anger is a feature of provocation and 
fear a feature of self-defence. But it is too much to say that fear caused by an 
act of provocation cannot give rise to a defence of provocation. " 39 
As Yeo notes, in order to recognise and accept the social reality of battered women, it 
is vital that the law also recognises fear as an underlying emotion, 40 a step which has 
recently occurred within this jurisdiction. Lord Hoffman in the House of Lords case 
of Rv Smith 41 stated that in cases involving battered woman '... the law now 
recognises that the emotions which may case loss of self-control are not confined to 
anger but may include fear and despair. ' 42 Tarrant, however, questions the advantage 
which this approach may confer on battered women. If the fear is based on 
reasonable grounds, then this should lead to an outright acquittal on the basis on self- 
defence, which recognises that the defendant's actions were justified, rather than 
merely excused. If, however, the fear is unreasonable, provocation, constructed in 
this manner appears to imitate the defence of excessive self-defence. Although such 
an extension is undoubtedly beneficial for battered women, Tarrant expresses concern 
that it may '... appropriate ... evidence of fear which would otherwise 
found a claim of 
self defence'. 43 Hence, if a battered women kills in fear the courts may readily apply 
the defence of provocation, as opposed to self defence, thus convicting her of 
manslaughter in circumstances which an acquittal may be appropriate. 
39 Van den Heok vR (1986) 161 CLR 158 at 167; cited in Yeo SHM "The Role of Gender in the Law 
of ProvocatioW'p. 437 see also Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of their Own Lives: 
A Feminist Critique of Law and Laws" U. WAL Rev (1990) 20,573-606 p. 595 
40 Yeo SHM "The Role of Provocation in the Law of Provocation" p. 438 
41 [2000] 3 W. L. R 654 
42 Ibid., p. 673 
43 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" p. 596 
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Overall, as Baker maintains, the restricted nature of the suddenness requirement fails 
to comprehend the disparate range of domestic abuse homicides, specifically those in 
which the homicide appears to be a reasonable choice, being a response to an 
intolerable, inescapable situation. In this situation, it is argued that her actions should 
be partially excused, not due to the loss of self-control, but to the practical 
impossibility of remaining within the law, i. e. not killing. 44 Such an approach may be 
supported by adopting a different theoretical basis. Highlighting the inadequacy of 
the human frailty rationale, Greene argues that society places particular categories of 
people in provocative situations, and thus full blame should not be attached when they 
kill as society should also shoulder some of the blame. Hence: 
"[v]ictims of domestic violence ... suffer directly at the hands of their abusers. Indirectly, however, battered women and children are victimised by 
widespread societal acceptance of wife and child beating coupled with the 
failure of the legal system to effectively intervene on their behalf. Society 
therefore ought not be heard to condemn completely the battered wife or child 
who is provoked to kill is or her abuser. ý45 
Whereas it is important for the law to recognise such mitigating circumstances, 
perhaps the situation would be better reflected by allowing duress of circumstances 46 
to be a partial defence to murder. 
44 Baker BM "Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women who Kill? " 77ze Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence (1998) XI, 193-211 
45 Greene J "A Provocation Defence for Battered Women Who Kill? " p. 146 
46 The defence of duress can be described as an excusatory defence which recognises that the will of 
the defendant was overborne either due to the threats of a third party, or because of the surrounding 
circumstances. See for example Rv Hudson and Taylor [ 1971] 2 QB 202 and Rv Martin [ 1989] 1 All 
ER 65. This defence will be considered in the conclusion. 
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Objective loss of self control 
The objective strand of the provocation defence, the reasonable person standard, 
evaluates the conduct of the accused and requires a level of self control which is 
considered reasonable. This issue was recently considered by the House of Lords in 
the case of Smith, 47 a decision which appears to have significantly reduced, if not 
completely eroded, the standard of a reasonable person. 
In order to present a successful plea of provocation, it must be shown that a 
reasonable person would have reacted in a manner similar to the defendant. The 
reasonable person test received a strict interpretation by the House of Lord in Rv 
Bedder. 48 Their Lordships refused to acknowledge the unusual individual physical 
characteristic (impotency) of the accused when considering the effect of the 
provocation on a reasonable person, despite it being relevant to the provocative 
conduct in question . 
49 This arguably harsh approach was modified by the House of 
Lords in DPP v Camplin5o in which it was held that certain characteristics of the 
accused may be attributed to the reasonable person. To quote Lord Diplock: 
"The reasonable man ... is a person having the power and control to be expected 
of an ordinary person of the same sex and age of the accused, but in other 
47 [200013 WLR 654 
48 [195412 All ER 801 
49 The defendant in this case was impotent and killed a prostate after she had made fun of his infliction. 
When applying the reasonable person test the House of Lords considered whether a reasonable man, 
who was not impotent, would have lost self control and killed in these circumstances. 
50 [197812 All ER 168 In this case the defendant was a 15 year old boy who killed the victim by hitting 
him over the head with a chapatti pan after being sexually assaulted by him. The House of Lords held 
that his age should amount to a relevant characteristic when assessing whether a reasonable person 
would have reacted a similar manner. 
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respects sharing such of the accused's characteristics as they think would 
affect the gravity of the provocation to him; and that question is not merely 
whether such a person would in like circumstance be provoked to lose his self 
control but also whether he would react to the provocation as the accused 
did. "51 
As with the law of self-defence, this objective standard has brought countless 
problems for battered women who kill their abusers. As Taylor comments, standards 
of reasonableness within the law have been developed solely in relation to the 'ideal' 
man. Indeed, it is noted that '[t]here is not a single common-law reference to a 
reasonable woman' 52 which is considered by Taylor to be unremarkable due to the 
legal status of the woman in the nineteenth century, who were, once married, 'legally 
dead and subject to government by her husband'. 53 Criminal law has generally 
required women to conform to the standard of a reasonable man, as opposed to the 
reasonable woman. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the term 
'reasonable woman' is an oxymoron: 'as to what might be involved in the law of the 
reasonable woman, we follow precedent and venture no opinion .... leaving open the 
question of whether conjoining 'reasonable' and 'woman' creates a contradiction in 
terms. 54 Tbus such an approach can be seen to be based on a construction of women 
as emotional and tied to their bodies, unable to achieve those characteristics which are 
generally associated with males: transcendence, rationality and reasonableness. 
Hence, it is only male characteristics which are deemed to be reasonable. However, 
the lack of reference to the 'reasonable woman' can also be explained via the 
51 Ibid. p. 175 
52 Taylor LJ "Provoked Reason in Men and Women; heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self 
Defence" p. 1690 
53 Ibid. 
54 Weber JK "Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law" (1981) 10 Anglo American 
LR 159-179 p. 175 
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convention of using masculine nouns and pronouns, a convention which has only 
recently changed. 
It is through the application of the reasonable man standard that the law 'others' 
women. The phrase 'reasonable man' or 'reasonable person' purports to be a 
standard which is applicable to both men and women. A problem, however, arises 
when the standard is not gender neutral, but is based on men's understandings of 
reasonableness and reflects masculine characteristics and behaviour. By presenting 
male behaviour and responses as the universal standard, an injustice in the form of 
cultural imperialism is committed. Man forms the 'norm', the standard in society, and 
woman are outside this, hence her own experience is excluded. Hence women's 
standpoint and experiences, are disregarded and this includes the battered woman's 
experience of violence and abuse suffered at the hands of her partner. Moreover, it is 
argued by Young that the legal interpretation and application of this standard actually 
legitimises the battering of women 55 and hence injustice in the form of violence also 
committed. It is, however, argued by some that the presence of two different 
standards of self control - one for men and one for women - infringes the principle of 
equality. In order for men and women to be treated equally, their actions should be 
judged against one standard - the reasonable person standard. 
56 This argument, 
however, loses weight when it is realised that the reasonable person is actually the 
reasonable man and requiring women to comply to such a standard does not confer 
equal treatment before the law. 
55 Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis" p. 780 
56 Yeo SHM "The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation" pp. 448-449 
120 
The House of Lords in Camplin 57 recognised that the gender and age of the accused 
is relevant to the level of self control expected, thus the action of a woman who kills 
her abuser will be judged against the objective standard of a reasonable woman. To 
some extent this is considered to be progressive and beneficial to women, as it goes 
some way to enabling their perceptions to emanate. 58 Nevertheless, the opinions of 
some commentators indicate how a 'reasonable woman' standard may actually be 
interpreted in a discriminatory manner. Williams 59 argues that the sex of the 
defendant in relation to the expected self control should be irrelevant, as it may lead to 
unjust results. This argument is based on the consideration that women possess a 
higher control level, due to the oestrogen in their blood as opposed to androgen. He 
states that the proposition that sex should be relevant '-would operate to the 
disadvantage of the gentle sex. ' 60 Such an opinion perpetuates stereotypes of women 
as passive, links gender inextricably to biology and reinforces the view that women 
are able to endure male violence and thus any violent reaction is inexcusable, and 
unfeminine. 61 It therefore constructs those women who do kill as 'aberrational and 
evil monsters or excessively pathological. 962 Hence, whilst it is important for a 
'reasonable woman standard' to emerge, enabling the female experience to enter the 
57 [ 197812 All ER 168 
58 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women who Kill" p. 226 
59 Williams G "rextbook of Criminal Law" [Stevens; London; 2 ed 1983] p. 539 
60 Ibid. 
61 Such a biological essentialist view, which basis women's identity and characteristic in her biology, 
has been subject to much criticism. See chapter 2 see also Kaplan GT and Rogers LJ "rhe Definition 
of Male and Female, Biological Reductionism and the Sanction or Normality" in Gunew S Feminist 
Knowledge, Critique and Construct pp. 205-228 
62 Yeo SHM 'The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation" pp. 450-451 
121 
legal arena, care must be taken to ensure that the women's perspective is not 
fonnulated by such patriarchal stereotypes, as this involves the injustice of cultural 
imperialism. Women are defined from the outside and they have no control or say in 
their identity. 
In addition to sharing the same sex and age as the defendant, Lord Diplock in 
Camplin 63 also stated that the reasonable person may possess those characteristics of 
the defendant which affect the gravity of the provocation. Such traits will not, 
however, affect the level of self-control the accused is expected to maintain. This 
distinction, however, has now been abolished by the case of Smith. 64 Hence, 
characteristics in addition to the age and sex of the accused may also affect the level 
of self-control society would expect the accused to possess. In the Smith 65 case, it 
was recognised that the accused's depression could be taken into account when 
assessing the level of self-control, although it was not in any particular way connected 
to the provocation. The impact of Smith 66 and the issue of whether the battered 
woman syndrome amounts to a relevant characteristic will be analysed in chapter 5. 
Provocation -a suitable defence for battered women? 
Whilst an examination of the legal requirements of provocation highlight how the 
defence excludes the battered woman's experience, can also be questioned whether 
provocation is actually an appropriate defence for battered women. This issue is 
63 [ 197812 All ER 168 
64 [200013 VYLR 654 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
122 
analysed by Baker 67 in reference to the Canadian jurisdiction. One important aspect 
in this jurisdiction is the apparent applicability of self defence for women who kill 
their abusers, following the landmark decision of Lavallee v The Queen. 68 Baker 
argues that self-defence is not, by itself, sufficient to provide justice for battered 
women. Firstly, as opposed to self-defence, which is justificatory, provocation is a 
partial excuse, thus allowing a defence for murder in those cases in which a complete 
justification is not considered appropriate. Secondly, the circumstances in which 
domestic abuse homicides are committed are not homogeneous, but diverse, thus 
highlighting the need for excusatory as well as justificatory defences. Thirdly, it is 
noted that provocation focuses on a different time frame. Whereas self-defence is 
concerned with a an impending attack, provocation is centred upon the actions 
committed after an attack has taken place. Although this latter point would certainly 
be applicable in the English jurisdiction, its relevancy to Canada is disputable in light 
of the Lavallee 69 case, in which the fatal action took place after a violent assault, 
when the batterer was walking away. 70 Baker also argues that opening the provocation 
defence to battered women recognises that they may also kill in anger, in addition to 
fear. She suggests that many women do kill in anger, however this is generally not 
acknowledged due to the social and cultural constructions of gender, which present 
women as passive. Thus the law of provocation should be interpreted to include the 
typical form of female slow bum anger. 71 
67 Baker BM "Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women who Kill" 
68 [1990] 1 S. C. R. 852,55 C. C (3d) 97 
69 [1990] 1 SCR 852 
70 Baker B M"Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women who Kill" p. 195 
71 Ibid. pp. 196-198 
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Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie present a number of cogent arguments against using the 
defence of provocation. 72 One of the main concerns is that the courts may 
automatically assume that provocation as opposed to self-defence is the most 
appropriate defence, a situation which Tolmie 73 illustrates has occurred in Australia. 
Such an assumption prevents the case of the battered woman being evaluated in the 
context of self defence, and fails to distinguish a homicide which is committed in 
order to protect the woman and perhaps her children, from those which are generally 
dealt with under the law or provocation, such as sexual jealousy. Provocation labels 
the actions of the battered woman as 'unreasonable and extraordinary', thus 
suggesting that the woman's perception that she was trapped within a life threatening 
situation within her home and unable to obtain adequate legal protection, was an 
irrational, emotional over-reaction. Furthermore, those who do not act in such an 
emotional manner may have difficulties explaining their behaviour. 74 
Tolmie argues that the law of provocation allows the experiences of women as 
victims of domestic abuse to be recognised, but in a manner which denies them 
complete validation. Their actions are constructed as 'irrational but excusable 
individual responses to individual problems' as opposed to 'legitimate responses to 
circumstances that reflect deeper structural problems which women, as a gender, face 
72 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: the Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations" Crim Law J (1992) 16,369-394 pp. 378-379 
73 Tolmie J"Provocation or Self Defence For Battered Women Who Kill" in Yeo SHM Partial 
Excuses to Murder [Federation Press; Australia; 1991] 61-79 
74 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: the Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations" 
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within society. 75 The defence suggests that her response to the domestic violence, as 
opposed to the actual violence suffered, is a departure from 'normal existence', and 
thus fails to address the problem of domestic abuse. 76 Labelling the homicide as 
provoked is considered to maintain the public/private distinction which places the 
family within the private sphere, free from state intervention, and the ideology of the 
family as a loving, caring, institution. Provocation suggests that the homicide 
involved 'private passions and emotions running wildly out of control, ' as opposed to 
recognising that 'women may be trapped and justified in fighting for their lives within 
their most intimate relationship. 977 It is also argued that the preference given to 
physical abuse over emotional abuse by the defence undermines the claims of 
provocation by those women who have suffered psychological abuse. This argument, 
however, could also be presented against self-defence. 78 
Nevertheless, provocation as a defence still remains useful for the plight of battered 
women. As Baker argued, not all cases of domestic abuse homicide are the same, and 
thus it is important for women to a range of defences available to them. Justice for 
battered women should not be linked to one defence. What is required is justice for 
all women, which requires the law to accommodate the different experiences of 
women in all areas, not just in one defence. 
75 Tolmie J "Provocation or Self Defence For Battered Women Who Kill" p. 66 
76 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" p. 573 
77 Tolmie J "Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women who Kill" p. 67 
78 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: the Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations" 
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Diminished Responsibility 
Another possible defence for battered women is diminished responsibility which, 
similar to provocation, is a partial defence, thus leading to a conviction for 
manslaughter. The defence is contained within section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, 
which states: 
"(1) Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be 
convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind 
(whether arising from a condition of arrest or retarded development of mind or 
any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired 
his mental responsibility for his actions and omissions in doing or being party 
to the killing. " 
Lord Parker CJ in Rv Byrne 79 defined 'abnormality of mind' as: 
6'... a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the 
reasonable man would define it abnormal It appears to us to be wide enough 
to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of 
physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment whether 
an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to control 
physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment. "80 
It has been said that whereas provocation is a defence for 'normal' people, diminished 
responsibility provides a defence for 'abnormal people'. 81 Indeed Williams stated: 
"Provocation is traditionally a defence for 'normal' people' Abnormal people 
can shelter under it, but only on the same conditions as apply to normal ones. 
If they want their abnormality to be taken into account they must raise a 
defence appropriate to them - insanity or diminished responsibility. " 82 
79 [ 196012 QB 396 
go Ibid., p. 403 
81 Mousourakis M Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses [Ashgate Publishing Ltd; Hants; 1998] 
p. 163 
82 Williams G Textbook of Criminal Law p. 544 
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However, it can now be seen that this distinction between 'normal' and 'abnormal' 
has been somewhat reduced due to the House of Lord's decision in the case of 
Smith, 83 which is considered in further detail in chapter 5. 
As required by section 2, this abnormality of mind has to substantially impair the 
defendant's mental responsibility, and although medical evidence may be called upon, 
whether or not the defendant's responsibility is substantially impaired is ultimately a 
question of degree to be decided by the jury. Lord Parker CJ in Byme 84 stated: 
"[m]edical evidence is, of course, relevant, but the question involved a 
decision not merely as to whether there was some impain-nent of the mental 
responsibility of the accused but whether such impairment can properly be 
called 'substantial', a matter upon which juries may quite legitimately differ 
,, 85 from doctors. 
The role of the jury in deciding whether or not the defendant has a substantially 
impaired responsibility as led some to argue that the success of the defence depends 
upon the sympathies of the jury. 86 As argued by Williams: '... the defence is 
interpreted in accordance with the morality of the case rather than as an application of 
psychiatric concepts. Where sympathy is evoked-it seems to be dissolving into what 
is virtually the equivalent of a mitigating circumstance. ' 87 Thus a successful defence 
depends less upon the influence of the medical or psychiatric evidence and more upon 
the perceived worthiness of the defendant. 
83 [200013 WLR 654 
84 [ 196012 QB 396 
85 Ibid. p. 406 
86 Mousourakis M Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses p. 170 
87 Williams G Textbook of Criminal Law p. 693 see Mousourakis M Criminal Responsibility and 
Partial Excuses p. 170 
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Diminished responsibility has frequently been successful in cases involving 
88 
cumulative provocation, thus indicating that such women are looked upon in a 
sympathetic light. In contrast to the both provocation and self-defence, however, 
much less ink has been spilt on the defence of diminished responsibility. This is 
arguably due to two reasons, firstly, the law seems to have little difficulty in 
incorporating the battered woman who kills into the requirements of the defence, 
unlike provocation and self defence. As McColgan states '[I]n 1996 and 1997 women 
indicted for homicide were about twice as likely as men to be convicted of section 2 
manslaughter. '89 Secondly, the majority of commentators are in agreement that the 
defence is inappropriate for battered women. Such arguments are presented by 
O'Donovan 90 who states that, firstly, the defence focuses on the mental state of the 
battered woman as opposed to the violence she suffered. Thus, as opposed to arguing 
that she is responsible for actions, but justified in taken such a course of conduct, due 
to the actions of the deceased, she is presented as suffering from an abnormality of 
mind. Rather than placing the blame on the deceased, '... [h]er personality, 
characteristics, and problems are on trial. '91 Secondly, diminished responsibility 
labels the battered woman as crazy and incapable, which perpetuates stereotypes of 
women as irrational, sick or mad. It is also suggested that, unless such attitudes 
change, violence against women will persist. 92 Furthermore, if too much stress is 
placed on the mental abnormality there is a possibility that she may receive an 
88 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 229 
89 McColgan A General Defences p. 140 
90 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 229-230 
91 Ibid. p. 230 
92 Wannop AL "Battered Woman Syndrome and the Defence of Battered Women in Canada and 
England" p. 270 
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inappropriate sentence, for example one that focuses upon psychiatric treatment, as 
opposed to a sentence which is concerned with punishment. Thirdly, the defence fails 
to further the plight for battered women as a group. 93 In order for the law to change 
and recognise the experiences of women and the danger they face within the home, 
the requirements of other defences must be challenged. 
Self-Defence 
The final defence which may apply to battered women who kill is self defence. In 
contrast to provocation and diminished responsibility, it is a full defence, hence a 
successful plea will lead to an outright acquittal, as opposed to a conviction for 
manslaughter. Another important aspect of this defence is that it is justificatory. The 
actions of the battered woman are justified, she, is not considered to have committed 
an unlawful act. This may be distinguished from diminished responsibility, and, to a 
degree, provocation, which are excusatory defences. Under an excusatory defence the 
act is still considered unlawful, however the actor is not considered to be entirely or 
fully responsible for their action, due to their mental instability. 
Self defence developed as a common law defence, and, on a basic level, allows the 
defendant to use a level of defensive force which is considered reasonable and 
OA 
necessary. To quote Lord Morris in Palmer v The Queen: '- 
"It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend 
himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do 
what is reasonably necessary. , 95 
93 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 229-230 
94 [ 197 1] AC 814 Privy Council 
95 Ibid., p. 831 
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The doctrine balances two different interests: society's interest in upholding the 
sanctity of human life, and the societal and individual interest in a right to protection. 
Hence, the law justifies only those killings which are necessary to avoid serious 
bodily harm or death. 96 As with provocation, the male based development of this 
defence has tended to exclude the female experience and reaction. 97 Indeed, 
Gilliespie's examination of self defence law in America illustrates that from the early 
1200s to the beginning of the Twentieth Century only three American appeal cases 
dealing with self defence involved female defendants. 98 
The requirements of self-defence differ slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but 
the stipulation that the defensive force must be necessary has generally led to the 
establishment of four principles: imminency; genuine (and in some jurisdictions, a 
reasonable) belief in serious harm; proportionality or reasonable force; and, in some 
jurisdictions, a duty to retreat. These requirements are considered to exclude evidence 
which is vital to a battered woman's self defence case, and to deny them equal 
protection under the law. 99 
96 Castel J "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" Toronto Faculty of Law Rev (1990) 48, 
229-258 p. 235; Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self Defence" New Zealand University Law Rev 
(1997) 19,292-328 p. 298. 
97 Gillespie CK Justiflable Homicide [Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 19891 pp. 31-49 
98 Ibid., pp. 4849 
99 Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" pp. 636-638 
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Imminency 
This element permits defensive action to be taken against an ensuing attack, and also 
100 4 permits pre-emptive strikes. To quote Lord Griffiths in Beckford vR... a man 
about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow or 
fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike. "Ol In order to be 
justifiable, the pre-emptive strike must be in response to some imminent danger. 
Thus, the requirement of imminence focuses solely on those moments preceding the 
killing. 102 A killing will not be justified if it is committed after the attack has 
occurred, as this is considered to be an act of revenge, as opposed to self defence. 
Nor is it justified if it is committed in response to a threat of some distant future 
harm. 1 03 Such an approach embodies the construction of the appropriate masculine 
behaviour as brave, courageous and assertive, and thus it may be seen as 'a guide to 
manly behaviour in dangerous circumstances. ' 104 As Gillespie asserts: 
"A real man, a brave man, faces his adversary in a fair fight. He does not 
sneakily lie in a bush or shoot an enemy in the back or kill him while he is 
asleep. He does not panic and kill someone who is just blustering and making 
threats .... These are the acts of cowards and villains. " 
105 
Through her examination of the development of self-defence, Gillespie notes how this 
requirement of imminence applies to situations in which men have historically found 
themselves: one time encounters involving disputes between neighbours, fights 
100 [19881 AC 130 
101 Ibid., p. 144 
102 Castel J "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 237 
103 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 67; Schneider "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in 
the Law of Self-Defense" p. 634 
104 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 67 
105 Ibid. 
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involving bullies and strangers and arguments over women. 106 In such situations, the 
requirement that the attack must be either in process or imminent and inevitable is 
understandable, as it prevents defensive action taking place before there is any real 
threat of harm. This explanation of the imminence requirement is also expressed by 
Court in the Canadian case of Lavallee: 107 
'7he sense in which "imminent" is used conjures up the image of an "uplifted 
knife" or a pointed gun.... If there was a significant time interval between the 
original unlawful assault and the accused's response, one tends to suspect that 
the accused was motivated by revenge rather than self-defence. In the 
paradigmatic case of a one-time barroom brawl between two men of equal size 
and strength, this inference makes sense ... one can always take the 
opportunity to flee or call for the police. "' 08 
The situation with battered women is, however, completely different and cannot be 
conceived of in terms of the one time encounter. The battered woman becomes 
trapped inside an abusive relationship, living under a constant threat of the next 
beating, not knowing when this may take place and whether this time it may lead to 
her death. Hence, even during those times when she is not actually being physically 
assaulted, she is living in fear of her life, 109 and thus it is suggested that a battered 
woman lives with a constant imminent threat of serious harm or death. 110 
Furthermore, verbal threats of future violence by someone who has inflicted abuse 
and carried out previous threats are not comparable to those delivered by a stranger. 
106 Ibid., see also Castel J "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 237 
107 [1990] 1 SCR 852 
108 Ibid., p. 879; see also Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defence" p. 300 
109 Tolmie J'Trovocation or Self-Defensive for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 68 
110 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 58; Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can 
A Battered Woman Claim Self-Defence When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " The Uni of Kansas L 
Rev (1989) 38,169-192 p. 182 
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As Gillespie illustrates, 'mere' threats have regularly preceded a wife's death at the 
hands of her husband. "' 
Nevertheless, if a battered woman kills her abuser in anticipation of a future attack, 
knowing this to be inevitable, but not necessarily imminent, self-defence will be 
precluded. As King CJ commented in 77ze Queen v R, 1 12 if a battered woman, after 
many years of abuse, killed her partner, believing this to be the only way in which she 
could protect herself and her children from future harm, self-defence would not be 
applicable, as other methods of protection which are lawful and peaceful must be 
adopted: '[t]he law of a well-ordered and civilised society cannot countenance ... 
killing as a means of averting some apprehended hann in the future. ' 113 Such an 
approach, however, assumes that other means of protection are realistically available 
to battered women, and that she has the psychological and economic ability to leave 
the relationship; an assumption which is questioned by many commentators. 114 
Furthermore, it is suggested that this supposition imposes on battered women a duty 
111 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 68; Castel JR "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who 
Kill" pp. 240-241 see also Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can A Battered 
Woman Claim Self-Defence When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " pp. 184-185 
112 (1987) 71 ALR 641 
113 Ibid., see also See Tolmie J'Trovocation of Self-Defense for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 68; 
Castel JR "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 238 
114 Tolmie J'Trovocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 68-69; Castel J 
"Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 237-240; Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each 
Woman Her Due: Can a Battered Woman Claim Self-Defence When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " 
pp. 185-187; See the following chapter on the Battered Woman Syndrome, which also notes the 
ineffectual response of society, police and judiciary in providing battered women with adequate 
protection. 
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to retreat, in the absence of considering whether it would be reasonable to retreat in 
each individual case. 115 
A minority of battered women kill under non-confrontational circumstances, 116 for 
example when the abuser is asleep, as in the case of Ahluwalia. 117 This could be 
considered to be a fairly unsurprising situation considering the possible escalation of 
violence which is likely to occur if she attempts to physically defend herself during an 
attack. 118 The Kansas Supreme Court in State v Stewart 119 ruled that, by law, a 
battered woman who killed her abuser whilst he was sleeping was not entitled to a 
self-defence instruction: '... when a battered woman kills her sleeping spouse when 
there is no imminent danger, the killing is not reasonably necessary and a self-defense 
instruction may not be given. "20 Thus, in such circumstances, the imminence 
requirement provides an insurmountable obstacle. 
115 Tolmie J "Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 69 
116 See Nourse VJ "Self-Defense and Subjectivity" U. Chi. L Rev (2001) 68,1235. Nourse, in her 
survey of 20 years of American case law estimates that cases in which battered women killed in a non- 
confrontation situation amounts to under 10% of the cases considered. Three quarters of battered 
women killed in a confrontational situation. 
117 [1993196 Cr App R 133 
118 Castel J "Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 240; Schneider E "Equal Rights to 
Rights for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" p. 634; Sheehy E. A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J 
"Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 372 
119 243 Kan. 639,763 P. 2d 572 (1988) see Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can A 
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " 
120 243 Kan at 649,763 P 2. d at 579, see Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can A 
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defence When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " pp. 176-177 
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Furthermore, the requirement also poses difficulties for those battered women who 
kill during an actual confrontation, as it focuses on a very narrow time-frame of 
events. Only those actions of the deceased committed immediately before the killing 
occurred will be considered. Hence previous acts of violence are considered to be 
separate, isolated events. Evidence of the deceased's previous on-going abuse towards 
the accused may, however, be crucial to explaining why she perceived the threatened 
hann to be serious or life threatening, 121 as Schneider explains: 
"Subtle motions or threats that might not signify danger to an outsider or to the 
trier of fact acquire added meaning for a battered woman whose survival 
depends on an intimate knowledge of her assailant. " 122 
Conversely, such evidence may also be perilous. The courts may view previous 
violence as a motivation for a revenge killing, as opposed to a killing committed in 
fear of her life, and consider that the homicide was unreasonable as she had survived 
the previous beatings. 123 
The restrictions established by the requirement of imminency are stated to 
4 represent the most profound instance of the exclusion of women's experience. ' 124 
Tarrant explains that by concentrating on those events which immediately precede 
attack, the killing is thus seen to be committed 'in response to an extraordinary 
eruption in normal existence, ' and thus adheres to the image of the one-off 
121 Tolmie J "Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 69 Castel JR "Discerning 
Justice for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 237 
122 Schneider E 'Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense"p. 634 
123 Tolmie J'Trovocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 69-70 
124 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" p. 597 
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confrontation between two strangers. 125 In contrast, battered women are seen to kill 
in response to their 'ordinary existence. ' Their abuse is part of their every day 
'normal' life, and this is what they respond to. They are not responding to a one off 
attack which is a deviation from their every day life. It is this defence against normal 
existence which the law is unable to comprehend and accommodate, which is 
emphasised by the narrow focus which imminence requires. 
The meaning of imminence is scrutinised by Nourse 126 in her survey of homicide 
cases spanning twenty years. She argues that the meaning of imminence is much 
wider than the existence of a time lapse between the threat and the killing. It tends to 
carry a number of other meanings. 'The case law shows that imminence has many 
meanings; indeed, imminence often operates as a proxy for any number of other self- 
defense factors - for example, strength of threat, retreat, proportionality, and 
aggression. ' 127 Hence, even in a case were the killing occurs during a confrontation, 
the issue of imminence will be raised even though it appears to be irrelevant. One 
example provided is the case of State v Hundley. 128 Hundley, shot and killed her 
abusive partner after he broke into the hotel room to which she had fled to escape. 
Once he had brutalized and raped her he preceded to 'pound[] a beer bottle (a source 
of injury in the past) on the table and ordered her to get cigarettes. ' 129 Feeling 
threatened, she pointed a gun at him, at which point he laughed and declared 'You are 
125 Ibid., p. 598 
126 Nourse VJ "Self-Defense and Subjectivity" 
127 Ibid., p. 1236 
128 236 Kan 461693, P2d 475 (1985) 
129 Ibid., p. 475-176 
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dead, bitch, now' 130 and reached for the beer bottle. Hundley then pulled the trigger. 
The issue for the appeal court was whether the trial judge had correctly directed the 
jury as the requirement of 'immediate harm' as opposed to 'imminent harm'. 
However, as Nourse argues, imminence was not strictly an issue here, in the sense 
that there was no time lapse between the threat and the defensive action. The 
defensive action was carried out during a confrontation. What was really in issue 
here, Nourse argues, was the severity of the threat and the ability to retreat. However, 
the trial court constructed this as an issue of imminency. 
Other factors which tend to be constructed as 'imminency' issues are: the necessity of 
the response; the possibility of alternative options; and the defendant's motive and 
emotions. 13 1 Although such alternative definitions are not limited to cases involving 
battered women, Nourse illustrates that this conflation of imminence with other 
issues, especially the ability to seek alternative courses of action, tends to take place 
132 
overwhelming in cases dealing with women who kill their abusive partners. This 
leads Nourse to conclude that cases which actually involve defensive action in a 
confrontation situation, are not seen as confrontational, due to the many meanings 
which have been attached to imminency. 133 This indicates that it is not the 
requirement of imminency per se which is problematic, but the court's construction of 
imminency. Undoubtedly, such an argument could also be extended to the 
requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control in provocation. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Nourse VJ "Self-Defense and Subjectivity" p. 1255-1256 
132 Ibid., p. 1262 
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Belief in Serious Harm 
In order for a plea of self-defence to be successful, the law, in some jurisdictions, 
requires a reasonable and genuine belief in death or serious harm. However, some 
jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, adopt a subjective approach and stipulate 
that the belief need only be genuine, hence viewing the situation from the eyes of the 
accused, as opposed to the reasonable person. These two tests, however, should not be 
viewed as distinct and opposite, but rather as a continuum, along which different 
characteristics of the defendant are situated. Thus it is suggested that the only 
difference lies '... in the extent to which they import the defendant's particular 
characteristics in to the definition of "reasonable person. "' 134 The more lenient test, 
requiring the belief to be merely genuine, has been adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
Rv Williams (Gladstone) 135 in which it was held that defensive action may be 
justified, even if the accused was mistaken as to the circumstances. Moreover, there 
is no requirement that the mistake be reasonable, providing he genuinely believed that 
the force was necessary. Hence, a genuine albeit unreasonable mistake in serious 
haim, will not preclude a plea of self-defence. Thus the subjective nature of self 
defence in England and Wales provides the opportunity for the law to view the 
incident from the perspective of the battered woman. As McColgan argues: 
"[flhe application of self-defence to many battered women who kill does not 
involve any alteration or extension of the defence, rather a rethinking of the 
way in which the requirement that the defendant's use of force be reasonable 
is applied to cases other than those involving the traditional model of a one-off 
,, 136 adversarial meeting between strangers. 
133 Ibid., pp. 1285-1286 
134 Kinports K "Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims" (1988) 67 Oregon Law Rev 393- 
465 p. 411 
135 [ 198713 All ER 411 
136 McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women who Kill" p. 527 
138 
However, despite the subjective nature of self defence in English criminal law, very 
few women who kill their abusive partner are acquitted on the basis of this defence. 
McColgan argues that the difficulty lies '... not with the formal legal rules, but with 
informal, almost extra-legal, models of self-defence'. She states: 
"[t]hese models are constructed in the imagination, owe their contours to 
gcommon sense' or traditional paradigms of human behaviour and operate to 
block real consideration of situations which, although arguably within the 
legal defences' contours, do not fit the model. " 137 
The requirement of objective reasonableness in other jurisdictions, however, has 
caused significant difficulties for battered women. To some extent, a requirement of 
reasonableness is necessary. As Gillespie notes, it is not expected that the law should 
justify the unreasonable killing of another person. 138 Difficulties are highlighted, 
however, when it is realised that the jury are required to judge the reasonableness of 
the battered woman's actions in a situation which they have little, if any, 
understanding or comprehension. 139 Gillespie 140 examines a number of cases in 
which battered women have entered a plea of self-defence, which has invariably 
failed, and concludes that it is not an exaggeration to suggest that juries are adverse to 
finding a homicide committed by a woman reasonable, simply because it was 
committed by a woman. Furthermore, adhering to an objective standard of 
reasonableness renders self-defence difficult to apply to a case of domestic violence, 
as the intimate knowledge the battered woman holds about her abuser is excluded. As 
137 McColgan A "General Defences" in Nicolson D& Bibbings L Feminist Perspectives on Criminal 
Law p. 154 
138 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 93 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., p. 94 
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Tolmie notes: '[i]f this knowledge takes the form of an 'intuitive' understanding it 
may be impossible to articulate reasonable grounds to substantiate it. ' 141 An objective 
standard ignores the insights and experience which the woman holds. It merely 
questions whether, in relation to present incident, her belief that she was in danger of 
severe bodily harm or death was reasonable, without recourse to the relationship or 
history. Nor does it acknowledge that a battered woman may be enable to anticipate 
with some accuracy the extent of the harm although it may not to be obvious to the 
reasonable person. 142 Furthermore, as with provocation, reasonableness is constructed 
by 'social mores' and relates to the male experience, and hence the standard which the 
woman is judged against is essentially masculine. 143 Women are not considered to be 
reasonable beings, indeed, they are constructed to be the antithesis of reasonableness, 
and thus unable to comply to this 'objective' standard. 144 Hence it is not difficult to 
envisage that juries may easily conclude that a woman's belief in serious harm or 
death was unreasonable, especially if this belief is shaped by her previous 
experiences. 
Proportionality/Reasonable Force 
The requirement of reasonableness also extends to the amount of force used. In order 
to illustrate that the homicide was an act of self-defence the amount of force used 
141 Tolmie J "Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women who Kill" p. 72 
142 Ibid., Wannop A L'The Battered Woman Syndrome and the Defence of Battered Women in 
Canada and England" pp. 264-265; Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can A 
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defence When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer? " pp. 182-183 
143 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 99 
144 Tolmie PTrovocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women who Kill" p. 72; Schneider "Equal 
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" pp. 635-636 
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must be objectively reasonable. 145 Once again, this requirement of reasonableness 
presents a major hurdle for battered women. A woman has to contend with the myths 
and misconceptions which a judge and jury may hold and the view that it is never 
reasonable for a woman to kill her husband. To quote Gillespie: 
"A juror who shares the old stereotype of women as irrational, emotional, 
inherently unreasonable creatures will not be receptive to a woman's argument 
that what she did when she took someone's life was reasonable. A juror who 
accepts the widespread myths-that battered women are masochists who want 
to be hurt or nagging shews who drive their long-suffering mates to violence- 
will not be inclined to find any defense against such "invited" beatings 
reasonable. ... A juror who believes that acquitting any woman who 
kills her 
husband will give all wives a "licence to kill", and will result in an "open 
season on men, " will sure not find any such killing reasonable, no matter 
what the circumstances. " 1Y 
Unsurprisingly, the level of force considered justifiable is generally that which the 
reasonable man would have used in the circumstances. Hence, the situation is judged 
as though it was a fight between two men, and a woman is expected to adopt a 
masculine reaction. This masculine reaction demands equal retaliation, does not 
allow the use of a weapon against an unarmed opponent, does not permit one to kill in 
response to 'mere' threats, or wait to catch their opponent unawares. 147 From the 
picture which is developing about the manner in which a battered woman fights back, 
it is not difficult to see how her actions are considered to amount to unreasonable 
force. Even if the reasonable man is transformed into the reasonable person, the 
difficulties still remain. As Gillespie notes, '[flighting has always been defined by 
145 see the cases of Rv Owino [19951 Crim LR 743 and Rv Clegg [1995] 1 All ER 334. This point was 
also recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rv Martin [2002] 1 Cr App R 27. This 
case will be considered chapter 5 in relation to the application of the battered woman syndrome. 
146 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 94; see also Tolmie J 'Trovocation or Self-Defence for 
Battered Women who Kill" pp. 72-73; Wells C "Domestic Violence and Self-Defence" NLJ (1990) 
140,127-128 p. 128 
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our society as a masculine activity. We automatically tend to impose male rules of 
behaviour on violent confrontations because those are the only ones we have. ' 148 
Hence, juries are prone to apply a masculine standard, as this is the only standard they 
know. 
Evolving from this concept of reasonable force, is the requirement that the defensive 
action is proportional to the harm used or threatened. A notion which clearly has its 
roots in cases involving opponents of the approximate same size and fighting ability. 
Indeed in such cases the rule is considered to be intelligent. The situation changes 
slightly, however, when the fight is between a woman and a man. Is it reasonable for 
the law to expect a woman to meet her abusive husband fist for fiSt? 149 Especially 
when it is considered that women are generally not socialised to fight in such a 
manner. 150 Compelling women to respond in a style which is contrary to their 
socialisation effectively precludes self-defence. Furthennore, suggesting that a 
woman's behaviour will only be reasonable if it mirrors a male model is considered 
by some to be absurd. 151 This requirement of equal force raises significant difficulties 
for battered women who have killed their unarmed abuser with a weapon, as this is 
seen to be disproportionate, is it, however, unreasonable? Any previous attempts to 
defend herself unarmed may have lead to increased violence, thus enhancing her 
147 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 95 
148 Ibid., p. 100 
149 McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" p. 520 
150 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 99; Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias 
in the Law of Self-Defense" p. 632 
151 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 99 
142 
opinion that a weapon is necessary for her to properly defend herself, especially if she 
believes that her husband is capable of killing her with his bare hands. 152 
Another significant difficulty which arises in relation to the requirement of 
proportional force, is the judiciary's interpretation of what amounts to serious harm. 
Gillespie's review of battered women's self defence cases in America highlights the 
judiciary's unwillingness to construct a husband's unarmed attack as sufficiently 
grievous, despite the serious injuries which have often been inflicted. Gillespie 
examines the research conducted by Dr Leonre Walker and highlights that many of 
the severe injuries caused were inflicted without the aid of a weapon: 
"The 120 women .... were slapped in the face, punched with fists on their 
faces, 
heads, and bodies and stomped and kicked after they were knocked to the 
floor. Their arms were twist and broken, they were thrown across rooms and 
down stairs, and choked until they passed out. They were hurled against 
objects and had objects hurled against them. When they raised their arms to 
defend themselves, their arms and ribs were broken. Although some of the 
assaults involved knives and dangerous objects, the overwhelming majority of 
the women's injuries were inflicted by the man's hands, fists, and feet. " 153 
What is made clear by this research is that, despite the absence of a weapon, the level 
of harm inflicted by the batterer is undoubtedly grave and possibly life threatening. 
What is even more disturbing is the reluctance of some States in America to 
categorise rape and severe sexual assault as conduct amounting to serious bodily 
injury. The Supreme Court of California in 1978 arrived at such a construction in the 
case of People v Caudillo. 15,4 The victim suffered a severe attack by the defendant 
152 Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" p. 632 
153 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide pp. 51-52 
154 121 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Cal. 1978) cited in Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide pp. 65-67 
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who subjected her to vaginal, anal and oral rape. In the opinion of the Supreme Court 
such conduct did not constitute serious bodily injury. 155 
Subjective Reasonableness 
As mentioned above, the tests for reasonableness can be either objective 
questioning how the reasonable person would have responded in the circumstances - 
or subjective, questioning the reasonableness of the action from the unique viewpoint 
of the specific defendant. Whereas the former position has caused unlimited 
difficulties for battered women, the latter position is more amenable as it allows the 
killing to be judged according to her perception and recognises her individual 
characteristics. 
A significant breakthrough for battered women was delivered by the Supreme Court 
of Washington in the case of State v Wanrow. 156 Although this was not a battered 
woman case, it involved a 5'4" woman, who had a cast on her leg and had to use a 
crutch, who shot and killed a 6'2" intoxicated unarmed man, whom she knew to be a 
child molester, when he broke into her house, and threatened both her and her 
children. She was convicted for murder after the trial judge ruled that self-defence 
did not apply, due to the unequal application of force. This decision was overruled by 
the Supreme Court who stated that the requirement of objective reasonableness: 
&constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the context of this 
case, violates the respondent's right to equal protection of the law. ' 157 Hence, when 
155 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide pp. 65-67 
156 88 Wash. 2d 221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977) 
157 88 Wash. 2d 240,559 P. 2d at 558-59 
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assessing the reasonableness of the defensive force, the defendant's disparate size, 
strength and ability to fight must be taken into consideration. 158 The Supreme Court 
also ruled that the actions of a defendant are to be judged against her own subjective 
perception and knowledge, and not that of a reasonable person. Furthermore, the 
court strongly emphasised society's role in framing the behaviour and perceptions of 
women, and stated that any exclusion would lead to an unequal application of law: 
"The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light 
of her own perception of the situation, including those perceptions which were 
the product of our nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex- 
discrimination ...... Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated, 
care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford women 
the right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual handicaps 
which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the 
right of the individual woman involved to trial by the same ruled which are 
applicable to male defendants. "159 
It may be argued that this approach is prejudicial towards men, as women are allowed 
to be judged against a more subjective standard, whereas the test applicable to men 
remains objective. This also suggests that women are not as reasonable as men, as 
they require a distinct standard of reasonableness. 160 The court, however, recognised 
that the standard embedded in the law is not objective, per se, but masculine, and thus 
can be discriminatory. It considered that: '... instructions on self-defense law that 
158 McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women who Kill" p. 521; Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial 
for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" pp. 641-642; Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 
117 
159 88 Wash 2d 240-41,559 p. 2d at 559; see Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias 
in the Law of Self-Defense" p. 642; Scheff LS "People v Humphrey: Justice for Battered Women or 
Licence to Kill" Uni of San Fran L Rev (1997) 32,225-260 p. 235; Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide 
p. 117 
160 Taylor LJ "Provoked, Reason in Men and Women: Heat-Of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect 
Self-Defense" p. 1703 
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suggested, by persistent use of male gender, that a woman's conduct in defending 
herself be measured against that of a reasonable man finding himself in the same 
circumstances... .' 
161 effectively remove a woman's right to equal protection under 
the law. Furthermore, it is argued that subjectivising the test of reasonableness does 
not suggest women are less reasonable or applies a separate legal standard. It merely 
recognises that the situations in which men and women reasonably perceive a threat 
of imminent serious harm may differ. 162 The approach also seems to correspond with 
the view that gender and gender differences are socially constructed, as opposed to 
biologically determined. Hence, such an approach suggests that the ability exists to 
change the manner in which women perceive and react to violence. 
The court's recognition that perceptions are shaped by society's sex discrimination is 
undoubtedly radical and potentially has 'far-reaching implications'. 163 As Eber notes, 
women are generally not trained to fist fight, and thus often feel that a weapon is 
needed to defend themselves against a serious attack threatened by a man. Hence, the 
court would be implicitly allowing a woman to use a weapon in those situations where 
a man could not reasonably use more than his fists. Furthermore, it may also be 
implied that her perceptions, which are shaped by her emotional and economic 
dependency on her husband, should also be considered. This would include the 
161 (1977) 559 p 2d 548 at 559; see Tolmie "Provocation or Self-Defence for Battered Women Who 
Kill? " p. 73 
162 Schneider and Jordan "Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical 
or Sexual Assault" Nat J Crim De 4 (1978) 141; p. 143 cited in Taylor LJ "Provoked Reason in Men 
and Women; Heat of Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense" pp. 1704-1705 
163 Eber L "The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To be Kill or to be Killed" Hastings LJ (1981) 32,895- 
931 p. 925 
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perception that she is unable to leave and that the action adopted is the only possible 
solution. 164 One major difficulty with the approach of the Court, however, is that it 
appears to equate difference with inferiority. This is clearly evidenced in their 
employment of the word 'handicaps'. As Scheinder points outs, although sex 
discrimination 'is disabling to women as a class and to individual women', 165 the 
language of the Court relies on stereotypes of women as victims which suggests that 
the decision was due to 'patriarchal solicitude'. 166 Furthermore, the court prioritises 
difference on the grounds of gender, and implicitly rejects the significance of other 
differences, such as race and class. 167 
The Supreme Court also stated that a strict application of imminence was legally 
incorrect. The jury's consideration did not have to be limited to the events 
immediately preceding the killing, but should also take into account the defendant's 
knowledge of the deceased, including any previous acts of aggression thus admitting 
her insight that the deceased was a child molester. The fact that this knowledge may 
have been gained sometime in the past did not affect its relevancy: 168 
"It is clear that the jury is entitled to consider all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident in determining whether [the] defendant had 
164 Ibid., pp. 925-926 
165 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" Women's Rights Law Reporter (1986) 9,195-222 p. 214 
166 Ibid., p. 214 
167 Taylor L J'Trovoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-Of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect 
Self-Defense" p. 1703 
168 Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" p. 643 see 
also Eber L"The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To be Kill or to be Killed" pp. 920-921 
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reasonable grounds to believe grievous bodily harm was about to be 
inflicted. " 169 
Such a construction is undoubtedly beneficial for a battered woman who has an in- 
depth knowledge of the defendants propensity to be violent, the continuous nature of 
which is likely to render her constantly ready for defensive action. 170 The court also 
placed significant emphasis on the accused's knowledge of the deceased and implied 
that, in addition to its relevance in relation to the imminence requirement, it is also 
relevant to the reasonableness of the degree of force used. 17 1 Hence, a battered 
woman's knowledge of her attackers propensity to be violent should also reflect on 
the level of force she used. Furthermore, expanding the jury's consideration to all the 
surrounding circumstances may render relevant a number of wider factors which 
impact on the battered woman's perception of the necessitY to use violence Such 
factors may include the reluctance of the police and criminal justice to offer effective 
protection, the limited assistance of civil remedies, and society's historical acceptance 
of domestic violence. 172 
Nevertheless, a comprehensive view of imminency does not widen the requirement to 
include those battered women who kill during a non-abusive period or whilst the 
abuser is asleep. 173 In such circumstances it is clearly difficult to view the battered 
woman under a threat of imminent serious harm. Hence, regardless of how subjective 
the requirements of belief in harm and reasonable force may be, self-defence will not 
169 State v Wanrow 88 Wash 2d 236,559 P. 2d at 556 
170 Eber L "The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To be Kill or to be Killed" p. 921 
171 Ibid., p. 922 
172 Ibid., pp. 922-923 
173 Ibid., pp. 926-927 
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be available. Such a situation occurred in the New Zealand case of Rv Wang. 174 In 
New Zealand the test of self-defence appears to be subjective, indeed the statute 
states: 'Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another, such force 
as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use. ' 175 
The defendant in this case tied her abuser up and killed him whilst he was asleep. 
Thus the court held that self-defence was not applicable, as she faced no immediate 
danger. Furthermore, in contrast to the statute, the court appeared to apply an 
objective test of reasonableness, 176 which has been attributed to the court's refusal to 
allow evidence of the battered woman syndrome. 177 This could also be linked to the 
judicial reluctance to construct a woman's killing of her abusive husband as justified. 
Overall the Wanrow 178 decision, which took into account the size and ability of a 
woman when assessing the reasonableness of her defensive force against an unarmed 
man, develops a distinct female standard of reasonableness. Furthermore, it also 
indicates the judiciary's acceptance of a number of important factors: the differences 
between men and women in relation to acts of self-defence; the sex bias inherent in 
self-defence; and that a jury's evaluation of women's action may be tainted by 
stereotypes. 179 On a more theoretical level, Schneider argues that the decision blurs a 
174 (1990) 2 NZLR 529; see Beri S "Justice for Women Who Kill: A New Way? " 113-125 pp. 119-120; 
Seuffert N "Battered Woman and Self-Defence" 
175 S48 Crimes Act 1961 
176 Beri S "Justice for Women Who Kill: A New Way? " pp. 119-120 
177 see Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self Defence" 
178 88 Wash. 2d 221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977) 
179 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 213 
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number of binary oppositions. Firstly, the difference/sameness dichotomy is 
challenged through the recognition that women employ self defence in different 
circumstances and in a different manner to men. The court recognised that a failure to 
acknowledge these differences could, however, amount to a denial of equal 
protection. Women could be afforded equal protection if their perceived differences 
were explained to the jury, as then the jury are able to apply the existing legal 
standards. Women's differences are explained in order for them to receive the same 
legal protection as men. 180 The decision also works to redraw the distinction between 
excuse and justification. Whereas the actions of women, especially battered women, 
are usually excused, the judgement constructs her actions as justified, and attempts to 
challenge those stereotypes which prevent such a finding. 181 The individual/group 
dichotomy is also challenged. As Scheinder illustrates, although the court emphasised 
the significance and relevancy of the individual standpoint, it also recognised that the 
standpoint incorporates a group element. This is evidenced by the court's suggestion 
that some perceptions are shaped by society's sex discrimination. The experience is 
seen as particular - in the sense that it is different to men - but also as common - in 
that it is an experience which all women share. Hence '... women share a common 
experience which is different. ' 182 Such an approach can, however be challenged. Do 
all women share a common experience? Or is the common experience based on one 
group of women, thus ignoring and disqualifying the experiences of other wornen? ' 83 
Finally, the objective/subjective opposition is challenged, and the judgement indicates 
180 Ibid., 213-214 
181 Ibid., p. 216 
182 Ibid., p. 217 
183 The question of differences among women will be explored later in chapters 6,7 and 8. 
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a move towards a more subjective test of reasonableness. The court Wanrow, 184 
however, also recognised that the subjective includes the objective, in that a woman's 
subjective perception is shaped by her experience as a woman. Hence her perceptions 
are categorised as objective, in the sense that they are drawn from a group 
experience. 
185 
A Duty to Retreat 
The final element of self-defence which requires consideration, is a duty to retreat. 
Developed during the dawning years of self-defence, this requirement excluded a 
successful plea of self defence if the defendant did not 'retreat to the wall' before 
defensive action was used. Not only does the duty oblige one to back away from the 
fight, it also requires one to escape, or attempt to escape, if the opportunity presents 
itself, and it is safe to do so. 186 Such a duty is also seen to be grounded in the one off 
unarmed encounter between two equally sized opponents. In such a situation, 
requiring one to swallow pride and back away before the situation escalates and 
results in a death, is clearly justifiable. ' 87 The situation with battered women is, 
however, slightly different. A battered woman is usually dependent, both 
economically and emotionally on her abuser, and may have no where to escape to, 
and no transport to escape with. She also may have ran in the past, only to be caught 
by her abuser and receive a severe beating. The difficulty escalates somewhat when 
she has children, as she may fear for their safety if she has to leave them with a 
184 88 Wash. 2d 221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977) 
185 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 220 
186 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide pp. 77-79 
187 Ibid., p. 78 
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violent man. 188 In such circumstances, her decision not to retreat may be anything 
but unreasonable. As Gillespie states: '... a woman's decision not to run out into 
night-often with no money or clothes, leaving her children behind, with no place to 
go, and with a violent and possibly homicidal man in pursuit-is often the most 
reasonable one she could make. ' 189 
The harshness of this rule is mitigated slightly in those jurisdictions which apply the 
'castle doctrine'. This recognises that one is not required to retreat from their own 
home. The situation in the America is, however, muddled somewhat when the abuser 
is the co-occupant, or the sole owner. In some States the castle doctrine will only 
apply if the attacker is an intruder, and thus the battered woman is still obliged to 
retreat from her own home. 190 
In England and Wales, as with many other jurisdictions, the duty to retreat has now 
been abolished. Whether the harm could have been avoided, however, does have an 
impact on whether the defensive force is necessary and reasonable. The Court of 
Appeal in Rv Julien 191 stated: 'It is not, as we understand it, the law that a person 
threatened must take to his heels and run ... but what is necessary is that he should 
demonstrate by his actions that he does not want to fight. ' 192 In Rv Bird 193 the Court 
of Appeal, approved of the following passage in Smith and Hogan: 
188 Ibid., pp. 79-80 
189 Ibid., p. 80 
190 Ibid., p. 82 
191 [1969153 Cr. App. R. 407 
192 Ibid., p. 411 
193 [1985181 Cr App R 110 
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"There were formerly technical rules about the duty to retreat before using 
force, or at least fatal force. This is now simply a factor to be taken into 
account in deciding whether it was necessary to use force, and whether the 
force was reasonable. If the only reasonable course is to retreat, then it would 
appear that to stand and fight must be to use unreasonable force. There is, 
however, no rule of law that a person attacked is bound to run away if he can; 
99 194 
In some cases it may '... be only sensible and clearly possible to take some avoiding 
action. "95 In light of such pronouncements, McColgan suggests that battered women 
will be able to demonstrate that, when viewed from their perspective, their defensive 
action was reasonable and retreat was not a viable option. 196 Hence, if a subjective 
stance is taken in relation to the reasonableness of the force used, theoretically 
speaking, the fact that she did not retreat should not present itself as a hurdle. 
Difficulties arise, however, when her failure to leave the relationship is considered to 
be unreasonable. Although this is absolutely separate from the duty to retreat, as this 
concentrates solely on the time when the killing was committed, Gillespie notes that 
juries appear to confuse the failure to escape on the night in question with a failure to 
leave altogether. 197 This confusion is increased by the emphasis the prosecution often 
place on the woman's failure to leave. They use this fact to argue that she was not 
genuinely afraid, that the threatened harm was not that serious or that she invited or 
enjoyed the beatings. Indeed, explaining why the battered woman remained in the 
relationship has amounted to one of the most important tasks of the defence counsel, 
despite its legal iffelevance. 198 In many cases in which the duty to retreat was 
194 Ibid., pp. 114 Smith and Hogan Criminal Law [Butterworths; 5h ed; 1983] p. 327 
195 Palmer vR (Privy Council) [1971] A. C. 814,831-2 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest 
196 McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" pp. 516-517 
197 Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide p. 81 
198 Ibid., p. 145 
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considered to be an issue, women have been convicted for murdering their abuser, 
despite being either physically held down, pinned in a comer, or being threatening 
with a gun. 199 In other words, it appears that a duty to retreat has been enforced in 
situations in which retreat was not actually physically possible. Hence, it appears that 
a woman's failure to leave a violent relationship is considered to render her defensive 
action unreasonable, even if on the night in question retreat was not possible. This 
view is, however, based on the erroneous assumption that battered women are 
physically, emotionally and financially free to leave the relationship at any time. 
Self-Defence: Still Problematic 
Despite the more subjective approach which has developed in some jurisdictions, 
including England and Wales, battered women continue to encounter difficulties in 
obtaining an acquittal on the grounds of self-defence. 200 In addition to the difficulties 
caused by the requirement of imminency and the requirement of reasonable force, 
especially for those who killed in non-confrontational circumstances, a barrier also 
exists outside the legal requirements. This barrier is consists of the reluctance on 
behalf of the courts and society to accept that the actions of a battered women are 
actually committed in self-defence. This prejudice is explained by Sheehy, Stubbs 
and Tolmic 201 to take two forms. Firstly, it is suggested that many people either deny 
or ignore the impact a battering relationship may have on a woman's perceptions of 
harm, imminency and necessity of force. Hence '... the circumstances of a battering 
199 Ibid., p. 81 
200 see for example Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: the 
Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 375; 
201 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: the Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations" 375-376 
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relationship do not translate into defensive action because they do not connote 
unavoidable danger to most. ' 202 Secondly, the existence of a number of myths and 
misconceptions regarding battered women exist to construct her experience in a 
different light, for example that it was her fault for failing to leave and that she either 
incited the beatings or enjoyed them. Hence, battered women '... are generally judged 
for who they are and what they represent rather than what they individually faced, 
thought or did. 9203 It is in the context of such difficulties that the battered woman 
syndrome was developed. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the requirements of the defences 
which are normally considered available for women who kill their abusive partners. 
The main argument forwarded is that the legal requirements of the individual 
defences, especially provocation and self-defence, are based on male characteristics 
and hence tend to exclude the experiences and reactions of battered women. In 
relation to diminished responsibility, it is argued that, although this may amount to a 
successful defence, it fails to adequately reflect the situation of women who kill. 
One major criticism of both the existing law and some of the literature which has been 
produced in discussion of the law is that they both tend to a) assume that certain 
characteristics are natural and innate, for example the female slow bum anger, as 
opposed to the masculine sudden and temporary loss of self control, although there 
202 Ibid., p. 376 
203 Ibid., 
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has been some recognition that reactions are sociallY constructed 204 and b) the gender 
categories of man, woman and battered woman are presented as homogenous 
categories with little consideration of whom is represented and whom is excluded. 
Both the law and the academic commentary tends to be normative and essentialist in 
that assumes that all women (and men) react in a certain way, whether this reaction is 
biologially determined or socially constructed. Little consideration is given to the 
differences between women and how these may affect their perceptions and reactions. 
The next chapter will continue the discussion of the defences, by analysing the impact 
of the battered woman syndrome. 
M4 see for example Gillespie CK Justifiable Homicide and the Supreme Court in Wanrow 88 Wash. 2d 
221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977), which recognised. that they way in which women react and fight is socially 
constructed, as opposed to natural and biologically determined. 
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THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
The Rise and Fall of the Battered Woman Syndrome 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the concept of the 'battered woman syndrome'. 
In addition to examining the main elements of the concept: learned helplessness and 
the cycle theory of violence, the chapter also considers the rationale behind its 
development, how it has been used in relation to the three defences to murder, and the 
criticisms of the concept. As with the previous chapter on the defences, the chapter 
adopts a comparative cross-national perspective. In particular, specific attention is 
paid to the use of the syndrome in America and Canada and how this has differed to 
this jurisdiction. 
The syndrome was originally formulated by Lenore Walker, an American 
psychologist, in her book The Battered Woman 1 in an attempt to dissipate the myths 
and misconceptions surrounding battered women, and to answer the frequently asked 
question: Why do battered women remain in these relationships? Due to the frequent 
recurring fact that battered women did not leave their abusers, Walker argued that the 
answers lie not within individual psychopathology, but within psychosocial causation, 
and thus the concept of 'learned helplessness' was considered applicable. 2 
1 Walker L The Battered Woman [Harper & Row; New York 1979] 
Ibid., p. 16 
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Learned Helplessness 
Learned helplessness embodies what is known as 'the principle of reinforcement', 
which relates to the relationship between voluntary responses and outcomes. If a 
certain response is expected to create a particular outcome, and succeeds to do so, 
this produces the feeling that one has been able to control that situation. This feeling 
of control is diminished, however, if the response fails to secure the expected outcome 
and no logical explanation for this failure presents itself. 3 Hence, if expected 
response-outcome relationships fail, a feeling that one lacks the ability to control the 
situation is likely to develop. This theory of learned helplessness was developed by 
psychologist Martin Seligman. 4 Seligman subjected dogs to sporadic electric shocks 
and once it became apparent that any voluntary movement would not prevent further 
shocks, the dogs became submissive and passive. They developed a learned 
helplessness. Furthermore, when an attempt was made to illustrate to the dogs that 
they could escape, by simply moving to the other side of the cage, or leaving the cage, 
the dogs still remained unresponsive. The dogs had to be taught how to engage in 
5 voluntary actions, by being physically removed from their cages. 
Hence, once a person comes to believe that they have no control over the response- 
outcome relationship they respond with the learned helplessness phenomenon, even if 
they do, in reality, possess the ability to exert control. Walker emphases that it is the 
belief that one lacks control, as opposed to the actual nature of controllability which is 
of consequence. Once the belief that one has the ability to control and influence a 
Ibid., p. 44-45 
4 Seligman, M; Maier and Geer "Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog" J qfAbnortnal 
Psychology (1968) 73,256 
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situation has disappeared, it becomes very difficult to regain the belief that control 
will ever be possible. 6 In relation to battered women, it is considered that learned 
helplessness arises due to the erratic nature of the abuse and the apparent 
disconnection between his abuse and her behaviour. 7 Walker states: 
"The violence is unavoidable, she can do nothing to pacify her husband and 
prevent the beating. The battered woman's inability to control the situation 
leads to feelings of fatalism. She perceives her husband as omnipotent and 
,, 8 believes there is no way for her to escape or improve her life. 
Thus, in order to comprehend why women remain in abusive relationships, Walker 
places significant emphasis on the concept of learned helplessness. Once abused 
women develop the belief that they are helpless, this belief becomes reality, and they 
become submissive, passive and helpless. 9 '[T]he repeated batterings, like electrical 
shocks, diminish the woman's motivation to respond. "o 
Dupps 11 also notes that, in addition to this learned helplessness, there are several 
other factors which prevent a battered woman from leaving the relationship, or 
seeking help. These include fear for her own safety and the safety of any children she 
may have, economic dependency, and the belief that the batterer will reform. The 
combination of the learned helplessness and these other factors leads to feelings of 
shame, as she may believe that she is a 'bad wife' or a masochist, and low self- 
5 Walker L The Battered Woman pp. 4546 
6 Ibid., p. 46 
7 Kinports K "Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims" Oregon Law Review 67 (1988) 393 
8 Ibid., p. 398 
9 Walker L The Battered Woman p. 47 
10 Ibid., p. 49 
11 Dupps DS "Battered Lesbians: Are they entitled to a Battered Woman Defense? " J of Family Law 
(1990-1991) 29,881-899 pp. 883-883 
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esteem. Furthermore the feelings of helplessness are often compounded when she 
turns to the police and courts for help, as they have, generally, been ineffectual in 
helping battered women. 12 
The Cycle Theory of Violence 
The second element of Walker's Battered Woman Syndrome, which has had an 
impact on the legal treatment of battered women who kill, is the cycle theory of 
violence. The violence which women suffer is not entirely sporadic, but cyclical with 
three discrete phases. The first stage, the tension building stage, involves incidents of 
minor battering. During this stage attempts to calm the batterer are generally made 
and she may become nurturing and submissive, letting the batterer know that his 
violence towards her is legitimate, in order to prevent any escalation of violence. 13 
The acute battering incident, which forms the second phase, develops from the 
immense pressures which have accumulated during the tension building phase, and 
leads to uncontrollable outbursts of violence. The second stage is distingiushable from 
the first due to the nature of the violence. The violence tends to be destructive and 
lacking in control. Although the tension building phase may involve legal assaults, the 
acute battering incident involves incidences of serious physical, sexual and 
psychological violence. This second phase is also characterised by its lack of 
predictability. From the women's accounts of the events preceding the acute 
battering, Walker found that it was impossible to predict the nature of the abuse which 
will form the acute battering, and women who suffered this cycle of violence whilst 
being interviewed were unable to offer any suggestions on how to predict this 
12 Ibid., pp. 886-889 
13 Walker L 7he Battered Wonzan pp. 56-59 
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explosion of uncontrollable violence. A factor pertinent to both phase one and two is 
the severe psychological trauma suffered by the battered woman, inflicted both 
directly by the batterer and indirectly due to the violent relationship. Indeed, in 
relation to the acute battering, Walker states '[s]he does not feel the pain as much as 
she feels psychologically trapped and unable to flee the situation. ' 14 Realising that his 
behaviour is uncontrollable, and not open to reason, she responds with calmness and 
acquiescence. This submissive conduct is also influenced by her knowledge that any 
resistance from her may lead to an escalation of the violence. 15 
Walker draws comparisons with victims of catastrophes, noting how women during 
the second phase evidence symptoms of 'delayed reaction syndrome', which include 
'listlessness, depression and feelings of helplessness'. 16 The woman is likely to 
isolate herself, and not to seek help, whether medical, legal or otherwise, for at least 
24 hours. 17 Furthermore, Walker notes that battered women often feel that protection 
from the abuse, whether legally or otherwise is completely unattainable. 'They 
frequently comment that they feel their batterers are beyond the grasp of the law. '18 
Following this acute battering stage, the behaviour of the batterer transforms, and he 
becomes loving and kind. This third stage is termed loving contrition, and Walker 
states that this stage completes the woman's victimisation. 19 The batterer is full of 
remorse, begs for his victim's forgiveness and promises that he will never hurt her 
14 Ibid., p. 63 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 64 
19 Ibid., p. 65 
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again, believing that from now on he will regain control over his actions. He has the 
ability to persuade both himself and his victim that this time his promises will remain 
true, and may take steps to prove his sincerity. Furthermore, he also believes that 
'... he has taught her such a lesson that she will never again behave in such a manner, 
and so he will not be tempted to beat her. ' 20 
Any feelings of anger, fear and hurt which she may possess at the end of the acute 
battering phase, and any desire to leave, may dissipate due to his changed behaviour. 
Indeed Walker notes that although many battered women leave at the beginning of the 
third phase they return due to the batterer's transformed conduct, the continuous 
promises to remain benevolent and emotional blackmail. 21 The battered woman 
comes to believe that the batterer shows his true nature during this phase. The 'real 
person' is this kind loving man, not the violent abusive individual who beat her during 
the other two phases. If only help was available, she believes, he would remain 
passive and loving. 22 As noted by Dupps, her belief that his behaviour has changed 
23 
and will so remain corresponds to the 'intermittent reinforcement theory' . This 
psychological theory 'recognizes that the period between beatings reinforces the 
woman's belief that the abuse has stopped during this time. 24 
20 Ibid., pp. 65-66 
21 Ibid., p. 66 Walker states 
...... during this time ... the battered woman realizes how frail and insecure her batterer really is. Included in this entreaties are threats that he will destroy his life if she does not forgive him. 
He reminds how much he needs her and asserts that something awful will happen to him if she 
leaves him. " 
22 Ibid., p. 68 
23 Dupps DS "Battered Lesbians: Are they entitled to a Battered Woman Defense? " pp. 885-886 
24 Ibid., pp. 885-886 
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Walker states that this violent relationship renders the couple completely dependent 
upon each other, they become a 'symbiotic pair', and it is during this third phase that 
this attachment is cemented, and any attempt to leave the relationship by either 
partner would significantly affect the other. 25 Unfortunately, his promises do not hold 
true and the loving contrite behaviour slowly turns into tension building, and the cycle 
runs again. 26 The anxiety and fear which the battered woman feels during phases one 
and two pervades the battered woman's life, and she becomes consumed with a 
6cumulative terror', 27 living in constant fear of harm, even during the calm, loving 
periods. Indeed it is during such calm periods in the woman may decided to become 
proactive and use force against the batterer. Hence, Walker states that sometimes the 
battered woman '... strikes back during a calm period, knowing that the tension is 
building towards another acute battering incident, where this time she may die. ' 28 
The Impact of the Battered Woman Syndrome 
The battered woman syndrome has undoubtedly enhanced the legal position of the 
woman who kills her abusive husband, and has, in some cases, led to an outright 
acquittal. As already noted, one rationale for developing the syndrome was to explain 
why the woman did not leave the abusive relationship, and this is generally explained 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 69 
27 Comment "Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single Standard In? Law and 
Human Behaviour (1978) 2,133 p. 164; Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self- 
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent" Virginia L Rev (1986) 72, p. 627 Wallace H "The Battered 
Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissenf'Pol J (1994) 133-138; 232-236; 
p. 134 
28 Walker L 77te Battered Woman Syndrome p. 142 
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through the concept of learned helplessness. The second rationale, which has on the 
whole been exceptionally significant in proving self-defence, is to show that her 
killing of the batterer was reasonable, and thus justifiable, and it is to this end that the 
cyclical theory of violence is used. As noted by Schneider: 
"The purpose of expert testimony has been to educate the judge and jury about 
the common experiences of battered women, to explain the context in which 
as individual battered woman acted, so as to lend credibility and provide a 
context to her explanation of actions. 99 29 
The syndrome became central to the United States Women's Self-Defense Law 
Project founded in 1978 by the Center for Constitutional Rights in order to enhance 
the effectiveness of lawyers who represent women who kill their abusers. 30 The main 
aim of this project has to been to 'overcome sex-bias in the law of self-defense and to 
equalize treatment of women in the courts. ' 31 Such equality was to be achieved by the 
recognition of difference. Thus the project aimed to secure the legal recognition of 
the different experiences and circumstances in which women kill. The admission of 
the battered woman syndrome is considered to be a '... logical extension of this idea. ' 32 
The testimony can be seen to work on a number of different levels. Firstly, in order to 
disprove any myths and misconceptions the judge and jury may hold about battered 
women, which may unfairly taint their evaluation of the defendant, evidence of the 
29 see Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering"; see also Dupps DS "Battered Lesbians: Are they entitled to a Battered 
Woman Defense? " pp. 879; 879-884, Donnelly M "Battered Women who Kill and the Criminal Law 
Defences" p. 163 
30 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 195 
31 Ibid., p. 197 
32 Ibid. 
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syndrome provides details of the shared experiences and characteristics of battered 
woman. The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v Kell Y 33 considered that the 
evidence would increase the credibility of the battered woman as a witness, as it 
would illustrate to the jury the commonality of her experiences, who may find them 
incredible. 34 The woman is presented as a victim, thus combating any belief that she 
was in some way to blame for or deserved the beatings, and that such abuse is 
acceptable in a marital relationship. 35 Secondly, it also explains the psychological 
impact of social and economic difficulties which are generally suffered by battered 
women. 36 Thirdly, it can also illustrate why she believed the conduct of the batterer 
on the occasion in question presented an imminent danger of serious bodily harm or 
death. 37 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the battered woman 
syndrome was vital to the question of whether her belief in the imminent harm was 
honest, and will assist the jury in deciding the objective question: would a reasonable 
person also believe that an imminent threat existed. 38 
Overall, evidence of the battered woman syndrome has had a significant beneficial 
impact on cases involving women who kill their abusers, and a great number of 
33 97 NJ. 178,197,478, A. 2d 364 (1984) 
34 Ibid., p. 201; Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem 
of Expert Testimony on Battering" p. 209 
35 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony" p. 202; see also Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defense" p. 325; Tolmie J 
"Provocation of Self-Defense for Battered Women Who Kill" 
36 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony" p. 203 
37 Ibid., p. 204 
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appeals have succeeded on the basis that the evidence was wrongly and unfairly 
excluded . 
39 Schneider states '[i]n general the expert testimony cases have 
demonstrated significant judicial recognition of the depth and severity in the trial 
process for battered women claiming self-defense. 940 
38 Ibid., p. 209; State v Kelly 97 NJ. 178,197,478, A. 2d 364 (1984) at 37 
39 see Maguigan H "Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform 
Proposals" Uni of Pennsylvania L Rev 140 (1991) 379 
40 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 205 
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THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND THE DEFENCES 41 
Provocation: Characteristics and the Reasonable Person 
In relation to provocation, the objective strand of the test (whether or not a reasonable 
person would have reacted in a similar manner) has caused significant difficulties for 
the judicary. The main problem has focused on which, if any, particular 
characteristics of the defendant should be attributed to the reasonable person when 
assessing the level of self control which society expects. The complication appeared 
41 As a psychological theory, evidence of the battered woman syndrome may only be presented by an 
expert witness, and will only be admitted if it fulfils the jurisdiction's specific requirements relating to 
expert testimony. In England and Wales, the decision in the case of Rv Turner [ 1975] QB 834 states 
that the issue on which the evidence goes to must 'be beyond the ken of the average juror' (p. 834). 
Thus if it is considered that the issues is within the knowledge and experience of the jury, and that a 
decision may be reached without an expert, than the testimony will be irrelevant. On this issue see 
O'Donovan "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman and Her Syndrome" p. 
430 and McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" p. 523. The Battered Woman 
Syndrome has also be held to be admissible in the following jurisdictions: Australia, see Bates F 
"Expert Witnesses and Battered Women-The Lighthouse Flashes" Journal of Crim L 58 (1994) 85-96; 
Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending Battered Women On Trial: The Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations"; O'Donovan "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered 
Woman, and Her Syndrome" p. 43 1; Tyler L "The Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia" Crim 
Lawyer 44 (1994) 5; in Canada, see Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A 
Comparative Analysis" p. 796; McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women who Kill"; O'Donovan 
K "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman and Her Syndrome" pp. 429-430; 
Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self Defence"; and some States in America see Coffee C "A Trend 
Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Wife 
Syndrome" Journal of Family Law 25 (1986/1987) 373-396 
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to be twofold: a) the definition of a relevant characteristic and b) whether it should 
bear any relation to the self control expected of the accused. This issue, however, 
seems to have been resolved by the House of Lords in the recent case of SMitjI. 42 The 
query related to the particular characteristics of the accused and whether or not they 
should be transferred to the reasonable person when deciding the objective strand of 
the defence. This confusion developed after the case of Camplin 43 within which Lord 
Diplock appeared to draw a distinction between the level of self control, which could 
only be affected by the age and the sex of the accused (hence, a 50 year old woman 
will be evaluated against the level of self-control of a reasonable 50 year old woman) 
and 'other' characteristics, which may be relevant to the gravity of the provocation. 
This distinction was abolished by the House of Lords in the case of Smith, 44 however 
Camplin 45 was not overruled, with Lord Hoffman asserting that this interpretation was 
actually consistent with Lord Diplock's judgment. Hoffman held the opinion that the 
reference to age and sex as factors which could affect the level of self-control were 
illustrative as opposed to exhaustive. Prior to the case of Smial 
46 it was not 
particularly clear whether or not the battered woman syndrome would amount to a 
relevant characteristic which could affect the gravity of the provocation. 
The issue of battered women syndrome and the objective strand of provocation first 
fell to be considered by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rv Ahluwalia. 47 One 
42 [200013 WLR 654 
43 [ 197812 All ER 168 
44 [200013 VaA 654 
45 [ 197812 All ER 168 
46 [200013 VaR 654 
47 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
168 
ground of the appeal related to the trial judge's direction as to the relevancy of the 
appellant's characteristics. The Trial judge directed the jury thus: 
"rhe only characteristics of the defendant about which you know specifically 
that might be relevant are that she is an Asian woman, married, incidentally to 
an Asian man, the deceased living in this country. You may think that she is 
an educated women, she has a University Degree. If you find these 
characteristics relevant to your considerations, of course you will bear that in 
mind. 948 
The defence, however, argued that this direction excluded a particular characteristic 
which could have affected the gravity of the provocation (as opposed to the level of 
self-control). The defence argued that Ahluwalia was suffering from battered woman 
syndrome, and that this characteristic had been ignored. The Court of Appeal, 
however, stated that no evidence was adduced before the trial judge which suggested 
that she was suffering from the syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, or any other 
specific condition which could amount to a 'characteristics', 49 which seems to suggest 
that the battered woman syndrome could amount to a relevant characteristic. The 
Court of Appeal did, however, state that the history of abuse suffered did not amount 
to a relevant characteristic as it did not amount to a characteristic which rendered the 
accused '... a different person from the ordinary run of (women) or marked off or 
distinguished from the ordinary woman of the community', 50 a requirement which 
was adopted by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rv Newell. 51 Ahluwalia's appeal 
was actually allowed on the grounds that there was evidence which supported a plea 
of diminished responsibility. Hence, it appears that, whereas the battered woman 
syndrome could amount to a relevant characteristic, the fact of suffering long-term 
48 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 p. 140 
49 Ibid., p. 141 
50 P. 141 
51 [1980] 71 Cr App R 311 
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abuse would not. What is not completely clear from the cases of Ahluwalia 52 and 
53 Newell, however, is whether the characteristics are only relevant to the gravity, or 
whether they can also affect the level of self control. 
The Court of Appeal also recognised the relevancy of other mental characteristics in 
the cases of Humphreys 54 and Dryden. 55 In the former case it was held that the 
defendant's characteristics of attention seeking and immaturity should be applied in 
order to decide the objective question of self control, even though they did not have 
any bearing on the gravity of provocation. Lord Chief Justice Taylor stated: 
"The jury would, as ever, use their collective common sense to determine 
whether the provocation is sufficient to make a person of reasonable self- 
control in the totality of the circumstances (including personal characteristics) 
act as the defendant did. "56 
Hence, the cases thus far seem to suggest that a relevant characteristic can alter the 
level of self-control expected of an accused. This position was, however, criticised by 
Lord Goff in the House of Lords case of Rv Morhall 57 and in the Privy Council case 
58 of Luc 77det Thuan. Through the judgement of Lord Goff in both cases, the 
distinction between the standard of self control and the gravity of provocation as 
formulated by Lord Diplock in Camplin 59 was reasserted. Lord Goff held the correct 
legal approach to be that suggested by Ashworth: 
52 [ 1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
53 [1980171 Cr App R 311 
54 [1995] 4 All ER 1008 
55 [ 199514 All ER 987 
56 (1995) All ER 1008 see Edwards S "Battered Women in Fear of Luc's Shadow" p. 92 
57 [ 199513 All ER 659 
58 [199612 All ER 1033 
59 [197812 All ER 168 
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"... individual's peculiarities which bear on the gravity of the provocation 
should be taken into account, whereas individual peculiarities bearing on the 
accused's level of self control should not. " 60 
Lord Goff declared that the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the cases of 
Ahluwalia '61 HumphreyS, 
62 Dryden 63 and Thornton (No 2) '64 was incorrect 
due to 
their reliance on the test formulated in the New Zealand case of Rv McGregor, 65 
which was rejected by both the House of Lords and Privy Council. This New Zealand 
test was composed in the absence of a defence of diminished responsibility, hence it 
recognises that those individual peculiarities which are sufficiently permanent and 
distinguish the accused from the rest of society, may reduced the standard of self 
control expected. Nevertheless, Lord Goff did recognise the relevancy of mental 
characteristics, provided they are the focus of the provocation: 
"... it is of course consistent with Lord Diplock's analysis in Camplin ... that the 
mental infirmity of the defendant, if itself subject to the taunts of the deceased, 
may be taken into account as going to the gravity as applied to the 
defendant.,, 66 
Hence, whereas the mental infirmity or personality disorder of a defendant will not be 
allowed to reduce the objective level of self control, it will be admitted in order to 
assess the gravity of the provocation, if the provocation is directed at the 
characteristic. In Luc Thiet Thuan 67 Lord Goff also stated that other circumstances, 
which may not properly amount to characteristics, may also bear relevance to the 
60 Ashworth A'7he Doctrine of ProvocatioTf'(1976) CLJ 292 p. 300 
61 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
62 [199514 All ER 1008 
63 [199514 All ER 987 
64 [199611 WLR 1174 
65 [1962] NZIR 1069 
66 Luc 77det 7huan [1996] 2 All ER 1035 
67 Ibid. 
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question of gravity. This suggests that evidence of cumulative provocation may be 
taken into account whilst assessing whether the victim's conduct was sufficiently 
grave to justify the response which it received. A somewhat different approach, 
however, was adopted by the House of Lords in the case of Smith. 68 
Smith, who was an alcoholic and suffered from depression, was convicted for murder 
after he stabbed and killed his friend during the course of an argument. The Court of 
Appeal allowed his appeal on the basis that his depression amounted to a relevant 
characteristic which should be taken into account when assessing the objective 
question. Furthermore, no distinction was to be made between the gravity of the 
provocation and the level of self-control expected. Hence, his depression could be 
taken into account when assessing the level of self-control he was expected to 
possess. The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for manslaughter on the 
grounds of provocation and the Crown appealed to the House of Lords. In dismissing 
the appeal, Lord Hoffman, who delivered the main judgment, stated that it was not the 
position of the judge to tell the jury to ignore certain characteristics of the accused 
when assessing the objective element of provocation, as this would be to 'trespass 
upon their province' . 
69 Thus, seentingly, the jury can take into account any 
characteristic, which presumably includes the battered woman syndrome, when 
considering the level of self-control the accused should be expected to maintain. 
Although Hoffman recognised the general principle that the 'same standards of 
behaviour are expected of everyone', 70 he also considered that the principle may 
68 [200013 VaR 654 
69 Ibid., p. 668 
70 Ibid., p. 678 
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'have to yield to a more important principle, which is to do justice in the particular 
case. 71 Hence, it may be unjust for the jury to ignore a certain characteristics when 
assessing the level of self-control to be expected. Clearly, justice required Smith's 
depression to be taken into account. 
Lord Hoffman, however, does not stay completely true to his statement that the 
judiciary should not trespass into the province of the jury, as he also states that some 
characteristics should be ignored. Concerned that the safety of the public does require 
a certain standard of self-control, an individual who kills '-when he is crossed, 
thwarted or disappointed in the vicissitudes of life would not be able to rely upon his 
antisocial propensity as even a partial excuse for killing. 72 Moreover, Lord Hoffman 
paid particular attention to the case of Stingel v The Queen 73 in which the accused 
killed the lover of a woman with whom he had become infatuated. With this in mind, 
he stated that characteristics such as '... male possessiveness and jealously should not 
today be an acceptable reason for loss of self-control leading to homicide, whether 
inflicted upon the woman herself or her new lover. ' 74 Additionally, juries should be 
directed not to take such characteristics into account, a position which is considered 
75 by some to be 'pro-feminist'. Hence, it appears that not all characteristics can be 
taken into account by the jury, but only those which are considered socially 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., p. 674 
73 (1990) 171 CLR 312 
74 [200013 V; LR 654 p. 674 
75 Edwards S "The erosions of the objecitve test in provocation: leaving it to the jury? Rv Smith: 
Towards a just law on provocation? " Joumal of Soc Wel & Fam Law 23(2) (2001) 227-238 p. 236 
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acceptable. Little guidance, however, is forwarded on what is considered to be a 
socially acceptable or 'just' characteristic. 
Under Lord Hoffman's direction, it does appear that the jury could, if they considered 
it just to do so, take into account the battered woman syndrome or post-traumatic 
stress disorder when dealing with a woman who kills her abusive partner. Indeed Lord 
Clyde stated: 
"I would not regard it as just for a plea of provocation made by a battered 
wife whose condition falls short of a mental abnormality to be rejected on the 
ground that a reasonable person would not have reacted as she did. The 
reasonable person in such a case should be one who is exercising a reasonable 
level of self control for someone with her history, her experience and her state 
of mind. tq 76 
Hence, in addition to taking into account any perceived mental conditions, regard 
should also be taken of the fact of the abuse and the experience she has suffered. 
The decision in Smith 77 has been hailed by some to be a significant breakthrough for 
women who kill their abusive partners. 78 Whether or not the battered woman 
syndrome is considered to reduce the level of self-control is, however, another matter. 
It may be argued that the phenomenon of 'learned helplessness' suggests an increased 
level of self-control. Additionally, simply because characteristics such as the battered 
woman syndrome are considered to be socially acceptable at a particular point time 
this does not guarantee that they will always be viewed in such a light. As Edwards 
points out, Lord Hoffman's rejection of male possessiveness and jealousy is to 
,... turn back the hands of time and to strike at the very heart of past and current 
76 SMith [200013 WIR 654 p. 682 
Ibid. 
78 See for example Dyer C "Women who kill given court hope" The Guardian 20 July 2000 
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orthodoxy. '79 Since the perceived acceptability of characteristics can alter over time, 
little is to prevent the battered woman syndrome or post-traumatic stress disorder 
becoming an unacceptable characteristic. 
In addition it has been argued that the House of Lords misinterpreted Camplin 80 and 
also 'brushed aside the effect of the unanimous most recent decision of the House in 
Morhall. ..,. 
81 As Horder illustrates, the House of Lords in Camplin 82 and Morhall" 
considered that, whilst any of the characteristics which affect the gravity of the 
provocation may be considered those characteristics which make him/her less 
reasonable, thus reducing the standard of self control, and are considered to be 
repugnant or wholly inconsistent to the notion of the reasonable person, and this 
should not be admitted. Allowing 'unreasonable' characteristics to be taken into 
account whilst assessing the objective question of self control would demolish the 
justificatory aspect of the defence, the objective standard, and transform provocation 
into a solely excusatory defence. 84 Furthermore, there appears little need to extend 
provocation in this manner, as diminished responsibility exists to deal with those 
defendants who suffer from mental abnormalities. 
79 Edwards S 'The erosions of the objecitve test in provocation: leaving it to the jury? Rv Smith: 
Towards a just law on provocation? " p. 236 
80 [197812 All ER 168 
81 Smith JCR "R v Smith (Morgan James)" [2000] Crim LR 1004 p. 1005 see also Gardner J& 
Macklern T"Compassion without Respect? Nine Fallacies in Rv Smith" (2001) Crim LR 623-635 
82 [ 197812 All ER 168 
83 [ 199513 All ER 659 
84 Horder J 'Trovocation's Characteristic Difficulties, Rv Humphreys" Int J of Discrimination Law 1 
(1996) 288-294 pp. 289-290 
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One approach which does appear to provide some solution can be seen in the 
dissenting judgment of Lord Millet in Smith. 85 Lord Millet disagreed with the 
approach adopted by Lord Hoffman, arguing that it was inconsistent with both section 
3 and Lord Diplock's judgment in Camplin. 86 In contrast to allowing the peculiar 
characteristics of the accused to reduce the level of self control expected, Lord Millet 
suggests that the objective test should be reformulated thus: '-would or might the 
provocation have produced the like reaction from the accused if he had exercised 
normal powers of self-control. ' 87 Such an approach allows the jury to take into 
account 'the entire factual situation' in which the accused found themselves, and to 
judge how they would have reacted if they possessed the normal level of self-control. 
Lord Millet specifically refers to the situation of the battered woman and argues that 
in such a situation the jury should take into account the effect of cumulative abuse and 
question '-whether a woman with normal powers of self-control, subjected to the 
treatment which the accused received, would or might finally react as she did. 88 
Hence, as opposed to focusing upon her mental state and how this might have affected 
her level of self-control, the jury focuses specifically on the abuse she suffered. 
I would agree with the proposition that the House of Lords in Smith 89 did actually 
misinterpret Lord Diplock's direction in Camplin, 90 which does clearly distinguish 
85 see also Burton M "Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence - Endangering Women? Rv 
Smith" Feminist Legal Studies (2001) 9,247-258 
86 [ 197812 All ER 168 
87 Rv Smith [200013 WLR 654 p. 715 
$a Ibid., p. 717 
89 Ibid. 
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between those characteristics which affect the level of self-control (age and sex) and 
other characteristics which may affect the gravity of the provocation. Allowing any of 
the characteristics of the accused to alter the level of self-control to be expected does 
seem to turn the defence into a complete excusatory defence. However, difficulties 
arise when we start to question what is the ordinary standard of self-control. Upon 
whom is this standard based? Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between 
recognising the problematic nature of the fictious 'reasonable person' and allowing 
any characteristics especially mental abnormalities, to be taken into account. Justice 
can be achieved in such cases by placing the 'reasonable woman' in the situation of 
the accused and asking how they would have reacted, as advanced by Lord Millet. 91 
Such an approach would still protect the woman who kills her abusive partner, 
providing she manages to fulfil the first requirement of a sudden and temporary loss 
of self control, which remains the major hurdle. 
Diminished Responsibility 
The courts in this jurisdiction have generally accepted that the battered woman 
syndrome provides sufficient evidence of diminished responsibility. In the case of R 
v Hobson 92 evidence of battered woman syndrome was not admitted at the trial, as, at 
that time, it was not recognised as a mental illness. The defendant appealed against 
her murder conviction on the grounds that she was suffering from the battered woman 
syndrome when she committed the homicide The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal 
90 [1978] 2 All ER 168 
91 see also Burton M "Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence - Endangering Women? Rv 
Smith" 
92 [ 19971 Crim L Rev 759 
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and ordered a retrial recognising that the battered woman syndrome is now admissible 
and relevant to the plea of diminished responsibility. 93 
Applying the battered woman syndrome solely to cases of diminished responsibility, 
which has largely been the approach of the judiciary in England, can be seen to 
perpetuate images of women as passive, weak and iffational. Such an application 
conceptualises the battered woman syndrome as evidence of a mental disorder, as 
opposed to evidence that the actions of the abused woman were reasonable and should 
be considered as self defence, as occurs in the jurisdictions of America and Canada. 94 
Hence, although admitting evidence of battered woman syndrome has usually led to a 
successful defence of diminished responsibility, thus leading to a conviction for 
manslaughter as opposed to murder, it accepts such stereotyped notions of women, 
blames their mental weaknesses for their actions, and does not challenge the legal 
conceptions of reasonableness. 
Self Defence 
In America and Canada, the battered woman syndrome has proved to be most 
significant in relation to the plea of self-defence. In particular, it is the cycle theory of 
violence which has supplied the evidence necessary to prove the relevant legal 
requirements. It is considered that the woman's perception of the level of threatened 
harm is affected by her knowledge of the batterer's history of violence towards her, 
hence the history of past abuse is relevant to the requirement that her belief in 
93 see Edwards S "Battered Women - In Fear of Luc's Shadow" pp. 103-104 
94 Wannop AL "Battered Woman Syndrome and the Defence of Battered Women in Canada and 
England" p. 270 
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imminent harm must be reasonable or honest. 95 As noted by the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in State v Kelly: 96 '[t]he expert's testimony might also enable the jury to 
find that the battered wife, because of the prior beatings ... 
is particularly able to predict 
accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her. ' 97 and this could 
substantially impact upon the jury's determination of whether her belief was 
98 reasonable. Nevertheless, this does appear to contradict Walkers' findings that 
many women caught in a cycle were unable to predict the extent of violence likely to 
occur during the acute battering stage. 
In relation to the requirement that the amount of force used must be reasonable and 
proportionate to the perceived harm, the cycle theory of violence explains why it may 
be reasonable for a woman to use deadly force against an unarmed man, as she feels 
unable to free herself from a cycle of potentially deadly violence. 99 The admission of 
the expert testimony enables the question of reasonableness to be considered in the 
context of all the relevant circumstances, ' 00 as opposed to restricting legal relevancy 
to the period of time immediately preceding the fatal attack. When one adds to this the 
insights of the learned helplessness theory, it is clear to see how the battered woman 
95 Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent"p. 
628 
96 478 A 2d 364 (1984) 
97 97 NJ at 206,478 A. 2d at 378 
98 at 375; see Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of 
Expert Testimony on Battering" p. 211; Kazan P "Reasonableness, Gender Difference, and Self- 
Defense Law" Manitoba LJ (1997) 24,549-575 p. 554 
99 Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent"p. 
628; Kazan P "Reasonableness, Gender Difference, and Self-Defense Law" p. 554 
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may believe she is truly acting in self-defence. As noted by Dupps, a battered 
woman's propensity to use deadly force will increase as she becomes overwhelmed 
by a feeling of helplessness and desperation, and starts to perceive the police as 
unresponsive and unable to offer protection. 101 
The case which is widely used to show the application of the battered woman 
syndrome to self-defence is Rv Lavallee 102 which was decided by the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The accused suffered years of frequent violence at the hands of her 
partner, Kevin Rust. On the night in question, violence had broken out. Rust handed 
Lavallee a gun, who considered shooting herself, due to the fear she felt. Rust then 
shouted 'either you kill me or I'll get you'. She shot him in the back of the head as he 
was leaving the room. She was charged with second degree murder, and was 
acquitted by the trial court on the grounds of self-defence. The Crown appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which upheld her acquittal. Madam Justice Bertha 
Wilson, who delivered the judgement, emphasised that the law needed to recognise 
the experience of women, especially battered women. She thus considered that 
evidence of the battered woman syndrome was crucial: 
"The law of self-defence was critically examined to expose its elements as 
reflecting and embodying male experience with violence and hence male 
evaluations of appropriate responses to violence. Expert evidence of the 
experience of battered women put a new complexion on self-defence from the 
,, 103 perspective of a battered woman. 
The impact of the syndrome on the plea of self-defence also received recognition: 
100 Schneider E "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense" 
101 Dupps DS "Battered Lesbians: Are they entitled to a Battered Woman Defense? " p. 890 
102 [1990] 1 SCR 852 
103 Hon B Wilson "Women, the family and the Constitutional Protection of Privacy" [unpublished] 
quoted in Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis" p. 794 
180 
"Angelique Lavallee was acquitted when the social reality of wife battering 
and its documented effects on women victims was not only taken into account 
104 but was incorporated into the legal concept of self-defence. " 
Justice Wilson considered that the situation must be considered from the perspective 
of the woman; to do otherwise would be to deny women equal rights to legal 
protection. 105 
The requirement that the defendant must have a reasonable belief in imminent hann 
clearly posed a problem for Angelique Lavallee as the deceased was walking away 
from the defendant when the shot was fired. The Supreme Court, however, rejected 
the approach taken in previous cases which considered a perception of serious bodily 
harm or death to be intrinsically unreasonable in the absence of an ongoing 
confrontation. 106 The Court relied on evidence of the battered woman syndrome to 
paint a broader picture of imminency, showing how the accused's perception of harm 
was not unreasonable in the circumstances. The court stated: '... the appellant's 
shooting of the deceased was a final desperate act by a woman who sincerely believed 
that she would be killed that night. ' 107 The battered woman's ability to predict the 
onset of violence, and the fact that the violence had recently intensified, rendered her 
belief in imminent harm reasonable. ' 08 
104 Ibid. 
105 (1990) 555 C. C. C. (3d) 97 at 115; see Schuller "The Impact of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Testimny on Jury Decision-Making: Lavallee vR Reconsidered" Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to 
Justice (1990) 10,105-126 p. 113 
106 Lavallee vR[ 1990] 1 SCR 852 p. 877; see Seuffert N "Battered Women and Sel f-Defense" pp. 
309-310 
107 Lavallee vR [1990] 1 SCR 852 p. 859 
log Ibid., p. 822; see Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defense" p. 3 10 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada widened the concept of a pre-emptive 
strike. It was held that a battered woman was not required to wait until the threats 
were executed for her defensive action to be considered reasonable and necessary, as 
this would sentence her to 'murder by instalment'. 109 The court also appeared to 
consider that a time lapse between the threat and the homicide would not, as a matter 
of law, exclude a plea of self-defence. The court justified this opinion by comparing 
the position of a battered woman to that of a hostage: 
"The situation of the battered woman as described [by the expert witness] 
strikes me as somewhat analogous to that of a hostage. If the captor tells her 
that he will kill her in three days time, is it potentially reasonable for her to 
seize an opportunity presented on the first day to kill the captor or must she 
wait until he makes the attempt on the third day? "110 
The impact of the battered woman syndrome is well illustrated by contrasting two 
cases. The syndrome was only admitted in one case. Seuffertill compares the 
Canadian case, Lavallee 112 with the New Zealand case of Rv Wang, 113 in which the 
defendant killed her abuser whilst he was sleeping. Whereas Lavallee was acquitted, 
Wang was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, as opposed to 
murder. It is suggested that one of the reasons for the divergence in the law's response 
109 (1990) 555 C. C. C. (3d) 97 at 120; see Schuller "rhe Impact of Battered Woman Syndrome 
Testimny on Jury Decision-Making: Lavallee vR Reconsidered p. 111; Seuffert N "Battered Women 
and Self-Defense"; Willoughby MJ "Rendering Each Woman her Due: Can a Battered Woman claim 
Self-Defence when she Kills her Sleeping Batterer? " p. 187 
110 Lavallee vR [1990] 1 SCR 852 p. 889; see Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defense" pp. 3 10- 
311 
111 Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defense' 
112 [1990] 1 SCR 852 
113 [199012 NZLR 529 
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is the acceptance of the battered woman syndrome in Lavallee, 114 and its rejection in 
Wang. ' 15 Hence, despite evidence of extreme violence and threats of death to herself 
and her family, including death threats on the night the killing was committed, her 
actions were considered to be unreasonable. Seuffert contends that if the court had 
accepted evidence of the battered woman syndrome, this would have enabled the jury 
to accept that the defendant's perception of the threat of imminent hann was 
reasonable, and how it was impossible for her to leave the relationship. Indeed she 
testified that she '... had to kill him, there was no other way. ' 116 
Indeed, it appears that Wang was rather like the hostage referred to by Madam Justice 
Bertha Wilson. She was trapped inside the relationship, and on the times she had 
managed to leave, she was forced to return. Thus, it does appear that if the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court of Canada was applied to the Wang 117 case, an acquittal may 
have followed. Nevertheless, although the facts of the cases are similar, there is a 
significant difference. In addition to the racial and cultural differences, the deceased 
in Wang 118 was asleep when he was killed. Hence the threat of harm is further 
removed that in the Lavallee 119 case, when the deceased could quite easily have 
turned around and carried out his threat. That is not to suggest that killing a sleeping 
batterer should never be considered an act of self-defence, and that the harm is not to 
be seen as imminent or inevitable, but that the situation is different, and requires 
114 [1990] 1 SCR 852 
115 [199012NZLR539 
116 Ibid. p. 677 
117 Ibid. 
1 'a Ibid. 
119 [199011 SCR 852 
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further analysis. Using the battered woman syndrome to 'fit' such a situation into the 
existing requirements of self defence does not explore whether such a killing is or 
should be justified, legally and morally. Furthermore, Wang 120 was not convicted of 
murder, but of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, a outcome which would 
be considered a victory in this jurisdiction, especially with the existence of a 
substantial time lapse. The difficulty with Seuffert's analysis is that she appears to 
assume that self-defence is the appropriate defence for all battered women, without 
considering whether a different defence would perhaps be more fitting. 
Self-Defence, Reasonable Force and the Battered Woman Syndrome in England: 
The Tony Martin Case 
In this jurisdiction, the issue of reasonable force and expert testimony was considered 
recently by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rv Martin. 121 Martin killed a 16 year 
old boy by shooting him in the back during an alleged burglary. Martin claimed that, 
as he had been burgled a number of times previously, he believed his house was 
particularly vulnerable to invasion and that on the night he question he genuinely 
feared for his life and was acting in self -defence. He appealed against his conviction 
for murder on the basis that there was compelling evidence to support a plea of either 
self-defence or diminished responsibility. 
One ground of appeal alleged that certain medical evidence should have been taken 
into account by the jury when they were assessing whether the level of force he used 
was reasonable. This evidence illustrated that Martin was, at the time of the shooting, 
120 [1990] 2 NZLR 529 
121 [200211 Cr App R 27 
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suffering from depression and a paranoid personality disorder. As noted in chapter 4, 
within this jurisdiction self-defence adopts both a subjective and objective test. 122 
The circumstances are viewed as the defendant honestly believed them to be, there is 
no requirement that this belief should be reasonable. However, the level of force used 
is judged from an objective standard. Hence the jury decide whether, in the 
circumstances as believed by the defendant, the level of force used was reasonable. In 
the first trial, the jury considered that the force used by Martin was unreasonable in 
the circumstances he believed them to be and the Court of Appeal rejected the claim 
that his medical characteristics should be taken into account when assessing the 
reasonableness of the force used. Lord Woolf CJ stated: 
"We would accept that the jury are entitled to take into account in relation to 
self-defence the physical characteristics of the defendant. However, we would 
not agree that it is appropriate, except in exceptional circumstances which 
would make the evidence especially probative, in deciding whether excessive 
force has been used to take into account whether the defendant is suffering 
from some psychiatric condition. " 123 
Hence, although a jury may take into account the size and strength of a woman who 
kills her abusive partner, as these amount to physical characteristics, any mental 
abnormality will be irrelevant. Thus, unless the situation of a woman who kills her 
abusive partner amounts to one of the exceptional circumstances, and the battered 
woman syndrome is especially probative, evidence of the syndrome will not be 
admitted in relation to the issue of whether the level of force used as reasonable. 
122 see Rees T& Smith JC "Case Comment: Homicide: Murder Excessive Force in Self-Defence" 
Crim LR (2002) Feb, 136-139: 
"It is well established that the law of private defence involves the application of a combination 
of subjective and objective tests. The defendant is to be judged on the facts as he honestly 
believed them to be, whether reasonable or not. But he may use only force as is reasonable in 
those supposed circumstances. " (p. 137) 
123 [200211 Cr App R 27 at p. 45 para 67 
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Criticisms of the Concept of the Battered Woman Syndrome 
Despite the undoubtedly virtuous motive behind the development of the syndrome, 
and its success in Jurisdictions such as Canada and United States in relation to a plea 
of self-defence, the syndrome has received a plethora of criticisms, from both 
feminists and other academic commentators. 124 This criticism has been directed at a 
number of different elements: methodology, judicial application and the ideology of 
the theory. 
One of the most pronounced criticisms of the theory was presented by Faigman, 
writing in 1986, when the impact of the syndrome was reaching its zenith. He notes, 
'[t]he scholarly commentary has overwhelming endorsed the use of the battered 
woman syndrome evidence. ' 125 But whilst Faigman agrees that social science research 
should be utilised in cases involving battered women, he argues that the syndrome 
should not be admitted into court, on the basis that its validity is questionable. 126 
Firstly, he criticises the ethics of Lenore Walker, noting that she appears willing to 
offer testimony even in what he considers to be implausible cases. Faigman presents 
State v Martin 127 as evidence of such misplaced willingness, suggesting that it 
124 see for example Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and 
Empirical Dissenf'pp. 619-620 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman 
on Trials- The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations"; Schneider E "Describing and 
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" 
125 Faigman D"The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent" pp. 
619-620 
126 Ibid., p. 624 
127 666 S. W. 2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) 
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involves an attempt to extend the requirement of imminence 'almost to infinity'. 128 In 
this case Hclcn Martin was violently abused by her husband for five years, until their 
separation in 1980. At this time her husband, Ronald, moved in with another woman, 
and threatened to blow-up the defendant's house, for insurance purposes. Fearing he 
would do so, she hired a man named Bratcher for E10,000 to kill Ronald. Ronald was 
killed by being shot and hit on the head when he visited the house on December 5th in 
order to sign some papers. After this Helen went out to celebrate a friend's birthday. 
She reported Ronald missing on the 6th and paid his insurance policy on the 7th. 
After the body was discovered on the 8th, Helen confessed to her involvement. Upon 
being convicted for murder, Martin appealed on the grounds that evidence of the 
battered woman syndrome was wrongfully excluded, and intended to call Lenore 
Walker as an expert witness. The appeal was rejected by the Missouri Court of 
Appeal, on the basis that the evidence did not support, in this case, a plea of self- 
defence. Faigman, however, considered Walker's willingness to categorise Martin as 
a case of legitimate self-defence to be deeply disturbing, and suggests that this 
questions her credibility as an expert witness in other cases involving battered 
women. 
129 
This analysis is, however, also open to criticism. Firstly, evidence of the battered 
woman syndrome in such a case is valuable as it may explain how many battered 
women are still in severe danger despite leaving the relationship, as many women are 
abused and killed after separation. Furthermore, Walker is merely presenting 
128 Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent"pp. 
631-632 
129 Ibid., pp. 631-633 
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evidence as to the affects on a long-tenn battering relationship, the jury will then 
decide, if the judge permits the plea of self-defence, whether or not it is a case of 
justifiable homicide. The expert witness does not decide whether or not the facts fulfil 
the legal requirements of self-defence. However, such evidence may be highly 
influential. 
Nevertheless, these concerns may not be completely unfounded. In the recent case 
involving Helen Cummings, 130 the battered woman syndrome was admitted in order 
to support in her defence for killing her unfaithful husband. Although it appears that 
she had previously been attacked, the main factor seems to have been the husband's 
unfaithfulness and the fact that he would flaunt this by leaving revealing photographs 
for Cummings to see. Two points can be made in relation to this. Firstly, it is 
difficult to see how the battered woman syndrome applies to a situation involving 
infidelity, as it is based on the nature of and the effect of a cycle of physical abuse. 
Secondly, Cummings shot and killed her husband after finding revealing photographs, 
which had been left on purposes for her to find, hence, a more fitting defence would 
be that of provocation. If the battered woman syndrome is increasingly applied to 
such situations, this will undoubtedly reduce the credibility of such evidence, and 
perpetuate the criticism that it is merely a device used to present women who kill with 
an excuse. 
Methodological Criticisms 
The validity of the methodology used by Walker receives Faigman's assiduous 
scrutiny, and several flaws within the cycle theory of violence and learned 
130 "Baby Daughtcr for Nursc who Killcd Husband" The Independent Friday 3 Octobcr 1998 p. 11 
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helplessness are highlighted. Faigman argues that the cycle theory is, at the very best, 
tenuously supported by the empirical research. 13 1 The theory is considered to embody 
five significant methodological and interpretative flaws. 
1. The answers received are considered dubious due to the use of leading questions. 
This may enable the subjects to guess the hypothesis, whereas social science 
researchers are generally expected to take the necessary steps to prevent such a 
situation. ' 
32 
2. In examining the different stages of the abuse, the interviewee's answer is 
substituted by the interviewer's evaluation of this response. This may render the 
research 'susceptible to the problem of experimenter expectations. ' Any 
expectations held by the interviewer are liable to colour their evaluation and 
interpretation of the responses received. 133 
3. Walker fails to position the cycle theory within any framework of time. Faigman 
considers this to be, on a legal basis, the most crucial flaw. If the tension building 
stage generally occurs for a number of days, and invariably leads to a severe 
battering, this will have significant legal consequence; however, a tension building 
stage which only occurs a few minutes before the acute battering episode is 
considered unlikely to establish a constant state of fear. In addition, the research 
fails to consider the existence of tension building episodes which do not lead to an 
acute battering, and whether a fourth phase of normal behaviour also exists. 134 
131 Faigman D "The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defence: A Legal and Empirical Dissent"p. 
636 
132 Ibid., p. 637 
133 Ibid., pp. 637-638 
134 Ibid., p. 638 
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4. An empirical relation between the cycle theory and the cumulative terror which 
consumes the battered woman is not revealed. Faigman notes that the research 
offers little support for the contention that the woman is gripped by fear, during 
phases one and two, and will resort to any lengths necessary to end the abuse. 135 
5. Finally, evidence of a distinct cycle of violence is not actually demonstrated by the 
results. The data provided by Walker does not clearly establish that all the battered 
women studied experienced a full cycle of violence. Walker founds the existence 
of a cycle on the follow statistics: '[iln 65% of all cases ... there was evidence of a 
tension-building phase prior to the battering. In 58% of all cases there was 
evidence of loving contrition afterward. ' 136 Hence, Faigman calculates: 
"if sixty-five percent of all subjects experience tension building before an 
acute battering incident and fifty-eight percent of all subjects experience 
loving contrition after an acute battering, then it is likely that only about thirty- 
eight percent of the women actually experienced the entire cycle. " 137 
The Learned Helplessness theory is also considered to be flawed, both theoretically 
and methodologically, as it involves a misapplication of the theory as developed by 
Seligman. As noted above, once the dogs became helpless, inciting them to take 
control became almost impossible. This is considered to be theoretically inconsistent 
with the woman who kills her abuser. If she is rendered helpless, unable to gain 
control over her situation, the realisation that she has to protect herself and the 
resulting action is clearly contradictory. The theory fails to explain why and how the 
135 Ibid., pp. 638-639 
136 Walker L The Battered Woman Syndrome p. 177 
137 Faigman D "rhe Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent"p. 
640 
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battered women are able to reassert control and kill their abuser. 138 Moreover, women, 
unlike animals, are still able to gain rational and assertive thoughts, thus it needs to be 
questioned whether or not an experiment based upon the reactions of dogs can offer 
any insight into the effect of ongoing domestic violence. Furthermore, it is questioned 
whether it is the woman, or society and agencies which are supposed to provide 
support and protection, which suffer from learned helplessness. 139 
Faigman also argues that the feelings and emotions which Walker cites as evidencing 
learned helplessness have not been established as 'uniquely indicative of that 
condition'. Although they are undoubtedly linked to learned helplessness, presenting 
them as evidence of the syndrome is theoretically problematic. Furthermore, Faigman 
notes that Walker's research did not involve a control group of non-battered women, 
against whom the reasonableness of the battered women's actions could be measured. 
Finally, only a handful of the women studied actually killed their abusers, and the 
research failed to compare and contrast these women to the majority of the subjects. 140 
138 Ibid., pp. 640-641 see also McColgan "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" p. 525; Nicolson 
D and Sanghiv R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of Ahuwalia" p. 734 
O'Donovan "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 232; Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J 
"Defending the Battered Woman on Trials: The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 384 
139 Seuffert N "Battered Women and Self-Defence" p. 303 
140 Ibid., p. 642-463; Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 385 
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Judicial Application 
A further criticism relates to the manner in which the concept is applied by the courts. 
Through an examination of the judgement in State v Kelly, 141 Schneider 142 
emphasises the adverse problems which have arisen due to the use of the battered 
woman syndrome. This decision indicates that the problems relate to relevancy of the 
syndrome. As opposed to considering the testimony as primarily relevant to the 
reasonableness of her killing, thus focusing primarily on the cycle of violence, the 
fear which this engenders, and how this renders her killing reasonable, the courts have 
overwhelmingly considered the syndrome as primarily relevant to the woman's 
inability to leave and the concept of learned helplessness: 
"The crucial issue of fact which this expert's testimony would bear is why, 
given such allegedly severe and constant beatings, combined with threats to 
kill, the defendant had not long ago left the deceased .... 99 
143 
Hence, whereas the court considers the testimony to be crucial when explaining why 
the woman remained in the relationship, and in refuting the myths and 
misconceptions, it is considered to be less pertinent in explaining why the killing was 
reasonable: 
"The difficulty with the expert's testimony is that it sounds as if an expert is 
giving knowledge to a jury about something the jury knows as well as anyone 
else namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of imn-dnent serious danger. 
This is not at all, however, what this testimony is directly aimed at. " 144 
141 97 NJ 178,197,478 A. 2d 364 (1984) 
142 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 211 
143 State v Kelly 97 NJ at 205,478 A. 2d at 377 see Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's 
Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" p. 209 
144 State v Kelly 97 NJ at 206,478 A. 2d at 378 see Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's 
Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" p. 210 
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The court did suggest that the testimony might emphasise the battered woman's 
unique ability to predict the extent to which she was threatened, and also assist the 
jury in determining the honesty of the defendant's belief. This concession, however, 
is contradicted and undermined by other parts of the judgement: 
"No expert is needed ... to tell the jury the logical conclusions, namely that a 
person who has in fact been severely and continuously beaten might very well 
reasonably fear that the imminent beating she was about to suffer could be 
either life-threatening or pose a risk of serious injury. " 145 
The judgment appears to contain a puzzling discrepancy. One of the court's 
rationales for admitting expert evidence on the battered woman syndrome is based on 
the need to educate the jury as to the reality of the situation, as their knowledge and 
views on domestic violence are likely to be obscured by existing myths and 
stereotypes. The court, however, suggests that the jury is able to detennine the 
reasonableness of her action and belief, without the aid of the expert testimony; it is 
considered to be within the realm of their knowledge. Hence, although the jury are 
assisted by expert testimony with regards her failure to leave, no such aid is given in 
relation to assessing the requirement of reasonableness. 
The question of reasonableness in the law of self-defence presents one of the most 
significant difficulties for battered women and, in most cases, expert testimony 
regarding this requirement is considered to be the crucially important. The approach 
taken by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, fails to adequately address this 
issue. 146 As Schneider notes: 
145 Ibid. 
146 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 211 
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"Expert testimony, admitted for the purpose of explaining why the battered 
woman did not leave, does not help the jury answer the question whether she 
was reasonable in acting violently in order to save her life. " 147 
It is argued by Schneider that the reasonableness of the battered woman's belief and 
actions do not fall within the realm of the jury's knowledge. Without expert 
testimony the jury is unlikely to comprehend the precision with which the defendant 
is able to calculate the closeness and severity of the next beating. 148 This approach is 
considered to expose the resilience and extent of the sex discrimination inherent in the 
law of self-defence. Courts seem to consider that the syndrome is principally relevant 
to the question of why the woman did not leave the relationship, as opposed to 
explaining why her actions were reasonable. 149 
Moreover, some fear that the syndrome may actually undermine a plea of self- 
defence, as opposed to supporting it, due to the conflict between the requirement of 
reasonableness and the pathological nature of the syndrome. 150 Although many 
feminists argue that the syndrome does not amount to a pathological condition, courts 
have tended to view it as evidence of mental instability or insanity. Kazan argues that 
this view is not unreasonable, due to the psychological symptoms which are held to be 
constitutive of the syndrome. It is stated that 'insofar that these symptoms refer to a 
pattern of cognitive impairment ... evidence that a woman is suffering from such 
symptoms may justifiably be interpreted by the courts as an indication that her 
reasoning may be impaired. "51 Thus a finding that one is suffering from the battered 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., p. 211 
149 Ibid., p. 210 
150 Kazan P "Reasonableness, Gender Difference and Self-Defense Law" 
151 Ibid., pp. 556-557 
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woman syndrome is consistent with a ruling that the actions are unreasonable, thus 
undermining the claim of self defence. Kazan thus argues that '... the psychological 
symptoms of learned helplessness and heightened sensitivity may interfere with a 
battered woman's ability to accurately perceive and respond to her situation in a 
reasonable manner. ' 
152 
Proponents of the battered woman syndrome argue that these psychological symptoms 
do not render the perceptions and responses unreasonable. They simply assert how 
any normal person faced with an aberrant and extremely dangerous situation would 
react, thus the syndrome illustrates a '... terrified human being's normal response to 
an abnonnal and life threatening situation. "" Hence, her actions should not be 
constructed as unreasonable. It is thus argued that the court's insistence on presenting 
the syndrome as a 'mental disorder' is due to the inherent sexism with the criminal 
justice system and society. 154 Kazan, however, disputes this contention, and states 
that the conception of the syndrome as a mental disorder is due to the fact that the 
psychological symptoms referred to do ostensibly seriously effect the battered 
woman's cognitive abilities. Hence the reasonableness, although it may be normal for 
those in such situations, does not correspond to 'our ordinary conceptions of 
reasonableness', which perceives a reasonable belief to be one which '... is formed and 
held on the basis of ordinary reliable evidence as acquired by unimpaired perception 
152 Ibid., p. 558 
153 Walker L Terrifying Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) p. 180 cited by Kazan P 
"Reasonableness, Gender Difference and Self-Defense Law" p. 559 
154 Kazan P "Reasonableness, Gender Difference, and Self-Defense Law" p. 559 
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and evaluated through normally sound reasoning and judgement. ' 155 It is a different 
conception of reasonableness, one which is not free from mental impairment. 
Ideological Criticisms 
It is argued that the court's eagerness to focus on the learned helplessness element of 
the syndrome arguably arises from the ease with which they can label women as 
helpless and passive. Judicial acceptance is forthcoming when the testimony 
highlights the personal and shared weakness of women, as opposed to the 
reasonableness of their actions. Battered women are constructed to be psychologically 
unsound and emotional, not as women who have inevitably responded in a rational, 
capable and positive manner to a life threatening situation. The women and their 
actions are rationalised through a discourse of victimisation which removes their 
agency and fails to clarify their perceived necessity to act. 156 Indeed, such a 
construction forms one of the main ideological criticisms of the battered woman 
syndrome. As opposed to countering images of women as passive, sick and helpless, 
the theory can be seen to perpetuate these stereotypes, 157 which is compounded by the 
weight placed on the theory of learned helplessness by the judiciary. Focusing on the 
psychological state of the defendant, suggests that the syndrome is a for7n of personal 
incapacity, such as diminished responsibility, or insanity, medicalises the battered 
155 Schoop, Sturgis & Sullivan "Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction 
Between Justification and Excuse" U Illinois L Rev 45 (1994) 92; cited by Kazan P "Reasonableness, 
Gender Difference and Self-Defense Law" p. 562 
156 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering" p. 213 
157 Ibid., pp. 214-215 
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women, and individualises the problem. They are presented as 'sick' as opposed to 
158 'bad'. 
However, it can be argued that the syndrome, does not, per se, medicalise the woman, 
as it should not be considered as forensic. 159 The battered woman syndrome merely 
describes the situation in which the battered woman finds herself in and is unable to 
escape, and is considered by some to be insufficiently scientifically valid to amount to 
expert forensic evidence. 160 Hence, it could be argued that the battered woman 
syndrome does not actually medicalise women, as it is not a medical concept. In 
contrast, perhaps it is the willingness of the medical and legal profession to accept the 
battered woman syndrome as a medical syndrome, and a desire to construct the 
woman as ill or medically abnormal which leads to medicalisation. Hence, it is not the 
syndrome per se which is problematic, but the manner in which it is interpreted and 
applied. 
Another criticism relates to the perceived necessity of using the concept in order for 
the female experience to enter the legal arena. As O'Donovan questions: '[w]hy can't 
158 see Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of Ahluwalia" 
p. 734; O'Donovan "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and Her 
Sydrome" p. 43 1; Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the 
Problem of Expert Testimony of Battering" p. 199; Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the 
Battered Woman on Trial: The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 384 and p. 387 
159 Feckleton I "Contemporary Comment: When Plight Makes Right - The Forensic Abuse Syndrome" 
Crim LJ (1994) 18, p. 29 
160 Feckleton I "Contemporary Comment: When Plight Makes Right - The Forensic Abuse Syndrome" 
p. 31 
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women's experiences be accommodated by law without resort to expertsT 161 Whereas 
the experiences and perceptions of the 'reasonable man' are considered inherent 
common sense, exempt from elucidation, the 'reasonable woman' appears to be a 
concept unknown to the law. 162 Furthermore, as Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie note, 
constructing the issue as beyond the knowledge of the average juror suggests that 
domestic violence is a rare occurrence, whereas such abuse is, unfortunately, all to 
common. Constructing domestic violence as an exceptional phenomenon enables 
solutions to be individualised, thus neglecting the social and political dynamics of 
male violence. 163 
Additionally, a judicial ruling that the syndrome is relevant in a certain case implies 
that the defendant reacted as a reasonable woman with battered woman syndrome. 
This, however, appears to suggest that the battering itself fails adequately to excuse or 
justify the homicide, 164 and may also lead to the adoption of a separate standard, a 
'bona fide' battered woman test. 165 Hence a battered woman's experiences are 
reconstructed to adhere to medical discourse, 166 and those who have suffered many 
161 O'Donovan "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expertý the Battered Woman and her Syndrome" p. 
430 
162 Ibid., pp. 429-431 
163 Sheehy E A. Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trials: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 384 
164 Wells C"Battered Women Syndrome and defences to homicide: Where now? " Legal Studies (1994) 
14,266-276 
165 Ibid. and Sheey E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trials: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitatione'p. 386 
166 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trials: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 384 
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years of abuse but do not fall within the stereotype of the battered woman presented 
by the syndrome are unlikely to present a successful defence. This could be crucial, 
as it is considered that the syndrome is primarily based on the experiences of white 
middle class women, and thus fails to represent women from different 
backgrounds. 167 Admission of the battered woman syndrome also fails to alter the 
apparatus which actually represents her actions as unreasonable - the structure of the 
law and the legal concept of reasonableness 168 _ and may lead to favourable decisions 
being reached out of sympathy as opposed to an adherence to the legal rules. 169 The 
focus of the jury is misdirected, with the evaluation of reasonableness concentrating 
on whether it was reasonable for her to remain in the relationship, as opposed to 
whether the homicide was reasonable given her physical demeanour and perception of 
danger. 170 The importance with which the judiciary and society appears to attach to 
the fact that the battered woman stayed with her abuser is shown by Sheehy, Stubbs 
and Tolmie to presuppose a number of factors. 17 1 Firstly, it is assumed that she has 
not left the relationship, however, many women do leave but eventually return either 
through coercion or emotional blackmail. Secondly, it assumes that the violence and 
the threat to her life will cease if she leaves, which is not supported by homicide 
statistics. It does not acknowledge that many women are forced to stay precisely 
167 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" p. 206 
168 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of their Own Lives: A Ferninst critique of Law 
and Laws" p. 604; Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trials: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 386 
169 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" 
170 McColgan A "In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill" p. 525 
171 Sheehy E A, Stubbs J and Tolmie J "Defending the Battered Woman on Trial: The Battered Woman 
Syndrome and its Limitations" p. 385-386 
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because of the threats and violence, nor does it acknowledge the research which 
highlights the inadequacy of the police and domestic violence agencies. More 
importantly, it disregards the lack of altemative housing and financial resources for 
battered women, especially those with children. Indeed, the existence of children 
impacts significantly on the decision to leave and their interests are often given 
priority over her own. 
The dilemma for feminist commentators and defence advocates is vivid. The battered 
woman syndrome is necessary in order for women to combat the sex-bias inherent in 
the defences to murder and the myths surrounding battered women, yet an application 
of the theory perpetuates stereotypes and renders the female experience as outside the 
realm of the average juror's knowledge. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the development of the concept of the battered woman 
syndrome, how it has been used in relation to the three main defences, and the 
criticisms of the syndrome. The syndrome has had an impact on all three of the 
defences, but has been more successful in relation to self-defence in America and 
Canada. In this jurisdiction, the battered woman syndrome is generally considered to 
amount to evidence of diminished responsibility, however with the House of Lords 
ruling in the case of Smith, the syndrome may be used more in relation the partial 
defence of provocation. Despite its advances, the syndrome has come under 
considerable criticism, as it tends to perpetuate women as passive and sick. The next 
chapter will draw upon some of the issues raised in this chapter and commence the 
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critical analysis of the defences and the battered woman syndrome via a scrutiny of a 
number of Court of Appeal cases involving women who kill their abusive partners. 
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CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCTION 
Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 provided a discussion of both the criminal law defences and the 
concept of the battered woman syndrome. The aim of this chapter is twofold: to draw 
together the main criticisms which relate to the law's treatment of women who kill 
their abusive partners, as considered in chapters 4 and 5 and to highlight the problems 
with this approach, and to move the debate forward in a manner which avoids the 
essentialising tendencies of the sameness/difference debate, which tends to assume a 
monolithic woman and disregards differences which exist between women. In 
particular, the chapter will examine the construction of identity, an endeavour which 
will be further developed in chapters 7 and 8. 
The Existing Criticisms 
Two main arguments have presented themselves in the existing literature dealing with 
the criminal law and women who kill their abusive partners: first, the law is presented 
as being gender neutral, yet it is shown to be based on male experiences and 
behaviour, hence excluding women's experiences and second, the law treats women 
more harshly than men as it applies double standards. Invariably, the suggested 
solutions to these perceived problems have centred around the issue of equal treatment 
or different treatment, thus drawing upon the sameness (men and women should be 
treated the same)/difference (any differences between men and women should be 
recognised) debate which has been a major issue within feminist theory. ' The 
1 As discussed in chapter 2. 
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argument that the law is male argues for a recognition of women's difference, such as 
the approach adopted by the Supreme Courts in the cases of Wanrow 2 and Lavallee; 3 
whereas an argument that the law applies double standards proposes that women and 
men should be treated equally. Both of these arguments, to an extent, appeal to the 
notion of equality, especially legal equality or legal justice, albeit in very different 
ways. 
'As a cultural artifact law is male; yet it aspires to represent us all. 94 
Throughout the discussion of the criminal law defences and the battered woman 
syndrome the criticism that the law is male has invariably arisen in relation to the 
specific requirements of the defences. 5 As noted in the introduction, this argument 
precedes along the lines that the law is, theoretically gender natural, applicable to both 
men and women. However, it is argued that, in reality, the law is based upon and thus 
reflects the experiences of men. This has the consequence of excluding the potentially 
different experiences of women. It is generally argued that the male bias is due to two 
factors, first that murder is, overwhelmingly, committed by men, and second, the law 
is generally written by men. 6 
288 Wash. 2d 221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977) 
3 [1990] 1 S. C. R. 852,55 C. C (3d) 97 
4 O'Donovan K "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, and Her Syndrome" 
p. 435 
5 Schneider EM "Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law", Taylor LJ "Provoked 
Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense" 
6 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 220 
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It is argued that homicide patterns vary considerably between men and women. In 
particular, men and women tend to kill in response to very different situations and 
also tend to use dissimilar methods. 7 Taylor notes that whereas men generally kill 
women in response to sexual provocation, such as adultery, women invariably kill 
8 men due to circumstances of abuse and physical violence. Thus the argument states 
that as the law is based upon the experience of men, women are excluded as they fall 
outside the established legal categories. This legal exclusion of the female experience 
is considered in detail by Tarrant, 9 who analyses the way in which the requirements of 
the criminal law defences produce and perpetuate the silence of women, especially in 
relation to domestic violence. 10 This silencing occurs due to the dominance of the 
male gender. Gender is considered to be the main organising principle in society and, 
as the male gender is dominant, the voices and experiences of women are ignored. 
Reality and truth is based upon the male voice, the female voice is excluded. Tarrant 
draws upon the following quote by MacKinnon in order to emphasise this point: 
"Men create the world from their own point of view, which then becomes the 
truth to be described. This is a closed system, not anyone's confusion. "' 1 
7 Taylor L J'Trovoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self- 
Defense" p. 1720-1725, 
8 Ibid. 
9 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing 'Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" 
10 Ibid. 
11 MacKinnon C "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence" Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society (1983) 8,635 p. 638 see Tarrant S "Something is Pushing 
Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law and Laws" p. 578 
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Meaning and reality therefore, due to the gendered nature of society, has been 
constructed predominately from a male perspective. 12 Furthermore this silencing and 
exclusion is perpetuated by the adoption of an epistemology which posits the 
existence of objective knowledge and truth which is universal, transcending time, 
culture and gender, existing outside the realm of human existence. In this framework, 
there is one reality, and it applies to us all. This reality, however, is constructed by the 
dominant standpoint, thus maintaining power relations and excluding the reality of 
divergent perspectives. Hence, the male view of reality becomes universal, and the 
female reality is excluded, thus perpetuating female subordination. 13 
In addition to the structural requirements of the defences being derived from male 
experiences, it is also argued that the 'reasonable man/person' is inherently male. Just 
as the legal requirements are supposedly gender neutral, so are the actions of the 
reasonable person. The reasonable person is considered to represent the objective, 
universal truth. As O'Donovan states, the reasonable person is '... taken to be the 
common sense experience of us all. ' 14 Both feminism and postmodernism, however, 
dispute such universality and recognise the existence of other truths and experiences. 
Such epistemological theories recognise that truth and knowledge are produced by 
society and social relations, and thus acknowledge a 'plurality of truths or 
12 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" pp. 575-578 
13 Ibid p. 582 
14 O'Donovan "Law's Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman and Her Syndrome" 
pp. 425-429 
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15 perspectives'. Such approaches question the assertion of universality and require 
the origin of any truth assertion to be examined. The difficulty which exists, however, 
is how to inject the female experience into the legal arena. 16 
Although both Tarrant17 and O'Donovan's recognise the problematic nature of 
appealing to 'universals', both seem to suggest that the experiences of women, 
especially in relation to domestic violence, form an homogeneous category. Although 
Tarrant 19 does recognise that there are other organising principles within society, such 
as race, class, sexuality and disability, she argues that gender is primary and separate 
to these other relations. Thus gender is considered to be more significant. This is 
highly contestable. Moreover, each relation is concerned with a process of 'Othering. ' 
In particular, not all the experiences of women are the same and, further, it is 
important to recognise that 'gender' is shaped by other relations of identity, such as 
race and class. 20 
15 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" p. 583 
16 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 429 
17 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" 
18 O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" 
19 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" 
20 This point is explored further in chapters 7 and 8 
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Double Standards 
In addition to male-bias, it is also argued that the law discriminates against women as 
it applies 'double standards'. The law requires women to conform to different, and 
perhaps, higher standards than men 21 and/or a woman is convicted for a more serious 
offence i. e. murder, whereas men tend to be convicted of manslaughter. 22 Bandalli23 
argues that this unequal application of the law is due to the blame which is attached to 
the woman. She argues that the role of the husband is ignored whether he is the victim 
or the perpetrator. In both cases culpability is attached to the wife, thus it is argued 
"[w]hatever the formal structure of the law, ultimately the success or failure of 
a provocation defence depends upon ingrained cultural judgement and the 
hidden agenda of this partial defence, as it operates in practice in spousal 
homicide, is one of female responsibility, whether as victim or offender. , 24 
In cases in which a husband kills his wife the provocative incident invariably consists 
of catching the wife committing the act of adultery or a confession of adultery. The 
focus in such cases remains within the matrimonial arena and the culpability of the 
husband is reduced as the victim is often portrayed as an inadequate and imperfect 
wife, attracting such comments as: '... the defendant has led a blameless life and 
everything he said in court would be accepted without hesitation. ' 25 In the case of 
Bisla Singh, the defendant strangled his wife to death, in order to shut her up, after she 
21 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who 
Kill" p. 185 and O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women Who Kill" p. 221 
22 Bandalli S "Battered Wives and Provocation"; Bandalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note", Justice 
for Women www. jfw. org; O'Donovan K "Defences for Battered Women who Kill" p. 221 
73 See Bandalli S "Battered Wives and Provocation"; Bandalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note" 
24 Bandalli S 'Trovocation -A Cautionary Note" p. 398 
25 Mr Justice Wein In the case of Robert Wright reported in The Times, 14 October 1975, cited by 
Bandalli S 'Trovocation -A Cautionary Note" P. 402 
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subjected him to verbal abuse. Allowing the plea of provocation, Judge Denison stated 
6 you have suffered through no fault of your own a terrible existence for a very long 
time. j 26 When one contrasts the approach taken in cases of women who kill their 
violent abusers the discrimination is brought sharply into focus. There is a great 
reluctance to focus upon blame of the abusing husbands, as highlighted in the case of 
DUk 27 in which the judge stated: '[ylou are not concerned with blame here - the 
blame attaching to the dead man. You are not standing in judgment on him. ' 28 
Furthermore, Bandalli illustrates that female defendants are often constructed as 
dishonest, and doubt is cast upon their credibility and on the claims of abuse she 
suffered. Hence, whereas a male defendant receives understanding and sympathy for 
the nagging he suffered or the adultery his wife committed, and his killing is viewed 
as reasonable, a woman who suffers years of violence is faced with disbelief, and her 
crime as unreasonable. 29 
26 reported in The Times 30 January 1992, cited by B andalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note" p. 
402 
27 [ 1949] 1 All ER 932 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bandalli S "Provocation -A Cautionary Note" p. 403 In the case of Rv Thomton [ 199 111 All E. R, 
306 at 312 the Judge stated: 
'7here are ... many unhappy, indeed miserable, husbands and wives. It 
is a fact of life. It has to 
be faced, members of the jury. But on the whole it is hardly reasonable, you may think to stab 
them fatally, when there are other alternatives available like walking out or going upstairs. " 
Yet it is clearly not unreasonable to strangle someone to death because they were nagging you. 
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Hence, this approach differs slightly from the argument that the law is male, in that it 
appears that women's difference is recognised, but only in a negative manner, one 
which is detrimental to her case. In addition to being judged against the legal 
requirements, women are also judged against a societal standard of what Nicolson 
calls the 'appropriate femininity'. 30 As noted in the introduction, Nicolson compares 
the cases of Sara Thornton 31 and Kiranjit Ahluwalia. 32 He attributes the difference in 
their convictions (Sara was convicted of murder and Kiranjit, on retrial, of 
manslaughter on the grounds diminished responsibility) to the ability to embody the 
society standard of 'appropriate ferninity'. As Sara was perceived to deviate from this 
standard, her murder conviction (at the time the article was written)33 was upheld by 
the Court of Appeal. Kiranjit, on the other hand, was constructed to to fall within the 
standard, and hence a manslaughter conviction was considered appropriate. 34 
Significantly, however, what also needs to be further addressed are the ethnic, cultural 
and racial differences which exist between Sara and Kiranjit, and how these also have 
an impact on the 'appropriate ferninity'. In addition to being 'other' to men, Kiranjit 
is also potentially 'other' to 'woman'. 
30 Nicolson D"Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who 
Kill" pp. 185-188 
31 Rv Thornton [1991] 1 All ER 306; Rv Thornton (No. 2) [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 108 
32 Rv Ahluwalia [ 1993196 Cr App Rep 133 
33 See Rv 7hornton (No. 2) [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 108. The Court of Appeal quashed Sarah's conviction 
and ordered a retrial. At the retrial she was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility. 
34 Nicolson D "Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who 
Kill" pp. 190-194 
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Equality 
Albeit in different forms, an appeal to the notion of equality has generally been 
advocated as the preferred solution to these two types of discrimination. The 
arguments are thus: in relation to the argument that law is male, women do not receive 
equal treatment to their male counterparts as the law only recognises masculine 
behaviour, therefore equal access to criminal law defences is denied . 
35 As highlighted 
in chapter 4, this argument was recognised by the respective Supreme Court in the 
cases of Wanrow 36 and Lavallee. 37 Furthennore, double standards criticism argues 
that as women are also judged against stereotypical notions of ferninity, they are 
treated differently to men. There is, however, a potential conflict here. One argument 
insists that legal equality can only be achieved by accepting that there are differences 
between men and women which should be recognised by the law, whereas the 
argument against double standards suggests that legal equality can be achieved via an 
equal application of the law. Chan argues that this emphasis on legal equality has 
reduced the possibility of reform, due to a absence of a clear definition of equality. 38 
Thus the question arises, what is legal equality? And from this question the 
sameness/difference debate emerges: does equality require women and men to be 
treated the same, or does it require the acceptance of differences? 
The sameness approach suggests that women and men should be afforded the same 
legal treatment, ignoring any differences and emphasising the similarities. Such an 
35 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" p. 204 
36 88 Wash. 2d 221,559 p. 2d 548 (1977) 
37 [1990] 1 S. C. R. 852,55 C. C (3d) 97 
38 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" p. 204 
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approach, however, encounters significant criticism: it is 'phallocentric', according 
supremacy to masculinity, and thus, in order to be recognised, women have to be 
masculine. 39 The corollary to this is the integration of women's differences into the 
law. However, this recognition of differences has been seen to amount to special 
treatment, and thus infringing the classical meaning of equality. 40 Moreover, the 
recognition of female difference is subject to the criticisms as seen in chapter two. It 
can perpetuate stereotypical ideas of femininity and also assume a commonality of 
experience, 41 which can effectively exclude many women who do not fit within the 
constructed category of woman. This leads Chan to question whether the concept of 
equality is able to offer any assistance whatsoever. 42 This thesis argues that the 
analysis of women who kill should move away from the yardstick of equality. 
Drawing upon Young's argument, equality depends upon a logic of identity, as 
analysed in chapter three, and thus constructs any differences as negative, and 
difference is excluded, it is constructed as an 'absolute other. The alternative to this 
yardstick of equality, is the concept of social justice, as discussed in chapter 3. 
This general critique has highlighted the main criticisms which have frequently arisen 
in the literature on the law and women who kill their violent partners. To summarise, 
the main points which have been emphasised include: the exclusion of the woman's 
experience; the 'othering' of women, due to the masculine nature of the law; double 
standards which require women to conform to standards not expected of men; the 
39 Ibid., p. 221-222 
40 Daily Mail 5 October 1994, cited Ibid., p. 218 
41 Chan W "Legal Equality and Domestic Homicides" pp. 222-223 
42 Ibid., p. 223 
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problem of constructing women in a detrimental stereotypical manner; and the 
sameness/difference debate, or whether women should have there differences 
accounted for, and how this is to be done whilst avoiding sexist stereotyping. 7he aim 
of this thesis is to continue such a debate in a manner which avoids the essentialising 
tendencies of the samenessAdifference debate. In particular, this thesis aims to 
highlight the differences between women by adopting a postmodern approach to 
identity, which recognises that subjectivity is notfixed, but is discursively constructed 
andfluid. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the law's role in constructing 
identity. This moves the debate away from analysing how the law excludes the 
experiences of women, to scrutinising how the law creates identity categories. 
Secondly, the thesis moves away from the notion of equality, but yet still applies a 
nonnative standard, that of Iris Marion Young's social justice, in order to be able to 
evaluate the law and the construction of women's identities within the cases. 
Construction of Identity 
The remainder of this chapter will focus upon twelve Court of Appeal cases and 
examine the construction of identity and consider some of the criticisms which can be 
levelled towards the existing literature dealing with women who kill. The cases are 
comprised of appeals against sentence and conviction. In the cases which involved an 
appeal against sentence all the women initially received a custodial sentence. Three of 
these women were convicted for manslaughter on the grounds of provocation: (R v 
Gardner '43 Rv Grainger, 
44 and Rv Howell 45) three on the grounds of diminished 
43 [1993] 14 Cr App R (S) 364 
44 [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 369 
45 [ 1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 
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responsibility (R v Fell, 46 Rv Sangha 47 and Rv Stubbs 48 ) and two due to a lack of 
intent (R v Anderson 49 and Rv Higgins 50) . Three cases dealt with an appeal against a 
conviction of murder (R v Hobson, 51 Rv Muscroft 52 and Rv Rossiter 53) . The case of 
Rv Oatridge 54 involves an appeal against a manslaughter conviction. By including 
cases which involved sentencing issues, comment can also be made on those women 
who have received a conviction for manslaughter at first instance, and the factors 
which affect the sentence can be identified. 
Overview of the Cases 
In all of the cases the women had suffered long term abuse and the majority killed 
their partners by stabbing. Only in two of the cases did the women kill by other 
methods. In the case of Howell, 55 the appellant used a shot gun and in the case of 
Stubbs 56 the victim died after being hit over the head and then strangled. In all of the 
twelve cases the killing took place during the course of some confrontation, ranging 
4's [2000] 2 Cr App R (S) 464 
47 [1997]1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
48 [1994] 15 Cr App R (S) 57 
49 Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 
50 [1996] 1 Cr App R (S) 271 
51 [ 199811 Cr App R 31 
52 [20011 EWCA 604 
53 [1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
54 [ 1992194 Cr App R 367 
55 [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 
56 [1994] 15 Cr App R (S) 57 
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from an argument to a violent fight. Only in the case of Anderson 57 is this fact 
disputed. Hence, none of the cases involved a non-confrontational attack. Psychiatric 
evidence of some form, whether evidence of the battered woman syndrome, or 
evidence of depression, was explicitly referred to in all cases except two: Rossiter 58 
and Oatridge. 59 Nevertheless, in the former case the murder charge was reduced to 
manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, and in the latter case, the woman was 
eventually acquitted on the grounds of self defence, thus indicating that psychiatric 
evidence may not always be required. Oatridge, 60 however, is the only case in which 
self-defence was successfully applied despite it being advanced as a defence in at least 
four other cases. In addition to provocation and diminished responsibility, a number 
of the defendants claimed that they lacked the necessary mental requirement for 
murder, in that they did not intend to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. This was 
accepted in three cases: HigginS, 6 1 Anderson 62 and, at the first trial, Oatridge. 63 
The Court of Appeal allowed all of the appeals against the murder convictions, and in 
the case of Rossiter 64 substituted a conviction for manslaughter on the grounds of 
provocation and sentenced the appellant to 6 years in prison. The appeal in the case of 
57 Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 
58 [ 1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
59 [1992] 94 Cr App R 367 
60 Ibid. 
61 [199611 Cr App R (S) 271 
62 Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 
63 [1992] 94 Cr App R 367 
64 [1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
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Hobson 65 was accepted due to evidence of the battered woman syndrome. The court 
recognised that the syndrome was now an official mental disease and capable of 
giving rise to the defence of diminished responsibility. In this case the Court ordered 
a retrial, upon which Kathleen Hobson was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds 
of diminished responsibility and immediately released after serving six years in 
ýft 66 custody. A retrial was also ordered in the Muscro case, due to evidence of a long- 
standing personality disorder giving rise to diminished responsibility. As of yet the 
outcome of the retrial has not been reported. Appeals against sentence were accepted 
in the cases of Howell, 67 (whose custodial sentence was reduced from six years to 
three and a half years) Gardner '68 Sangha, 
69 Fell 70 and Higgins 71 (in all of these 
cases the custodial sentenced was varied to a probation order). As mentioned above, 
Oatridge 72 was acquitted on the grounds of self-defence. 
This brief overview of the cases highlights a number of issues. Firstly, there does 
appear to be a growing acceptance, by both the judiciary and juries, that women who 
kill their partners after suffering long-term abuse should not be labelled murderers, but 
instead receive a conviction for manslaughter. However, the courts seem reluctant to 
accept that such women are acting in self-defence. Secondly, as provocation has been 
65 [ 1998] 1 Cr App R 31 
66 [20011 EWCA 604 
67 [ 1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 
68 [ 1993114 Cr App R (S) 364 
69 [1997]1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
70 [200012 Cr App R (S) 464 
71 [ 199611 Cr App R (S) 271 
72 [1992] 94 Cr App R 367 
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accepted in a number of the cases, it appears that the changes to the 'reasonable 
person' in the House of Lords case of Smith 73 may not have been as indispensable as 
once thought, as this defence does appear to be open to female defendants. Thirdly, 
the continuing persistent reliance upon some form of psychiatric evidence can be 
considered to be a cause of alarm. Despite the fact that the mitigating circumstances of 
these homicides are being recognised, this being reflected in the use of the 
manslaughter conviction, the courts appear reluctant either to deconstruct the 
stereotypical binary categories or create different identity categories for women, 
remaining overwhelmingly trapped within the mad/bad, victim/aggressor dichotomies. 
Provoked Action 
Provocation was a successful defence in five of the cases. Four women were 
convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation at first instance, and 
Rossiter 74 on an appeal against murder. Chapters four and five highlighted that two 
major barriers to provocation exist which tend to prevent women who kill their 
abusive partners successfully pleading the partial defence. These are a) the 
requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of self control and b) whether the battered 
woman syndrome should amount to a relevant characteristic when assessing whether a 
reasonable person would react in a similar manner. The key issue to be discussed here 
is the extent to which these two barriers caused difficulties in the cases which were 
heard by the Court of Appeal. As Mrs Rossiter was initially convicted of murder, this 
case will be analysed first, as it highlights the circumstances in which the appeal court 
recognises that the killing was actually provoked. Furthennore, this case is interesting 
73 [200013 WLR 654 
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as it is one of only two cases in which expert evidence relating to the mental health of 
the woman does not appear to have been relied upon. 
Mrs Rossiter was convicted of murder after she stabbed and killed her husband during 
a verbal and physical fight. The marriage was described as 'turbulent' and, with 
regard to the night in question, she stated that she could 'see that he intended to kill 
me'. 75 At the trial she pleaded self defence, but was convicted of murder. The appeal 
was based on the ground that the judge failed to leave the defence of provocation to 
the jury. With reference to the cases of Bullard vR 76 and Rv Hopper 77 the Court of 
Appeal highlighted that the judge has a duty to leave the issue of provocation to the 
jury in any case where there is evidence of provocation, however tenuous, even if the 
defence had not been advanced by the defendant's counsel. The Court of Appeal held 
that the conviction for murder was unsafe, and, on the basis of the evidence which 
they had heard, substituted the murder conviction for a conviction of manslaughter on 
the grounds of provocation. A sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed. As 
this equalled the length of time which she had already served in custody she was 
released. 
In relation to the two perceived barriers to a successful plea of provocation, the 
judgment only discusses the issue of a subjective loss of self control. The Court of 
Appeal accepted that, although the appellant did not testify that she suffered a loss of 
74 [1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
75 Ibid., pp. 329-330 
76 [ 1957] 42 Cr App R1 
77 [1915] Cr App R 136 
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self-control, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that Mrs Rossiter had killed 
whilst under great stress. She is described as 'going virtually berserk'. 78 It was 
submitted that her loss of self control could be inferred from '... the circumstances of 
the killing and the number of wounds that were inflicted. 09 In this particular case, 
although the history of the violent relationship is mentioned, the case focuses 
specifically on the events immediately preceding the fatal stabbing. An outline of the 
violent incident, which commenced with an argument regarding money, is provided in 
the Court of Appeal judgment. After a number of violent altercations, during which 
both sustained injuries, including Mrs Rossiter jabbing Mr Rossiter with a knife, the 
fatal incident occurs after the deceased tried to attack her with a long handled paint 
brush, and then attempted to hit her in the face with a mitre block. Mrs Rossiter 
claimed that she was holding the knife at waist height and that the knife went into Mr 
Rossiter when he stumbled towards her. It is these circumstances of events which give 
rise to the inference of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control. 
Provocation was also used successfully in the case of Gardner 80 without significant 
reliance being placed upon psychiatric or medical evidence. In this case, Janet 
Gardner stabbed and killed her partner, Peter Lies, after he had banged her head 
against a door frame. He was stabbed when he went towards her quickly, trying to 
grab her. Hence, the fatal act took place during an actual physical confrontation, and 
the judge commented that the appellant had been provoked '... in the full sense of that 
78 Rv Rossiter [ 1992] 95 Cr App R 326 p. 327 and p. 332 
79 Ibid., p. 332 
so [1993114 Cr App R (S) 364 
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phrase. s8l Although in this case there was some evidence relating to Janet's mental 
condition provided at the trial via a social enquiry report, which stated that Janet was 
an unassertive woman, who had suffered a terrible ordeal '82 this appears to be a pre- 
sentence report, and hence called for after the conviction for manslaughter was passed. 
The cases of Rossiter 83 and Gardner 84 can be contrasted with the case of Howell 85 in 
which provocation was a successful defence despite an apparent time lapse between 
the provocation and the fatal act. Patricia Howell shot and killed her husband, Richard 
Howell after suffering abuse for a number of years, in addition to being abused by her 
two former partners. The fight commenced in the bedroom, with Richard accusing 
Patricia of having an affair. He then hit her around the head a number of times. 
Patricia did not retaliate, but walked out of the bedroom and into the kitchen. She was 
eventually followed by Richard who dragged her onto the landing and then continued 
to punch her. After this assault he went into the bathroom, at which point Patricia saw 
the shot gun. Patricia claimed that she loaded the gun in order to frighten him as she 
considered that he could tell whether or not the gun was loaded. This was due to a 
past occasion when she had pointed the gun at him, when it was unloaded (on that 
occasion, as opposed to deterring Richard, her defensive actions led to a severe 
beating. ) When Richard emerged from the bathroom he headed towards Patricia, 
indicating that the assault would continue. She then pulled the trigger. 
81 Ibid., p. 366 
82 Ibid. 
83 [1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
84 [1993114 Cr App R (S) 364 
85 [199811 Cr App R (S) 229 
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When this case is compared to other provocation cases in which the defence was 
unsuccessful, such as Sarah Thornton who stabbed her partner after going into the 
kitchen to pick up a knife, it appears that the lapse in time could be sufficient to 
amount to evidence that Patricia had regained her self-control. The time lapse occurs 
when Richard goes in to the bathroom, during which time she picks up the gun. 
Indeed, this factor is noted by the trial judge. Brooke I-T in the Court of Appeal notes: 
"He [the trial judge] added that there had been an opportunity in the course of 
a final quarrel for the appellant to avoid further confrontation but she had 
employed this interval by taking a gun, loading it, and waiting for her husband 
to reappear. , 86 
However, it could also be argued that as Richard approached Patricia when she was 
holding the gun this action could to amount to a provocative act which causes a loss of 
self control. Nevertheless, Patricia's loss of self control is explained through the 
application of the battered woman syndrome. 
At the trial psychiatric evidence was received from Dr Nigel Eastman and Dr Jeanette 
Smith, both of whom stated that Patricia was suffering from the battered woman 
syndrome. Although they disagreed as to whether the battered woman syndrome 
amounted to an abnormality of the mind so as to diminish her responsibility, they both 
stated that Patricia was not suffering from a mental disorder, as defined by the Mental 
Health Act 1983. Such an approach can, however, be contrasted with the case of 
Hobson 87 in which it was emphasised that since 1994 the syndrome has been included 
in the British Classification of Mental Diseases, and seen as giving rise to diminished 
86 Ibid., p. 230 
97 [1998] 1 Cr App R 31 
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responsibility. Hence it could be argued that the meaning of the syndrome is far from 
static, a point which is considered in further detail below. 
In relation to the loss of self control, the psychiatrists acknowledged that the existence 
of the battered woman syndrome would have had impact on how Patricia responded to 
the deceased's provoking conduct. Elements of the syndrome, such as learned 
helplessness, low self-esteem, and 'inappropriate guilt', were considered to be 'mental 
characteristics' which would significantly increase the gravity of the verbal and 
physical abuse. Hence she was considered to be more vulnerable to the deceased's 
88 
violence than one who had not suffered continuous abuse. The Court of Appeal cited 
the opinion of Dr Smith: 
"... the appellant's reaction to the provocation was coloured by the 
psychological characteristics which would have affected her judgment, 
volition and control, particularly when provoked by his unremitting and severe 
physical and emotional abuse. "89 
Hence, as opposed to Mrs Rossiter, whose loss of self-control is inferred from the 
facts of the abuse she suffered and the manner in which she reacted, the subjective 
element of the provocation defence in Patricia's case can only be explained through 
the application of the battered woman syndrome. The syndrome is used to explain 
why she reacted with fatal force when there is a perceived escape route, or an interval 
of time in which to regain self-control. This corresponds with the arguments made 
above by Tarrant 90 that women are excluded from the creation of social and legal 
88 Rv Howell [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 pp. 233-234 
89 Ibid., p. 234 
90 Tarrant S "Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws" 
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meaning and thus their experiences can only be explained via expert testimony. A 
woman's loss of self-control outside the masculine time constraints, i. e. an immediate 
reaction to a perceived physical threat, needs to be explained via the application of the 
battered woman syndrome. The use of the syndrome to explain why she was still 
suffering a loss of self-control appears to be consistent with its uses in America and 
Canada, 91 and its application in relation to self-defence. Hence, the syndrome is 
clearly applicable to the subject strand of provocation. 
Moreover, it can also be inferred from this case that, prior to the House of Lords 
judgment of Smith, 92 the syndrome was also considered to be applicable to the 
objective strand of the provocation defence. If it had been considered that the 
reasonable woman would have reacted in a similar manner then, arguably, it would 
not'have been necessary to explain Patricia's actions via the syndrome. The use of the 
syndrome indicates that this is not how a 'reasonable' woman would have reacted, but 
how a woman who suffered from low-self esteem, learned helplessness and long term 
abuse would have reacted. The statements of the psychiatrists are testament to this. It 
stands to reason that, if Patricia's loss of self control could not be understood in the 
absence of the syndrome, than she would also fail the objective test (would a 
reasonable women react in such a manner) unless the reasonable woman was 
considered to be suffering from the battered woman syndrome. Following this line of 
argument, the syndrome also seems to be relevant to the level of self-control to be 
expected. 
91 See chapter 5 
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It can, however, also be questioned whether the battered woman syndrome was strictly 
necessary in this case. If one adopts the approach adopted by Lord Millet in the case 
of Smith, 93 it is clear that Patricia's actions can be explained without recourse to 
psychiatric evidence. Lord Millet 94 argued that when assessing the provoked act the 
entire factual situation should be taken into account. Arguably, once the entire factual 
situation is taken into account Patricia's reactions can be seen to be understandable, 
her loss of self control does not need to be explained via medical evidence. She had 
suffered severe abuse not only at the hands of Richard, but also two other partners. 
The violence had increased over the past couple of days and on a previous occasion, 
when she had tried to protect herself with the gun, he had taken it off her subjected her 
to a severe beating. Moreover, the time lapse which occurred was really insignificant. 
As the judgment states: '[i]t took her as long to pick it [the gun] up, load it and return 
to the kitchen doorway as it did for her husband to urinate. '95 Moreover, she shot him 
whilst he was approaching her in a threatening manner which, when placed in the 
entire factual situation is, arguably, sufficiently provoking to lead to a reasonable loss 
of self control. The use of the syndrome in this case prevents Patricia's actions as 
being constructed as a reasonable response to the abuse she suffered. This highlights 
a continued reluctance by the judiciary to accept that a homicide committed by a 
woman is the face of ongoing abuse is an understandable reaction. 
92 [200013 WLR 654 
93 Ibid., 
94 Ibid., pp. 715-717 
95 [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 229 p. 235 
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The case of Dawn Grainger 96 is also somewhat different to the cases discussed above. 
Although there are some similarities, in that she killed her husband after suffering 
abuse for a number of years by stabbing him, the circumstances of the fatal act are 
slightly different. Plus, whilst psychiatric evidence is used, it is only used in relation 
to the sentencing, despite the fact that the provocation does not appear to be as serious 
as in the Howell 97 case. Dawn stabbed and killed her husband, Paul, on an evening 
after they had both been drinking. The relationship is described as volatile and, on the 
night in question, a drunken argument erupted, during which Mr Grainger acted in 
what is describe as a 'bizarre manner', punching and head-butting the walls, and 
kicking the television and stereo. The deceased provoked the appellant by 
superficially stabbing himself with a knife, and then offered the knife to the appellant, 
saying 'Do it'. She stabbed him with a carving knife which she had brought from the 
kitchen to protect herself. In a police interview she stated that the deceased had 
'goaded' her into stabbing him. Hence, the provocation is by words, as opposed to 
physical assault. In addition, Dawn told the police that she thought that Paul was 
either going to kill himself or kill her, and that she was merely trying to frighten him, 
98 
as she herself was terrified. Initially, the defence offered a guilty plea to involuntary 
manslaughter, thus inferring that she lacked the intention to kill or cause grievous 
bodily hann. This plea was rejected by the Crown. The prosecution, however, 
accepted a plea of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation after hearing the 
evidence of Paul Kendrick, who witnessed the incident. 
96 Rv Grainger [ 1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 369 
97 [ 1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 
98 Rv Grainger [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 369 p. 371 
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A number of reports, including a psychiatric report and a pre-sentence report, were put 
before the judge, however, these were considered in relation to sentencing, as opposed 
to evidence which indicated that Dawn had killed due to provocation. Thus 
psychiatric evidence does not appear crucial to the defence. However, it is important 
to note that there is another voice, indeed a male voice, whose narrative is sufficiently 
persuasive. It is the evidence of Paul Kendrick which leads the prosecution to accept 
a plea of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation. Hence, Dawn's voice alone is 
insufficient. 
This overview of cases heard by the Court of Appeal disrupts some of the arguments 
previously made in relation to the defence of provocation and warris against 
forwarding any generalisations as to why and how women kill abusive partners, and 
how they are excluded from the defences to murder. The main argument in relation to 
provocation is that women tend to have a slow-bum anger, thus failing to fall within 
the law's requirement of a 'sudden and temporary loss of self-control'. 99 Whilst, 
undoubtedly some women, such as Kiranjit Ahluwalia, kill whilst their abuser is 
asleep or in a non-confrontation situation, the cases discussed here demonstrate that 
many women also kill during a fight, and in a manner which can be constructed as a 
sudden and temporary loss of self-control. Therefore undue reliance upon a female 
reaction or a female anger, whether this is considered to be biological or socially 
constructed, can work in a negative manner and exclude women who respond 
differently, such as Mrs Rossiter. The creation of a female slow bum anger can also 
" see for example Nicolson D and Sanghvi R "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of 
Ahluwalia" p. 730 Young A "Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis" p. 771 
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be subjected to Young's critique of a logic of identity. 100 It sets up a standard against 
which women are judged, and those who fall outside risk being constructed as 'other'. 
Moreover, it tends to be drawn from the experiences of certain women, and therefore 
will also exclude other women. Heed needs to be taken of Butler's argument against 
'idealiz[ing] certain expressions of gender. "O' Such an approach could have the 
consequence of constructing certain expressions as natural and others as false. 
Potentially, the construction of a female slow bum anger may go beyond its original 
purpose and become a normative standard against which women are judged. 
ExPert Evidence 
Worrall illustrates how psychiatric discourse is afforded a 'privileged position' within 
the judicial process, 102 and this is especially true in cases of women who kill their 
abusive partners. The involvement of psychiatrists operates at both the pre-conviction 
and post-conviction stage. At the pre-conviction stage the reports are used to explain 
how the women were either suffering from diminished responsibility or, as in the case 
of Howell, 103 have lost their self-control. At the post-conviction stage, the reports are 
used in relation to how the women should be 'managed. 104 Overwhelmingly, within 
cases involving women who kill their abusive partners, psychiatric evidence is used to 
argue that a non-custodial sentence is the more appropriate sentence. 
100 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference. See chapter 3 
101 Butler J Gender Trouble p. viii see chapter 2 
102 Worrall A Offending Women Female Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System [Routledge; 
London; 1997]p. 23 
103 [ 199811 Cr App R (S) 229 
104 Worrall A Offending Women Female Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System p. 23 
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The existence of fresh medical evidence was sufficient to render a conviction for 
murder unsafe in the cases of Hobson 105 and Muscroft. 106 The two women stabbed 
and killed their partners during a fight, both women had been drinking and Anita 
Muscroft was also under the influence of drugs. At the first trial they raised the 
defences of self-defence and provocation, but not diminished responsibility. Anita 
also claimed lack of intent. Nevertheless they were both convicted for murder. 
In Anita's case, the incident occurred after the deceased had hit her around the head a 
number of times, attempted to stab her, and also hit her with a crowbar. In addition to 
this, evidence was also admitted to show that she had been sexually abused by the 
deceased. She had also been sexually abused by her father and been involved in 
relationships with a number of other violent men. However, this latter information 
did not surface until after her conviction. At the first trial, reports had been produced 
by three psychiatrists: Dr Rix, who had been consulted by the defence, Dr Collins, 
expert witness for the Crown, and Dr Soliman, whom Anita had been visiting as a 
psychiatric patient since 1987. All of the psychiatrists agreed that she suffered from a 
long-standing personality disorder. Nevertheless the defence of diminished 
responsibility was not raised. Dr Rix commented that it may be difficult to persuade 
the jury that Anita was suffering from diminished responsibility: an abnormality of the 
mind which substantially impaired her responsibility. The other two psychiatrists did 
not refer to diminished responsibility. 
105 ( 199811 Cr App R 31 
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The fresh evidence which was to be used to raise the defence of diminished 
responsibility was provided by two female consultant psychologists: Dr Blake and Dr 
Mason. The report by Dr Blake was actually prepared before the first trial but had 
failed to be considered, and the Court of Appeal held that this failure supported the 
appellant's appeal. 107 The report was produced by Dr Blake whist she was a student 
working at Wakefield Prison, where Anita was in custody. The report contains 
allegations of abuse which Anita did not disclose to the three psychiatrists whose 
reports were received at the first trial. Significantly, the report contained detailed 
infonnation about the extent of the abuse which Anita suffered at the hands of Peter, 
which included forced deviant sexual acts and forced prostitution. 108 The report 
explained that this failure to disclose this information to the other psychiatrists, who 
were all male, was due to Anita's unease with men. The report states that '-she did 
not react well to males, and indeed had anxieties as her whole legal team were 
male. "09 Anita generally found it very difficult to discuss certain events which had 
occurred in her life, and this difficulty became insurmountable when the listener was 
male. Hence, the failure to disclose was due to the gender of the listener. This 
situation was explained by Dr Rix with reference to the battered woman syndrome. 
His report stated: 
106 [20011 EWCA 604 
107 Under section 21 l(l) of the Criminal Appeals Act 1968 (as amended) the court may receive new 
evidence was not adduced at the trial if it is considerded "necessary or expedient in the interests of 
justice". This ground of appeal was also relied upon, although unsucessfully, in the case of Zoora Shah. 
The issue of the admittance of fresh evidence will be consider in further detail in chapter 7. 
log [200 11 EWCA Crim 604 para 21 
109 Ibid., para 20 
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"To the extent that she was not, at the time of the trial, as co-operative, full or 
frank as ideally she should have been, I can say that this is not uncommon in 
women who have suffered abusive relationships and especially if the 
interviewer is male. I have encountered this in women who can be identified 
as having what the courts recognise as 'battered woman syndrome'.... ". " 0 
This conclusion was drawn by Dr Rix after reading the reports produced by Dr Blake 
and Dr Mason. With this new infonnation Dr Rix concluded that Anita was, at the 
material time, suffering from diminished responsibility. What is noteworthy here, 
however, is that this change of opinion took place in the absence of interviewing 
Anita again. Indeed, his report goes so far as to admit that he does not '-specifically 
recall the appellant'. "' Hence, despite not being able to recall Anita, he concludes 
that her behaviour was in line with the battered woman syndrome. Hence, the 
opinions of other psychiatrists render Anita an unnecessary source of information. 
Their speech overpowers her speech. Nevertheless, Dr Collins did conduct a further 
interview with Anita, and another report was submitted by two other psychiatrists. All 
the reports reached the same conclusion, that Anita was, at the time of the stabbing, 
suffering from an abnormality of mind which significantly impaired her responsibility. 
Due to the existence of this fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal held that the 
conviction was unsafe, and ordered a retrial. At the present time, the retrial has not 
yet been reported, however it is very likely that in such a situation Anita Muscroft will 
be found guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Indeed 
that was the outcome in the retrial of Kathleen Hobson. 112 
110 Ibid., para 27 
111 Ibid., 
112 Rv Hobson [199811 Cr App R 31 
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Similar to Anita Muscroft, the defence of diminished responsibility was not raised at 
Kathleen's trial, and she was convicted of murder. Kathleen stabbed and killed James 
McDonald, who is described as her 'abusive and alcoholic partner', 113 during an 
argument, which also involved an attempted rape. She stated that she had taken the 
knife from the kitchen in order to defend herself, and did not intend to kill the 
defendant. In addition to self-defence, the trial judge also left the issue of provocation 
to the jury. At the trial she gave evidence that she had suffered abuse and detailed a 
number of incidences which covered the eighteen months prior to his death. It was 
also shown that she had reported the deceased for violent behaviour on 30 occasions 
and made 4 fon-nal complaints. She appealed against the conviction, arguing that due 
to the abusive relationship she was, at the time of the incident, suffering from the 
battered woman syndrome, which was not brought into evidence at the first trial. It 
was submitted that this syndrome was not only relevant to the characteristics of 
provocation's reasonable person, but could also lead to, and actually did in this case, 
diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal upheld her appeal and ordered a 
retrial, as it was recognised that the conviction was unsafe, due to the fact that the 
battered woman syndrome had, since the first trial, been included in the British 
Classification of Medical Disease. At the retrial, the appellant was convicted of 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, and immediately released 
after serving six years in prison. 114 
113 Ibid., p. 32 
114 "Killer Freed at Retrial as Law Change allows 'Battered Woman' Defence" The Guardian 
December 16 1997 p. 11 
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Custody or Probation? 
In addition to being used in appeals against murder convictions, many women who 
have been convicted at first instance of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility, provocation or lack of intent, have used the battered woman syndrome 
in order to appeal against a sentence set by the court. Evidence of either 'post- 
traumatic stress disorder' or the battered woman syndrome has been used successfully 
to reduce a custodial sentence to a probation order in a number of cases. Nine cases in 
total dealt with an appeal against sentence and the appeal was successful in five. In 
four of these five cases the custodial sentence was varied to a probation order, and in 
the case of Patricia Howell her six year custodial sentence was reduced to three and a 
half years. 
Janet Gardner was sentenced for five years imprisonment, for her conviction for 
manslaughter on the grounds of provocation. In her appeal against this sentence 
psychiatric evidence was received by the court which described Janet as suffering 
from symptoms consistent with the battered woman syndrome: '... cumulative state of 
exhaustion, hopelessness, helplessness and depression. ' This was stated to be due to 
the abuse she suffered at the hands of her victim. Hence, it can be seen that in this 
case her victim is blamed for her mental state, in addition to her provoked act, which 
seems to counter the argument noted above that women are always held blameworthy, 
whether they are the victim or the aggressor. In addition the report verified her version 
of events, and commented upon Janet's reaction. The doctor stated: '... the act itself 
was the result of severe provocation by her eventual victim which led to an explosion 
of pent-up rage and frustration which, up to that point, had been suppressed or 
denied. ' Furthennore, opinion was also expressed on the provoking act, describing it 
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as '... a frenzied life-threatening assault by her eventual victim. ' These two quotations 
illustrate the powerful and privileged position of the psychiatric evidence. In addition 
to commenting upon Janet's mental condition, constructing her as suffering from the 
battered woman syndrome, which is undoubtedly the role of such evidence, the report 
also substantiates Janet's testimony that she suffered abuse and that the killing was a 
provoked act. It is in the light of this information that Janet's sentence is reduced 
from five years imprisonment to a probation order, which is a significant amendment. 
Hence, as Worrall argues, ' 15 the psychiatrist passes a moral judgment as well as a 
medical judgment, and both of these are given exceptional weight by the court. 
Probation orders were also considered by the Court of Appeal to be preferable in the 
cases of Higgins, 116 Sangha 117 and Fell. ' 18 In all these cases it was recognised that, 
whereas usually a custodial sentence would be appropriate in a case involving a loss 
of life, exceptional circumstances existed which suggested that a probation order was 
the more suitable method of disposal. In all cases the exceptional circumstances 
include suffering from clinical depression or the battered woman syndrome, and being 
subjected to prolonged violence. In addition, in the cases of Higgins 119 and 
Sangha, 120 emphasis is placed on the women's previous good character and their role 
as mothers. These 'exceptional circumstances' rendered a probation order appropriate. 
115 Woffall A Offending Women Female Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System 
116 [ 199611 Cr App R (S) 271 
117 [199711 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
118 [200012 Cr App R (S) 464 
119 [199611 Cr App R (S) 271 
120 [199711 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
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In three cases a custodial sentence was considered to be appropriate: Howell, 121 due to 
the use of firearms, and Stubbs 122 and Anderson. 123 
These exceptional circumstances will be scrutinised through the case of Sangha. 124 
Bakhshish stabbed and killed her husband, Suijit, during a physical and verbal fight, 
which occurred when she discovered that he had been having an affair for 
approximately five years. Her plea of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility was accepted and she received an eighteen months custodial sentence. 
On appeal the Court of Appeal varied this to a probation order. Psychiatric evidence 
played a significant part in both the conviction for manslaughter and the sentence 
passed at both the trial and appeal court. The trial judge recognised the 'very strong' 
mitigating factors which were present in this case, but also stressed the seriousness of 
the offence. With this in mind he sentenced Bakhshish to '... the least period of 
imprisonment that I can possibly impose having regard to the seriousness of the crime 
which is committed. ' 125 These strong mitigating circumstances were found to reside 
in the reports of three Doctors and a consultant anthropologist. Medical evidence was 
received from three doctors, all of whom supported the plea of diminished 
responsibility. In particular, the reports of Dr Bond and Dr Griffin commented upon 
the effect which the discovery of her husband's infidelity had upon her, considering 
this to be a pivotal factor in causing Bakhshish mental breakdown. Although the Court 
121 [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 
122 [1994] 15 Cr App R (S) 57 
123 Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 
124 [1997]1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
125 Rv Sangha [ 1997] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 p. 204 
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of Appeal judgment does not explicitly state that the medical reports concluded that 
Bakhshish was suffering from the battered woman syndrome, the description offered 
is certainly reminiscent. Dr Griffin stated 'Upon discovering incontrovertible 
evidence of her husband's infidelity,..., the situation changed suddenly, and she 
became severely distressed, severely anxious, angry, depressed, and took an overdose 
of drugs ...... 
126 In Dr Gahir's report she is described as suffering from '-persistent 
low mood, anxiety, disturbance of memory, tearfulness, feelings of hopelessness and 
helplessness ...... 
127 
The court also called for the opinion of a consultant anthropologist, who gave 
evidence as to the effect which her culture and ethnicity would have had on her 
reaction to the situation. To quote the report: 
"rhere is little doubt in my mind that within a Sikh conceptual framework [the 
deceased's] behaviour was both profoundly humiliating and deeply 
provocative as far as [the appellant] was concerned. She had been driven right 
to the end of her tether, and no resolution besides ending it all seemed to be 
available. Whilst killing cannot be condoned, the action which [the appellant] 
took in the circumstances is entirely comprehensible. " 128 
Hence, once assessed against her cultural background, her reactions are considered to 
be 'entirely comprehensible', but nevertheless still require an explanation. This is 
quite a different opinion to that which was expressed by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Zoora Shah, an issue which is examined in chapter seven. 
126 Ibid., p. 206 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
234 
In addition to this expert testimony, the Court of Appeal also chose to explain 
Bakhshish's state of mind via referring to the mental and physical abuse she had been 
subject to. She had suffered verbal, physical and sexual' abuse throughout the 
marriage, including being beaten whilst she was pregnant, and mocking of her 
religious views. He had also physically abused his children, and this was considered to 
be very important by the Court of Appeal. In 1990 he was convicted of grievous 
bodily haim after he had beaten his daughters with a hockey stick. It was noted that, 
although the abuse towards Bakhshish ceased after 1990 he continued to beat his 
children. Her lawyers emphasised that 'the cumulative effect on her was very 
damaging', 129 and that she had on a number of occasions, attempted to take her own 
life. She is described as a '-desperate and depressed woman who, ..., could see no 
way out of her plight. ' 130 She is also constructed by the defence as '... a woman of 
exemplary character, hard working and a devoted wife and mother who had worked 
all her life to provide for her family and raise her children. ' 13 1 The Court of Appeal 
considered that in such a case the sentence imposed should be more concerned with 
rehabilitating Bakhshish, as opposed to punishing her. As she was constructed as a 
woman who needed rehabilitation, a probation order was substituted for the 18 
months imprisonment. 
In contrast to this, in the case of Stubbs 132 the appellant's appeal against a thirty 
months custodial sentence for a conviction of manslaughter on the grounds of 
129 Ibid., p. 204 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid., p. 205 
132 [1994] 15 Cr App R (S) 57 
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provocation, was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The appellant killed her husband, 
after years of violent verbal, physical and degrading sexual abuse, she then buried him 
in the garden and did not confess to the murder until three years later. Although there 
was substantial evidence that the appellant was suffering from a depressive illness, 
'... due to the long suffering of physical and other abuse to which [she] had been 
exposed, ' 133 the custodial sentence was deemed to be appropriate due to the '... degree 
of deliberation and a degree of retention of mental control unusual in this class of 
case. ' 134 Hence, although some 'exceptional circumstances' did exist: evidence of 
depression and also the fact that she has children, these are considered to be 
overshadowed by the level of responsibility for her actions. Although it was 
recognised by the Court of Appeal that a sentence should only be concerned with what 
occurred at the time of the offence, and not what happens afterwards, the appellant's 
actions of concealing her crime were considered to provide evidence of a degree of 
responsibility which was deserving of punishment. 
A custodial sentence of four years was upheld in the case of Deborah Anderson, who 
stabbed and killed her partner Charles Dennis. She was convicted for manslaughter, 
and the Court of Appeal ventured the opinion that this was on the grounds of either a 
lack of intent or provocation. It was accepted by the court that Charles became 
verbally aggressive and abusive when he was drunk, and that both Deborah and 
Charles were alcoholics. Deborah claimed that the stabbing occurred accidentally 
during a struggle, after she had approached Charles with the knife. This explanation, 
133 Ibid. p. 58 
134 Ibid., p. 59 
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however, was undermined by pathological evidence 135 and was rejected by the jury. 
Thus it is suggested that Deborah deliberately stabbed Charles during the course of an 
argument. In addition, she did not tell anybody about the killing until two days later, 
and even concealed his death from a debt collector. In upholding the sentence, the 
Court of Appeal also noted that physical abuse had not been '... a significant factor on 
the relevant days in question. ' 136 The exceptional circumstance of suffering from the 
battered woman syndrome did exist in this case, however it was also recognised that 
this was superseded by the appellant's drunkenness. Hence the exceptional 
circumstances were negated by the lack of physical abuse at the relevant time, the 
appellant's drunkenness, and perhaps also her failure to confess to the crime 
immediately. Moreover, it was also recognised that Deborah was '-doing extremely 
well in prison' and that she was not ready for 'unfetted release upon the 
community. ' 137 Hence, prison did not seem detrimental to her rehabilitation. This 
can be contrasted with the case of Tara Mary Fell, in which it was expressed that a 
custodial sentence could in fact not only end her rehabilitation, but could also 
potentially cause damage. 138 A custodial sentence was also upheld in the case of 
Dawn Grainger, 139 who was sentenced to three years after being found guilty of 
manslaughter on the grounds of provocation after she stabbed and killed her husband. 
Although the exceptional circumstances of having children and suffering from the 
battered woman syndrome were apparent in this case, she was distinguished from the 
135 Rv Anderson, Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 para 8 
136 Ibid., para 18 
137 Ibid., para 21 
138 Rv Fell [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 464 p. 468 
139 Rv Grainger [1997] 1 Cr. App. R (S) 369 
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case of Janet Gardner, as she was not considered to be mentally ill. In addition to this, 
Dawn is also constructed as a particularly aggressive woman, one of the psychiatric 
reports before the court stated: 'She is often described as being the aggressive one and 
other witnesses have described Mr Grainger as suffering physical injuries which he 
had apparently attributed to his wife. ' 140 Thus her aggressive behaviour and the lack 
of a mental illness upon which to blame her aggressiveness rendered her unsuitable 
for a non-custodial sentence. 
What these cases illustrate is that women are punished in different ways for a 
perceived failure to adhere to gendered scripts. 141 As there are seen to be socially 
accepted and regulated gendered scripts, any 'performance' which does not 
correspond to this script becomes problematic, as Butler states: 'those who fail to do 
140 Ibid., p. 372 
141 The term gendered scripts relates to ideal path of the female (sex), femininity (gender), 
heterosexuality (sexual practice), male (object of sexual desire). This path creates certain gendered 
scripts which amount to intelligible genders. The specific gender scripts which this thesis explores can 
be seen to be related to Worrall's 'appropriate femininity'. This construction draws upon three 
elements: Domesticity: 'the extent of the woman's domestic responsibilities'; Sexuality: 'the extent to 
which her appearance, demeanour, and life-style accord with sexual 'normality"; and pathology: 'the 
extent to which her problems can be pathologized and 'treated" Worrall A Offending Women Female 
Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System p. 60. In addition this thesis also pays considerable 
attention to the passivelaggressive dichotomy, recognising that women are generally expected to be 
passive and non-aggressive. Moreover, the thesis argues that these gendered scripts are also racial, and 
emphasises that different gender scripts operate in cases involving black and Asian women. In 
particular, chapter 7 outlines how Asian women are expected to display a particular level of shame in 
order to be constructed as an intelligible gender. 
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their gender are regularly punished. ' 142 Although it could be argued that all women 
who kill amount to an unintelligible gender as such fatal action appears to amount to a 
contravention of the feminine gender script, some contraventions are constructed to be 
more serious than others. There is a certain level of cultural intelligibility in a woman 
who kills due to mental illness, and thus still remains within the realm of intelligible 
genders. Thus, some women are dealt with via rehabilitation as their contravention is 
not sufficient to warrant a harsher punishment, they can be brought back within the 
appropriate 'gendered script'. These are the women who fulfil what has been labelled 
by the courts 'exceptional circumstances'. These exceptional circumstances 
invariably amount to suffering from some form of mental illness, whether the battered 
woman syndrome or depression and of suffering years of abuse. However, these 
exceptional circumstances appear to exist in nearlY all cases of women who kill their 
abusive partners. All such women are capable of being constructed as 'exceptional'. 
However, some women receive a harsher punishment for their transgressive 
behaviour, for failing to be sufficiently 'exceptional'. Such transgressive behaviour 
can be seen to be being an alcoholic, not suffering from a sufficient mental illness and 
for being aggressive. In such situations the law has found a more subtle way in which 
to mark their unintelligibility. As opposed to the imposition of a murder conviction, 
such 'unexceptional women' receive a custodial sentence. 
142 Butler J "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An exxay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory" in Case SE ed Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre [The John 
Hopkins University Press Ltd; London; 19901270-282 p. 273 
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The Battered Woman Syndrome -A Stable Identity Category? 
Although Lenore Walker's intention behind the creation of the battered woman 
syndrome may have been to explain the situation of women who suffer long term 
abuse, it can be argued that the impact of the syndrome has gone beyond its original 
purpose. No longer does it simply describe an identity, it also constitutes an identity. 
Butler argues that an identity category is never simply descriptive. Drawing upon the 
work of Zizeck, Butler argues: 
"Political signifiers, especially those that designate subject positions, are not 
descriptive, that is they do not represent pre-given constituencies, but are 
empty signs which come to bear phantasmatic investments of various 
,, 143 kinds. 
Thus the battered woman syndrome does not simply reflect a pre-existing identity, it 
also creates identity and, more importantly, it will always fail to fully and completely 
represent that which it describes. Although an identity category holds out the promise 
of a true and unified representation, this is impossible, due to the exclusions upon 
which such a category is based. Butler states: 
"When some set of descriptions is offered to fill out the content of an identity, 
the result is inevitably fractious. Such inclusionary descriptions produce 
inadvertent new sites of contest and a host of resistances, disclaimers, and 
refusals to identify with the tenns. " 144 
The description will always be 'illimitable' or 'limited by a preemptory act of 
foreclosure, ' 145 1 certain characteristics' will be excluded, will be foreclosed by the 
category. Nevertheless, these exclusions will lead to resistance and the creation of new 
identities. In particular, this can be seen with the battered woman syndrome and the 
courts recognition of 'exceptional circumstances'. As noted above, the exceptional 
143 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 191 
1" Ibid., p. 221 
145 Ibid. 
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circumstance of suffering from the battered woman syndrome amounted to an identity 
which was consistent with a probation order. However, this category is based upon 
certain exclusions, certain other forms of identity which are deemed inconsistent with 
being a 'battered woman', and work to limit its exceptional status: being aggressive, 
or an alcoholic. These subject positions can thus be seen to fall outside the identity 
category of the battered woman syndrome. 
Nevertheless, cases such as Stubbs, 
146 Anderson 147 and Grainger 
148 
can be seen to 
offer resistance against the totalising tendencies of the battered woman syndrome. 
They illustrate how the term cannot provide a complete and unified description of 
women who kill their abusive partners, as they incorporate certain characteristics 
which are considered to frustrate the effect of the syndrome. However, the creation of 
different identity categories may spring from the syndrome's inability to provide a 
complete and unified representation. As Butler explains: '[t]he failures of such 
signifiers fully to describe the constituency they name... is what opens the signifier to 
new meanings and new possibilities for political resignification. ' 149 
In the above cases the courts have only used the terms battered woman and battered 
woman syndrome in order to describe the identity of the woman, as opposed to 
outlining the abuse she suffered. This corresponds to the observations made by 
146 [ 1994115 Cr App R (S) 57 
147 Unreported Monday 27 November 2000, No. 200002064/X5 
148 [199711 Cr App R (S) 369 
149 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 191 
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Schneider 150 in relation to cases in the United States. Whereas the theory of learned 
helplessness, or similar characteristics are readily discussed by the psychiatrists and 
the courts, little, if any, attention is paid to Walker's 'Cycle Theory of Violence'. The 
terms battered woman and battered woman syndrome are used as an identity category, 
as opposed to describing the abuse suffered. Similar to the 'slow bum anger', care 
must be taken to ensure that the battered woman syndrome does not become an 
'idealized form of gender expression'. However, due to the courts continued insistent 
reliance upon the syndrome, or analogous medical evidence, it does appear that it has 
indeed been constructed as a natural and ideal expression. Despite this perceived 
idealisation, however, it can be argued that the syndrome is far from a stable identity 
category, and thus may be subject to a resignification. This may occur due to two 
facts. Firstly, if it is recognised that the battered woman syndrome amounts to a 
'gendered script', its continued existence depends solely upon repetition. However, as 
no reiteration of a script is identical, this provides room for subversive performances, 
and here lies the possibility of transfonnation. Butler states: 
"... the possibilities of gender transformation are to be found in the arbitrary 
relation between such acts (acts that perform gender) in the possibility of a 
different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that 
style. " 151 
Secondly, the syndrome will always be haunted by its exclusions and by its inability to 
fully describe women who kill their abusive partners, and hence may be subject to 
scrutiny and resignification. Invariably, criticisms levelled against the battered 
150 Schneider E "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering". See chapter 5 
151 Butler J "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory" p. 271 
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woman syndrome have been premised upon the notion that the syndrome was either 
entirely descriptive, as opposed to constitutive, and/or completely fixed in its 
definitions and interpretation. As opposed to casting the syndrome as stable and fixed, 
and thus arguing that it should be completely rejected, I suggest that its instability and 
possibility of resignification should be explored. 
Self-Defence and Mistaken Beliefs 
Self-defence was only successful in one case, the case of Oatridge. 152 Gaynor 
Oatridge was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation after killing 
her partner, Tony Williams, by stabbing him whilst he was grabbing her throat, and 
saying 'I'm going to kill you'. She appealed against the manslaughter conviction on 
the grounds that the judge failed to direct the jury on the issue of mistaken belief in 
self-defence. As discussed in chapter 4, provided that the defendant has a genuine 
belief in serious harm, it matters not whether that belief is mistaken, furthermore, it 
does not have to be a reasonable belief. However, the trial judge directed the jury 
thus: 
"One of the matters you will have to consider is whether there was an attack 
such as the defendant describes. Whether there was really an attempt to 
strangle her, or whether the struggle was of a different nature. " 153 
On such a direction, the jury decided that she did not kill in self-defence, hence, 
rejecting Gaynor's narrative about the nature of the attack she suffered. The Court of 
Appeal allowed Gaynor's appeal and quashed her conviction due to the failure of the 
trial judge to expand this direction to include the situation where the defendant 
152 [ 1992194 Cr App R 367 
153 Ibid., p. 370 
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honestly believed themselves to be under attack, although in fact they were not. 154 
The appeal court held the opinion that Gaynor's belief that she was under a serious 
attack was not 'so fanciful' so as to exclude it from the case. No expert evidence was 
used to reach this conclusion. 
This is a very interesting judgment. On the one hand it can be seen to be a triumph. 
A woman who killed her partner after years of abuse was acquitted, and without the 
aid of the battered woman syndrome. Her reaction was clearly considered to be a 
reasonable response to the violence she was suffering. On the other hand, it can be 
argued that Gaynor's narrative is significantly undennined by the courts. Although it 
is recognised that Gaynor killed in self-defence, her belief that he was going to kill her 
is considered to be mistaken. It is not believed that she was, in fact, in that much 
danger, despite Tony's threats to kill. The threats are constructed as empty threats. 
Whilst referring to the Gaynor's reaction to his violence and her belief in the threats 
Tony had made, the court includes the sentence - 'even if in fact this was not what he 
was going to do. ' 155 His threats to kill are thus constructed as unreal, it is considered 
that Tony was not going to kill Gaynor, she was simply mistaken as to this fact. 
However, it cannot in truth be known whether or not he would have carried out his 
threat. The court's approach undermines Gaynor's narrative that she was facing a 
severe, life threatening assault. The court returns Gaynor's narrative and places a 
question mark over her actions. The judgment states that Gaynor was not facing a 
severe assault, she just thought she was. Tony was not actually going to kill her, even 
though he threatened to. Hence, although this case can be seen to be a 'just' result, 
154 Ibid. 
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the narratives of the court still operate to undermine the position of battered women 
who kill. 
The courts in a number of other cases have returned the narrative of the women in a 
similar manner, or simply refused to acknowledge their construction of events. In at 
least four cases self-defence was forwarded as a defence at the first trial, and in two 
other cases statements made by either the woman or the psychiatrist indicate they 
killed in self-defence. In Stubbs, 156 the appellant stated that she feared he would kill 
her, and in Gardner, 157 the psychiatrist recognised that she killed due to 'a frenzied 
life-threatening assault by her eventual victim. ' 
Self defence was rejected by the jury in the cases of Rossiter, 158 Hobson, 159 
Muscroft, 160 and Howell. 161 In particular, Kathleen Howell's narrative of events is also 
arguably consistent with a plea of self-defence, especially when considered with the 
battered woman syndrome. Kathleen stated that on the night in question she was 
particularly frightened, as the violence had intensified over the past couple of days, 
thus feeling the need to take steps to defend herself. When Richard came out of the 
bathroom she stated that she was not angry '... but actually feared for her life' and 
155 Ibid., p. 372 
156 [1994115 Cr App R (S) 57 
157 [ 1993114 Cr App R (S) 364 
158 [ 1992] 95 Cr App R 326 
159 [199811 Cr App R 31 
160 [20011 EWCA 604 
161 [ 199811 Cr App R (S) 229 
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believed that '-she would die at the hands of Richard and that her body could not 
take much more violence or pain. s162 Such a situation does seem to be consistent with 
a pre-emptive strike. She believed that she would be killed by Richard, and shot him 
whilst he was approaching her, holding the belief that the abuse would continue. The 
biggest barrier to her plea of self-defence appears to be the perceived time lapse 
between the confrontation and the fatal shooting. Although in the judgment there are 
no explicit statements to this effect, the time lapse is clearly constructed by the court 
as providing the opportunity to leave the situation. 163 In addition to explaining the loss 
of self control, in connection to provocation, the syndrome is also used to explain the 
perceived failure to take advantage of the opportunity to escape. It is argued on 
Kathleen's behalf, that the '-failure to withdraw was entirely consistent with the 
battered woman syndrome. "64 Moreover, it was emphasised that, in reality, she 
neither had the time to escape, as she lived in a public house which was securely 
locked, and that there was nowhere for her to escape apart from the street. 165 
However, this argument was not used in order to explain why her actions may have 
been in self-defence. The argument that she was not able to leave arguably also 
applies to the plea of self-defence as it explains why she felt under confrontation, why 
escape was not a possible solution. Thus, in contrast to the Canadian case of 
162 Ibid., p. 232 
163 The Trial judge stated '... that there had been an opportunity in the course of a final quarrel for the 
appellant to avoid further confrontation but she had employed this interval by taking a gun, loading it, 
and waiting for her husband to reappear. ' [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 229 p. 230 
164 [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 229 p. 235 
165 Ibid. 
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Lavallee, 166 when the syndrome was used to argue that a woman who shot her abusive 
partner whilst he was walking away from her was acting in self-defence, it fails to aid 
Kathleen in a similar manner. The narrative that she was acting in self-defence is not 
acknowledged by the court. 
The rejection of a self-defence narrative is more apparent in the case of Rossiter. 167 
The appeal court held that provocation was the appropriate defence, and quickly 
dismissed the defence of self-defence, stating that '... any realistic view of this case 
must necessarily dismiss self-defence as a viable proposition. ' 168 Furthermore, the 
Court maintained that the injuries inflicted on the deceased, and the violence used, 
was entirely disproportionate to the abuse that Mrs Rossiter suffered at his hands. 169 
This was decided with little acknowledgement of her fear, and also her statement that 
she did believe, at one point, that he intended to kill her. 170 This approach corresponds 
with the court's view, pronounced earlier in the judgement, that '... [m]atrimonial 
disharmony does not in itself and cannot entirely justify, extreme violence'. 17 1 By 
describing the abuse she suffered as 'matrimonial disharmony' the Court effectively 
minimalises the abuse Mrs Rossiter suffered, thus ruling out a plea of self-defence. 
Hence, self-defence remains an elusive defence for women who kill their abusive 
partners. 
1" [199011 SCR 852 
167 [ 1992195 Cr App R 326 
168 Ibid., p. 331 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid., p. 330 
171 Ibid., p. 327 
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The court's reluctance to recognise that such women are acting in self-defence can be 
explained by reference to the notion of performativity and gendered scripts. As 
argued above in relation to the sentencing, women who kill de facto contravene the 
existing domain of cultural intelligible performances of gender. Women who kill are 
not seen to be feminine, they contravene what is expected of women. However, these 
'unintelligible performances' are rendered, to a certain extent, intelligible if the 
women are constructed as 'victims' as opposed to aggressors. However, as they are 
on the boundary of intelligible and unintelligible, their actions cannot be constructed 
as completely reasonable orjustifiable. A successful plea of self-defence indicates that 
the reaction of the woman was the correct action to take, and thus suggests that her 
performance was culturally intelligible. As justificatory defences render prima facie 
unlawful behaviour, lawful, due to the surrounding circumstances, it could be argued 
that the law recognises that some culturally unintelligible behaviour has the ability to 
be intelligible depending on the surrounding circumstances. However, as the killing 
will invariably amount to a contravention of a gendered script, it cannot be 
constructed as the correct action to take as this would make the performance 
intelligible. This argument can also be applied to the case of Gaynor Oatridge, as it 
was a mistaken action, as opposed to a correct action. The reliance on mistaken belief 
constructs her actions as neither entirely intelligible nor completely unintelligible, but 
somewhere in the middle. 
All women who kill their abusive partners appear to hover between intelligible and 
unintelligible and are subject to construction by the criminal justice system. The 
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categories of victim and aggressor are central to the creation of their identity and their 
cultural status and the next two chapters will examine this argument in detail. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn together the main existing criticisms of the law's treatment of 
women who kill their abusive partners and suggests how the analysis should be moved 
forward. Invariably, the existing arguments have focused upon the 
sameness/difference dilemma. Either the law should treat men and women the same, 
or it should, on the other hand, recognise the different experiences of women. Both of 
these arguments tend to construct man and woman as homogenous categories and pay 
scant attention to the differences which exist between women. Moreover, such 
arguments also fail to recognise adequately the law's role in constructing identity, a 
point which this thesis aims to rectify. 
The second part of the chapter has focused upon twelve cases dealing with women 
who kill their abusive partners, and has highlighted that important differences between 
women fail to be recognised if women who kill are constructed as an homogenous 
category. Particular attention has been paid to the construction of a female slow bum 
anger and the battered woman syndrome, and how the syndrome is an unstable 
identity category which may be subject to a political resignification. The next two 
chapters will continue the investigation of unintelligible and intelligible genders and 
the existence of differences between women. Particular attention will be paid to racial 
and ethnic differences between women, and the extent to which 'racial scripts' also 
affect the women's intelligibility. 
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ZOORA SHAH: AN 'UNUSUAL WOMAN' 
Introduction 
This chapter will develop the analysis of how the construction of identity and 
intelligible genders are employed in cases of women who kill their abusive partners, 
via a close reading of the Zoora Shah' case. The case of Zoora Shah involved a 
Pakistani woman who lived in Bradford with her three children, Naseem, Amrez and 
Fozia. After being left by her husband for a younger woman she developed a 
relationship with Mohammed Salim Azarn. On the 10h April 1992, she killed Azarn 
by poisoning his food with arsenic, for which she was convicted of murder. In 
addition, Zoora was also convicted of forgery, soliciting murder and attempted 
murder. Her appeal against her convictions for murder and attempted murder rested 
upon the introduction of fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeals Act 
1968 (as amended). The Court of Appeal rejected her appeal and also refused to grant 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords. It is argued that the court's decision in this 
case was based upon their construction and judgment of Zoora's character or, more 
specifically, her ability (or inability) to conform to an approved 'gendered script', and 
her construction as an unintelligible gender. This close reading will draw specifically 
upon the work of Judith Butler and the concept of gender as performativity. In 
addition, the chapter will also examine the extent to which Zoora's race and ethnicity 
impact upon her perceived unintelligibility. 
1Rv Shah [1998] EWCA Crim 1441 (30 April 1998) 
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(Un)lntelligible Genders 
As discussed in chapter two, the notion of unintelligible genders is advanced by 
Butler, specifically in Gender Trouble, 2 and Bodies that Matter, 3 and is linked to the 
concept of compulsory heterosexuality. Intelligible genders are those which support 
or sustain the matrix of heterosexuality. Specifically, Butler constructs these to be 
those genders which support the perceived ideal path of sex, gender, sexual practice 
and sexual desire. 4 Genders which conform to this are those such as: female (sex), 
femininity (gender), heterosexuality (sexual practice), male (object of sexual desire), 
are thus seen to be intelligible. Same sex desire, for example, is considered to distort 
this line of desire and leads Butler to argue that homosexuality amounts to a gender 
which cannot exist: 
"The cultural matrix through which gender identity has become intelligible 
requires that certain kinds of "identities" cannot "exist" -that is, those in which 
gender does not follow from sex and those in which the practices of desire do 
not "follow" from either sex or gender. ,5 
It is through the concept of performativity that genders are 'constituted as materially 
intelligible. ' 6 Butler sees gender identity as a normative and regulatory ideal which 
one is compelled to perform under a threat of punishment. PerformativitY is therefore 
the citational repetition of norms, and these norms exist prior to the subject: Butler 
states: 
"The act that one does, the act that one performs, is, in a sense, an act that has 
been going on before one arrived on the scene. Hence, gender is an act which 
has been rehearsed, much as a script survives the particular actors who make 
2 Butler J Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Suberversion of Identity 
3 Butler J Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive Limits of Sex 
4 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 23 
5 Ibid.,. 23-24 
6 Loizidou E "The Trouble with Rape" p. 281 
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use of it, but which requires individual actors in order to be actualized and 
reproduced as reality once again. " 7 
Therefore gender is seen as a script, a script that bodies perform, and it is through this 
performance that the subject is constituted, hence there is in Butler's framework no 
'doer behind the deed', there is no subject which decides on which script to perform. 
As the regulatory norm of gender identity produces intelligible genders, it also 
produces genders which are excluded and abject: '... the exclusionary matrix by which 
subjects are formed thus requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject 
beings. '8 Just as some genders are intelligible, others, Butler argues, are unintelligible. 
However these abject identities are vital to the very existence of culturally intelligible 
subjects, as they fonn the underlying foundation. Hence the abject is '... inside the 
subject as its own founding repudiation. '9 Identity categories are always constituted 
through exclusions, thus emphasising their contingent and unstable nature. 
Butler, however, recognises that gender is not the only regulatory ideal which 
compels performance. In Bodies that Matter she questions: 
"Given that normative heterosexuality is not the only regulatory regime 
operative in the production of bodily contours or setting the limits to bodily 
intelligibility, it makes sense to ask what other regimes of regulatory 
production contours the materiality of bodies. " 10 
In answer to this query, Butler identifies race as another regulatory regime. Hence, it 
could be argued that in addition to 'gendered scripts' which compel performance there 
7 Butler J "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory" p. 277 
8 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 2 
9 Ibid., p. 3 
10 Ibid., p. 17 
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also exist certain racial and ethnic scripts. In her articulation of race, Butler adopts 
what may be labelled a post-colonial/post-modern perspective, in that race is not 
considered to be a natural 'pre-given' identity, but rather a product of history whose 
meanings are unstable and subject to change. However, this is not to assume that these 
gcndcrcd and racial scripts are separate 'axes of power', but rather vehicles for one 
another. Butler argues that the urge to think of such tenns as separate 'categories' or 
4positions' constructs them as unified categories which has the consequence of 
leading to a further 'enumerations' or '... a multiplication that produces an ever- 
expanding list that effectively separates that which it purports to connect... '. " Hence, 
care has to be taken when analysing the differences which exist between women who 
kill their abusive partners. Although women should not be presented as an 
homogenous group their differences must not be presented in such a way which may 
lead to further separation. Thus gender and race are not totally exclusive categories 
but are mutually constitutive. Gender is 'raced' and race is 'gendered'. What will be 
argued, however, is that race and gender are seen by both the courts and the lawyers 
as very discrete categories. To a significant extent this is arguably due to the failure 
to recognise white women as a racial category, whereas Asian women, such as Zoora. 
Shah and Bahkshish Kaur Sangha, 12 are marked by their racial difference. 
To summarise, the notion of intelligible genders concerns the citational performance 
of a regulatory ideal which maintains the matrix of compulsory heterosexuality. Any 
performance which fails to follow this path renders the gender culturally 
unintelligible. However this notion of unintelligible genders can be seen to extend 
11 Ibid., pp. 116-117 
12 Rv Sangha [199711 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 see chapter 6 
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further than sexual desire and sexual practice. If gender is performed, then surely a 
performance which amounts to an unintelligible gender is wider than those 
performances which are related primarily to sexuality and sexual practices. Hence, 
when reading the Court of Appeal judgment of Zoora Shah, it has to be questioned 
whether she is (re)produced as an unintelligible gender, therefore becoming abject and 
hence providing a repudiated foundation for other subjects (other women who kill). 
The law, just as other discourses, produces its own foundations and subjects through 
exclusion and rejection, and it can be argued that cases such as Shah amount to an 
excluded foundation. 
The Trial 
The Prosecution's case at first instance focused upon Zoora's attempts to purchase a 
certain property: 251 Legrams Lane. It was asserted by the Prosecution that there was 
a '... common thread though all counts of indictment: Zoora's desperate attempts to 
secure the title to 251 Legrams Lane'. 13 Although the main focus of the chapter will 
be the Court of Appeal's judgment, it is important to consider the impact which this 
statement, and the extent to which it is accepted by the court, has upon Zoora's case, 
and especially the type of woman she is perceived to be. At first instance it was 
believed that Zoora killed Azam in order to retain her title in number 251. Her 
motivation behind her actions were deemed to be materialistic and selfish, as opposed 
to being a victim fighting against her oppressive situation. 
Azarn had purchased the property in July 1983, however it was generally recognised 
that he merely lent his name to the transaction. Zoora advanced the E2000 deposit, 
13 [ 19981 EWCA Crim 1441 para 3 
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which was borrowed from an Asian Community Organisation. In April 1984 Azam 
was sentenced (on appeal) to eight years imprisonment for drug related offences. 
During the time Azarn was in prison Zoora 'began an association' with Raghib who is 
described as 'another married man'. 14 Thus far, within the first page of the Court of 
Appeal transcript, it is clear to see the 'type' of woman Zoora is being constructed as: 
determined and materialistic - due to her 'desperate attempts to secure title' - and also 
as a wanton woman due to her 'associations' with married men. The combination of 
these two represent her as deceitful and conniving. Not only does she have affairs 
with two married men, but also, as the rest of the Prosecution case strives to represent, 
she uses both these men as a means to her own ends: obtaining and retaining a 
property title. Moreover, despite the obviously dubious character of both these men, 
little doubt is cast upon their representations although their bad characters fonn an 
underlying foundation for the construction of Zoora Shah. She is necessarily 
implicated by her association with these two men, a 'good woman' would not become 
involved with such men, and moreover, nor would she lose her husband 'to a younger 
woman'. 15 Before the case really commences Zoora is constructed as a woman who 
does not conform with those 'types of women' who receive a conviction for 
manslaughter as opposed to murder for killing abusive partners. 
The Prosecution case at first instance outlines the number of times Zoora attempted to 
secure the title to 251 Legrams Lane, generally with the assistance of Raghib, who on 
one occasion, the prosecution contended, represented himself to be Azam. It was this 
action which resulted in Zoora's conviction for forgery. It is not stated whether or not 
14 Ibid., para 6 
15 Ibid., Para 3 
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Raghib was also convicted for the same offence. In relation to the such incidents the 
defence argued that any attempts Zoora made to sell the property to Raghib were in 
order to raise money for a trip to Pakistan. On the occasion for which Zoom was 
convicted for forgery, the defence argued that at this time Azarn did not dispute her 
claim to the title and that he was happy for the title to be transferred to her so that she 
could sell to Raghib. Zoora maintained that she had no role in the forgery as during 
the two visits during which such action was considered to have taken place, she was 
looking after a child. Such assertions were supported by the evidence of Zoora's 
daughter, Naseem, at the trial. 
The prosecution also alleged that Zoora approached an acquaintance named Bala, who 
is described as having 'a bad local reputation' 16 and asked him to kill Azam. The 
Prosecution maintained that, following on from her fraudulent actions to obtain title, 
Zoora was afraid of Azam's reaction and therefore asked Bala to kill him. A tape was 
produced at trial which was used as the evidence upon which her conviction for 
soliciting murder was based. The prosecution alleged that Bala taped his negotiations 
with Zoora, and then played the tape to Azarn. Azarn consequently contacted the 
police, which resulted in Zoora's arrest. Despite expert evidence to the contrary, the 
defence argued that the tape was produced in an involuntary piecemeal manner, under 
the orders of Azam. Additionally, the defence pointed out that only parties to have a 
copy of the tape were the police and the expert witness. The defence stated that this 
alleged incident took place during a time when Zoora complained to the police that 
Azarn had threatened her and had broken the windows in the house. Zoora also 
alleged that Bala had raped her and stolen some money and valuable bangles, the 
16 Ibid., para 6 
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same goods which the Prosecution argued that Zoora had used to pay Bala to kill 
Azam. The defence argued that incitement to murder arose due to the 'mischief 
making' 17 by Bala, as he was trying to interfere in her relationship with Azam. 
The defence argued that the frictions between Zoora and Azam in relation to the title 
of 251 Legrams Lane were not as central as suggested by the Prosecution. The 
Prosecution asserted that her attempt to kill Azam and his eventual death were due to 
Zoora's fear that he would not halt civil proceedings which disputed her claim. In 
contrast to this, the defence deduced evidence that, when the attempted murder and 
actual murder occurred, Azam and Zoora were on good terms, which seems to be born 
out by the fact that he visited her house on a number of occasions. On the night of his 
death, the Prosecution alleged that Zoora had poisoned Azarn by serving him some 
gagrella which was laced with arsenic. The defence, however, adduced evidence, 
mainly through the testimony of her daughter, Naseem, that Azam was not expected 
around that night and that Zoora was unable to poison the food as the family was 
eating out of a communal dish. The defence argued that Azam was perhaps poisoned 
at home as opposed to Zoora's house thus casting aspersions on to his wife, who was 
described by the defence as '... the only one to be unhappy because... ' Azam '-was 
shaming her by flaunting his relationship with another woman in public. '18 This to an 
extent highlights the defence's strategy, the deferment of blame from one woman to 
another. Azarn's wife appears to be a suitable and believable suspect, a suspect who 
would have an understandable motive, acting in order to protect her honour, and also 
a suspect who would be in a position to poison his food. 
17 Ibid., para 19 
18 Ibid., para 20 
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Although expert evidence was adduced to the effect that Zoora suffered at times from 
a 'slight' depressive illness, it was considered by the experts and the court that she did 
not suffer from such an abnormality of mind which would have diminished her 
responsibility for the murder of Azam. 19 Thus, the defence of diminished 
responsibility was not raised at the first trial. 
Overall, during the trial Zoora's identity is constructed as a woman who is the 
antithesis of those battered and victimised women who kill their partners after 
suffering years of abuse. She is considered to be a wanton woman due to her 
relationship with Azam, Raghib and Bala. Furthermore, comments were also made 
by Dr Wood, the consultant psychiatrist, which cast aspersions on the troublesome 
relationship she claimed to have with her husband. The judgment states: 
"She said that she had been beaten by her husband, but felt badly let down and 
disgraced by his leaving her. Dr Wood got the impression that she might well 
have had a succession of man friends thereafter, but she denied that. , 20 
This clearly has an impact on her character, what kind of woman would have a 
'succession' of men after such bad treatment? Again she is constructed as a woman 
who is not worthy of protection. In conjunction with the references made regarding 
Zoora's attempts to secure the title for Legrams Lane, she is presented as a deceptive, 
materialistic and conniving woman. Although there is some recognition that she 
suffered at times from a mild depressive illness, she is constructed as mentally able 
and responsible. However, ýthere is a contradiction which the court at first instance 
fails to recognise, (although the issue is dealt with at some length by the Court of 
19 Ibid., para 29 
20 Ibid., para 25 
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Appeal). Whereas she is constructed as such a strong, deceptive and able woman, she 
was also a woman who felt unable to give evidence. She felt unable to let people hear 
her truth (albeit through an interpretator). In the trial, little is made of her lack of 
ability to speak English and her feeling of isolation in a country which is far removed 
from her cultural background. In contrast she is presented as almost a female 
gangster, who displays stereotypical masculine desires, especially in relation to the 
acquisition of property. 
The Court of Appeal paid particular attention to the defence's arguments at trial, as 
they considered there to be 'nothing superficial about the case', and stated that it was 
6 a positive defence case ... built upon evidence which was extracted from the 
appellant's family and other members of the Asian Community. ' 21 The significance 
of this statement lies in the aspersion it casts upon the fresh evidence which the 
defence wished to be presented to the court. By constructing the defence at the first 
trial as substantial, the court implies that it could be taken as the a true version of 
events, and hence any subsequent evidence which tells an alternative account must be 
viewed with scepticism. Zoora remains constantly silenced, her truth is only 
represented through the words of others. She is unable to speak. 
The Appeal 
Zoora's version of events were brought to life after she had been sentenced. This was 
due to a significant extent to the involvement of Southall Black Sisters who were in a 
position to provide Zoora with a voice. A statement was prepared by Pragna Patel in 
which Zoora admitted that she had lied constantly to the police and her solicitors. The 
21 Ibid., para 22 
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statement also outlines the history of sexual abuse Zoora suffered at the hands of 
Azarn, Bala and others, and highlights the fact that Azarn was gradually turning his 
sexual attention towards her daughters, especially Naseem. Although she admitted to 
feeding the arsenic to Azarn, Zoora stated that she did this in order to quell his sexual 
desires. She had obtained the arsenic (Neela) from a Holy man whilst in Pakistan 
who had informed her how to use it. This statement, in addition to new medical 
evidence, formed the ground of the appeal. 
Under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1986 (as amended) the the Court of 
Appeal is entitled to accept new evidence. Section 23 states: 
"(1) For the purposes of the Part of this Act the Court of Appeal may, if they 
think it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice - 
(c) receive any evidence which was not adduced in the proceedings from 
which the appeal lies. " 
Hence the Court can receive new evidence if it appears to them that it is in the 
interests of justice to do so. What needs to be questioned here is what fonn of justice 
is the court appealing to? Nothing is said in the judgment about what justice means 
within this context. However, whilst deciding whether to accept the evidence, the 
Court, by virtue of subsection (2) must pay regard to the following matters: 
"(a) whether the evidence appears to be capable of belief; 
(b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground 
for allowing the appeal; 
(c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from 
which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; 
(d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the 
evidence in those proceedings. " 
Therefore, although the Court does have an unfettered discretion within section 1 of 
the Act, the question of whether or not the evidence should be received is to a large 
extent dealt with by reference the to issues laid down in subsections 2(a) to (d). In 
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Zoora's case the court paid particular attention to subsections (a) and (d) and these 
two grounds go straight to the question of the defendant's character. In both cases the 
issue is whether or not the defendant can be believed. 
The court accepted to a large extent that the evidence presented by professionals 
should be considered capable of belief. It was, however, the evidence presented on 
behalf of Zoora Shah that was deemed unbelievable. Hence the court proceeded to 
silence Zoora by constructing her as a liar, an identity which is undoubtedly in line 
with that put forward by the prosecution in the first trial. It is not surprising that one 
who is considered to be conniving, manipulative and deceptive is also held to be a 
liar. The Court of Appeal stated that she was '... a most unsatisfactory witness and 
her evidence to be not capable of belief. "' It is within this part of the judgment that 
we can further investigate the construction of Zoora's identity. In particular, the 
following aspects will be considered: the construction of Zoora as a bad mother; the 
perceived lack of phsyical evidence; her failure to disclose to anyone that she was 
being abused; and the courts judgment that Zoora was an 'unusual woman'. 
Zoora's failure to prevent her daughters eating the poisoned samosa leads to the 
Court's construction of Zoora as a bad mother. The judgment states: 'She professed, 
perhaps rightly, to care a great deal for her daughters, but ... she stood by on 29ffi 
February 1992 and watched both daughters eat part of the samosa which she knew to 
be poisoned. 923 However, no consideration is given to the fact that she might have 
been afraid of the consquences if she had stopped her children from eating the 
22 Ibid., para 59 
23 Ibid. 
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contaminated food, as this may have arisen his suspicion. Moreover, much is made of 
the fact that she would not admit that she 'got' Naseem (her eldest daughter) to lie for 
her. 24 The word got here is very important, implying that Naseem's actions where in 
no small part due to strong influence by Zoora. The word also suggests that perhaps 
Naseem also acted, to an extent, against her will. The court accepted that Zoora was a 
'strong willed woman', 25 who was undoubtedly capable of tricking professional 
psychiatrists into accepting that she was mentally ill at the time at which she killed 
Azam. It is stated: 'If, as is now apparent to us, both doctors were misled, the question 
arises as to whether their opinions can survive', 26 (and indeed it was decided that they 
could not). Hence it is not untenable to suggest that the court believed that Naseem's 
statement was due to the manipulative effect of her mother. A contrast can be drawn 
here with the case of Bakhshish Kaur Sangha, 27 in which motherhood was seen as one 
of the 'exceptional circumstances' which supported her appeal against a custodial 
sentence. As noted in chapter 6 Bakhshish is said to be '... a hard working and a 
devoted wife and mother who had worked all her life to provide for her family and 
raise her children. ' 28 
Whilst deciding whether or not Zoora was capable of belief, the Court of Appeal paid 
particular attention to the percieved lack of physcial evidence, a factor which, I 
suggest, is crucial in the construction of Zoora as an unintelligible gender. The court 
considered it strange that 'No one had noted a single suspicious bruise (other than one 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., para 61 
27 Rv Sangha [ 1997] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
28 Ibid., p. 205 
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black eye). '29 This observation raises a number of issues relating to seeing and the 
truth. The Court of Appeal appears to construct Zoora's body (bruising) as telling the 
truth of her situation. As no 'suspicious' bruising was noticed, then there could be no 
truth to her allegation of assault. As discussed by Fraser in "Classing Queer", the 
visible body is generally considered to tell the truth of a person's identity, '.. the body 
is the site, or place, where 'truth' of an identity is revealed. 930 Fraser examines how 
some identities are revealed upon the surface of the skin: such as race and gender; 
whereas the truth of other non-visible identities, such as sexuality, are only 
established 'by evidence over time. Fraser argues that the truth status of the body is 
due to the traditional influence of the 'visual paradigm' in Western discourse which 
4 ensures that material bodies, encoded with the seeable signs of identity, are 
assumed to carry their 'truth', overtly and irrefutably, on the surface of the skin. ' 31 
Although it could be argued that the body of a domestic assault victim will not tell the 
'truth' of her situation at all times, it nevertheless tells the truth at certain times, and 
this is very significant. The importance of this is shown in recent police initiatives to 
take photographs of a domestic assault victim shortly after an assault has taken place. 
Such action is generally taken as part of an overall strategy both to reduce incidents of 
domestic violence and to increase the number of arrests made. 32 One example is the 
29 [1998] EWCA Crim 1441 para 59 
30 Fraser M "Classing Queer: Politics in Competition" Theory, Culture & Society (1999) 16(2), 107- 
131 p. 109 
31 Ibid., pp. I 10- 111 
32 see for example the report in CWN - News & Information for Coventry and Warwickshire 13 
September 2000 www. cwn. or2. uk 
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use of cameras by the Essex police force, which are used in conjunction with advice 
booklets in order to take a 'double stand against domestic violence'. It is stated that: 
"By carrying the cameras on board police vehicles, officers will be able to 
capture the initial scene of any domestic violence incident. As well as sending 
a positive message to victims that the police treat domestic violence seriously, 
the photos can eventually be used in court should a victim decide to take 
,, 33 action. 
Hence the resulting photographs will be produced as evidence if the case proceeds to 
court. What is interesting is the use of the word 'scene' in the above paragraph. 
Undoubtedly photographic evidence of the place where the abuse occurred may be of 
relevance in some cases where the aggressor has also damaged the house or 
household objects (as happened in the case of Diana Butler, see chapter 8), but the 
real scene of domestic violence can be said to be the abused woman's body. This is 
the site upon which the violence is inflicted. If the evidence of damage related solely 
to the actual physical location, than it would be an issue of criminal damage. Hence a 
woman's body tells the truth of her identity, and this visual image can be so powerful 
that some forces have considered using the evidence in court in the absence of the 
victim's participation. 34 What is significant here is that the presence of visible injuries 
speaks louder than the spoken evidence of the actual woman. Her body is that which 
speaks the truth, and without this her words are silenced, and thus Zoora's 
representation of events remains unheard. 
However, when one reads the Court of Appeal judgment, it can be seen that there was 
some evidence of bruising, as the sentence notes the one black eye. The question 
33 www. essex. police. uk 
34 This approach has been suggested in the draft (as at 3 October 2000) Merseyside Police Force Policy 
Statement on Domestic Violence. 
264 
remains: why is the existence of one black eye not considered to be sufficient 
evidence of the abuse Zoora suffered? If the body tells the truth of a person's 
identity, why was this 'one black eye' not speaking the truth? What can be argued 
here is that what one sees is always already mediated via discourses and narratives, 
what we see '... is not given and self-evident but rather intertwined with narratives. ' 35 
Hence, although the body is considered to tell the truth of a individual's identity, how 
the body is seen and how the identity is constructed depends on the discourses which 
mediate the sight of the body. In the narrative of the judgment the bruising is 
constructed as separate to the sexual abuse Zoora suffered via the use of parenthesis. 
By placing 'other than one black eye' in parenthesis, the bruise is separated from the 
main body of the paragraph, and, more notably, from the word suspicious, and hence 
it is not considered to be dubious. By separating the black eye from evidence which 
may perhaps been accepted, i. e. suspicious bruising, the brackets establish the black 
eye as an unrelated event, an event which should not be seen to be part of the story of 
the appeal. The black eye is thus constructed as a coincidental factor. It is not 
accepted to be part of Zoora's version of events. It is not part of the alleged abuse. 
Hence Zoora was not considered to be a victim, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal 
she did not suffer abuse. Nobody saw a bruise which was acceptable evidence of any 
level of assault. This leads to an examination of those discourses of violence which 
can be seen to constitute a victim subjectivity. It is clear that terms such as domestic 
violence and battered wife/woman are identity categories which a woman must fall 
within in order for her to obtain that identity. Zoora falls outside the established 
35 Fraser M "Classing Queer: Politics in Competition"p. 112 commenting on the work of Vikki Bell in 
'Show and Tell: Passing and Narrative in Toni Morrison's Jazz' (1996) 2(2) Social Identities 221-236 
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discursive identity categories, and therefore the law can only construct her as a 
murderer. A case which can perhaps offer an insight here is that of Tara Mary Fell. 36 
In contrast to Zoora's case, Tara was living with her abusive partner and there had 
been substantial evidence of abuse, and this is mentioned in the facts of the case. The 
judgment states: '... those who lived nearby frequently heard shouting and screaming 
and crying. ' 37 'She was ... found on the pavement complaining of being 
hit by him. 
She had swollen lips and areas of redden skin. ' 38 After she had been arrested for 
killing Tara was '... examined by a doctor who noted bruising to her upper arms, 
breasts, neck, back and legs. ' 39 Hence there appears to be plenty of physical evidence 
which would construct Tara as a battered woman. What is interesting, however, is 
that within the case it is not this physical evidence which constructs Tara as an 
intelligible victim of domestic violence, it is, rather, her mental state. She is only 
identified as a 'battered wife (SiC)s40 when she is recognised as such by her 
psychological state as attested by a doctor. It is the medical categorisation which is 
needed for a woman to be recognised as a battered woman. The judgment states: 
"Dr Reeves ... found a number of features of Battered Women's syndrome; 
chronic depressive illness; a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness and 
despair; inability to act effectively; inability to see any escape for the situation 
or any future; self blame for the violence inflicted upon her by her male 
partner; a failure to see that what was happening was abnormal because she 
was isolated from reality; shame and a poor sense of worth and submission as 
a form of self protection. Having considered these elements Dr Reeves 
concluded that the Appellant fell into the category of a battered wife. s941 
36 Rv Fell [200012 Cr. App. R. (S) 464 
37 Ibid., p. 466 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
266 
Evidence of actual physical assault, although essential, as the Shah case demonstrates, 
is not by itself sufficient. Women must possess both the requisite bruises as well as 
the subjective damage. Another view to adopt is that there are perhaps two identity 
categories: victim of abuse and battered woman. Whereas the latter is dependent on 
the existence of the former, and a woman who showed evidence of abuse would be 
constructed as a victim of domestic violence, she may still not be categorised as a 
'battered wife'. What the Fell 42 case seems to suggest is that the actual physicality of 
being beaten will not suffice to place a woman in the category of 'battered wife'. 
In addition to the lack of physical evidence, the court also questioned the fact that 
Zoora did not speak to anyone about the abuse she was suffering. This statement is 
made in complete disregard to Zoora's admission that she did at one point appealed to 
Sher Azam, Azam's brother, an elder in the community, who declined to offer any 
assistance. I argue that the approach the court adopts in relation to this issue operates 
discursively to colonialise Zoora. The court seemed to disregard completely the 
subjective effect of violence upon a woman and how this may lead to her silence. As 
MacCannell and MacCannell state: 
"Independent of what happens to the body, the most violent acts are those 
resulting in long-term or permanent damage to the victim's subjective 
functioning,.... An assault is serious in the degree that it fragments 
subjectivity or constantly 'breaks in' on the inner dialogue of the victims and 
those who are victim-identified to the point that they can no longer conduct 
themselves in a way that can be termed 'normal'. 9943 
42 [2000] 2 Cr. App. R. (S) 464 
43 MacCannell D& MacCannell JF in "Violence, Power and Pleasure A Revisionist Reading of 
Foucault from the Victim Perspective" p. 205 in Ramazanoglu C (ed) Up Against Foucault: 
Explorations of Some Tensions Between Foucault and Feminism. [London: Routledge; 1993] pp. 203- 
238 
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In contrast, when discussing her silence the court paid considerable attention to her 
ethnicity and cultural background. It is stated: 'We appreciate that for someone from 
her background it may not have been easy to unburden herself. P44 The court from this 
statement onwards questions why she did not tell the many contacts she had, most of 
whom where Asian and some of whom shared her 'cultural background'. Hence it 
appears that, if most of her contacts had been non-Asian, her reluctance to speak may 
have been understood. However, as she had a number of people who the court 
deemed suitable to hear her voice, her silence becomes incomprehensible. Her 
inability to speak dissipates once there are other subalterns to hear her voice. At the 
very most the court states: 'Of course it would not be easy to say that she was being 
persistently sexually abused', 45 which is somewhat of an understatement. No 
recognition is given to other cases in which a woman remains silent due to the shame 
of being abused. (As indeed happened in the case of Diana Butler). What is needed 
here is the recognition that as both a Muslim woman, who cannot speak English, and 
also a sexually abused woman she is silenced in a number of ways. These two 
identities do not stand by themselves, but merge to help constitute Zoora's 
subjectivity. 
The court continues to consider her silence under the issue of whether there was a 
reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in the prior proceedings. 
In order for the new evidence to be admitted at a retrial, the defence has to provide a 
reasonable explanation as to why it was not produced at the first trial. It was 
recognised that, in some cases, the existence of a psychiatric illness may in it self 
44 [1998] EWCA Crim 1441 para 59 
45 Ibid. 
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adequately explain the failure to adduce, but, however, stated that this did not apply 
here. The approach taken by the defence was to admit that the initial defence was 'a 
tissue of lies'46 as Zoora wished to '... protect herself and especially her family from 
further shame and the risk of violence. ' 47 This is an interesting strategy adopted by 
the defence. In constructing her as a liar it could be argued that the defence is trying 
to undermine the court's initial construction of Zoora as a liar as they attempt to 
forward a justification for her untruths. Thus, the defence admits she lied, but at the 
same time a justification is derived from her ethnicity and cultural background via the 
evidence given by Zoora (through Southall Blacksisters) and Dr Lipsedge which 
stressed the '... importance of honour in the society from which the appellant springs, 
and as to the possibility of retaliatory violence. ' 48 As with the approach taken by the 
Court of Appeal in relation to Zoora's reluctance to tell anyone about the abuse she 
was suffering, it can be seen that the defence also discursively colonialises Zoora. In 
order to provide a reasonable explanation for her lying, the defence turn to her 
cultural background and this is the lens through which her actions are viewed. Once 
again, no explicit reference is made to the impact of the actual abuse on Zoora, and 
how this may have contributed to her 'tissue of lies'. Thus it can be seen that both the 
Court of Appeal and the defence fail to recognise the complexity of Zoora's 
subjectivity. She is viewed as either a victim of abuse, or as an Asian woman. These 
two identities are considered to be separate as opposed to intertwined. 
46 Ibid., para 67 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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Although the Court of Appeal did accept the cultural explanation for Zoora's lies, 
they did so 'only up to a point', as she was considered by the court to be 'an unusual 
woman' whose way of life, in their eyes, was such that '... there might not have been 
much left of her honour to salvage. '49 Two important points raise themselves in 
relation to the categorisation of Zoora as an 'unusual woman'. Firstly, this is perhaps 
one of the clearest parts of the judgment in which Zoora is constructed by the court as 
an unintelligible gender and thus loses her subjectivity (in the sense of a subject who 
is able to stand before the law). Secondly, this labelling works to implicitly censor 
Zoora and further her silence. 
As noted above, the concepts of intelligibility and socially accepted scripts relate not 
simply to gender, but also to race and ethnicity. Race and ethnicity can also be seen 
as regulatory regimes through which subjectivity is performed and thus constituted. 
Hence there is also a compulsory racialised script, which is performed under a threat 
of punishment. Thus, it can be argued that Zoora's unintelligibility relates not only to 
her failure to adhere to gendered scripts, but also to racialised scripts. Whilst 
categorising Zoora as an 'unusual woman' the Court of Appeal emphasised a number 
of factors. Firstly that '-she was certainly capable of striking out on her own when 
she thought it advisable to do so, even if it might be thought to bring shame on her or 
to expose her to the risk of retaliation. 50 Secondly, the fact that she had committed 
forgery and made allegations of rape and theft, which were considered to be false 
(these allegations were made in the first trial). And finally, that, again in the first trial, 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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her defence had made '... thinly veiled suggestion that the deceased's own widow 
might have been responsible for his death. 51 
In contrast to this, the Court of Appeal in the case of Bahkshish Kaur Sangha 52 
accepted the discourses of shame which impacted upon the appellant and paid 
significant attention to the report of the consultant anthropologist, who stated that, due 
to Bahkshish's ethnic and racial background, the abuse she suffered was '... both 
profoundly humiliating and deeply provocative. ' 53 This emphasises that the abuse 
should be seen as more severe in Bahkshish's case because she is an Asian Sikh 
woman. The abuse would not have been so profound had she been white. This 
recognition of the impact that domestic violence may have upon Asian women can, 
however, be seen as a double edged sword. Bahkshish's actions of attempting suicide 
on five occasions clearly illustrated the profound humiliation and shame she felt due 
to Sudit Singh Sangha's behaviour and thus was 'rewarded' with a probation order. 
The court in Zoora's case, however, considered that her reactions indicated that she 
was a woman who acted without honour, who feels no profound shame. Zoora failed 
to react in manner consistent to the court's expectation of an Asian woman. Hence she 
remains in custody. Being a 'strong-willed' Asian woman is much more of a 
contravention of the cultural scripts than being a 'strong-willed' white woman. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Rv Sangha [ 1997] 1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
53 Ibid., p. 206 It is important to recognise that Bakhshish is a Sikh, whereas Zoora is a Muslim, and 
such differences will also impact upon the perceived intelligibility of the women. Such an enquiry, 
however, is outside the scope of this work. 
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The significance of these racial scripts can also be seen in the well known case of 
Kiranjit Ahluwalia, 54 who killed her abusive partner by setting him on fire whilst he 
was asleep. Immediately similarities are apparent. Both Zoora and Mranjit killed 
their partners in non-confrontational situations, a factor which has not been evident in 
the other cases discussed in this thesis. Both women are Asian. However Zoora is 
originally from Pakistan whereas Kiranjit is Indian. Importantly, other significant 
differences exist. Kiranjit is a highly educated woman, whereas Zoora is not; Kiranjit 
was married to the man she killed, Zoora was not. Similar to Bakhshish, Kiranjit had 
attempted suicide and showed desparate behaviour, evidencing a high level of shame. 
The following passage from a letter Kiranjit wrote to her husband was read out in 
court: 
"Deepak, if you come back I promse you-I won't touch black coffee again, I 
won't go to town every week, I won't eat green chilli, I'm ready to leave 
Chandikah and all my friends, I won't go near Der Goodie Mohan's house 
again, even I am not going to attend Bully's wedding ... 
I won't laugh if you 
don't like, I won't dye my hair even, I don't go to my neighbour's house, I 
won't ask you for any he] P.,, 55 
The court also commented upon the fact that, despite discovering that her husband 
was having an affair, Kiranjit still wished to hold the marriage together, '-partly 
because of her sense of dutY as a wife and partly for the sake of the children. ' 56 
At the first trial, similar to Zoora, Kiranjit did not give evidence and medical evidence 
was not adduced. Kiranjit appealed against her conviction for murder on three 
grounds, two of which related to provocation, and have been discussed in chapter five. 
The third ground related to the defence of diminished responsibility, which, akin to 
54 Rv Ahluwalia [ 1993196 Cr. App. R. 133 
55 Ibid., p. 135 
56 Ibid. 
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the case of Zoora, was not raised at the first trial. It was on this third ground that 
Kiranjit's appeal was allowed. Despite the fact that medical evidence was not 
adduced at the first trial, the Court of Appeal considered it to be in the interests of 
justice to allow fresh evidence to be admitted. Thus, a report declaring that Kiranjit 
was suffering from 'a major depressive order', was admitted, therefore rendering the 
conviction unsafe and leading to an acquittal and a retrial. In contrast to Zoora, this 
report was actually produced for the first trial but was not adduced in court. A similar 
situation occurred in the case of Anita Muscroft, 57 as discussed in chapter 6. In both 
Kiranjit's and Anita's case the court considered it just to accept this evidence, but not 
in Zoora's case. It could be argued that this was due to the fact that no evidence of 
Zoora's depressed state existed at her first trial, however, it can be seen that this is not 
so. Evidence was admitted that Zoora suffered from depression. I argue that the Court 
of Appeal's decision not to admit the fresh evidence in Zoora's case was due to her 
status as an 'unintelligible gender', and this unintelligibility relates not only to her 
failure to adhere to 'gendered scripts' but also to 'racial scripts'. Whereas Kiranjit 
appears to have adhered to the gendered and racialised scripts, in that her behaviour 
arguably corresponds with culturally expected and accepted notions of Indian women, 
(i. e. feeling profound shame and humiliation due to the abuse, and the dedication to 
the marriage) and thus she amounts to an intelligible gender, Zoora's behaviour 
renders her unintelligible, as it fails to correspond to the regulatory scripts. 
Furthennore, the Court of Appeal fails to provide Zoora with the opportunity to 
explain her perceived 'unusual' behaviour. By constructing Zoora as an 'unusual 
woman' the court at the same time bars Zoora from explaining her 'unusual' 
57 Rv Muscroft [20011 EWCA 604 
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behaviour. Thus she is silence or implicitly censored. In this sense the phrase 
$unusual woman' could be taken as a form of hate speech: a speech act which has the 
58 
performative consequence of injuring the recipient. Butler argues that, as the body 
is sustained through language, in the sense that it is brought into social existence by 
being named or interpellated, its existence can also be threatened by language. 59 By 
being named an 'unusual woman' Zoora is injured in two different ways. Firstly, the 
address can be seen to injure Zoora as it reinforces her subordinate position. The 
address is illocutionary in the sense that its utterance contributes to the social 
constitution of Zoora, who is already in a socially subordinate position, and this 
naming reinforces this position. As Butler explains: 
64 ... speech does not merely reflect a relation of social domination; speech 
enacts domination, becoming the vehicle through which that social structure is 
reinstated. According to this illocutionary model, hate speech constitutes its 
addressee at the moment of its utterance; ... 
it is, in the very speaking of such 
speech, the performance of the injury itself, where the injury is understood as 
,, 60 social subordination. 
Although it could be argued that being interpellated as a 'woman' in itself places the 
addressee in an socially subordinated position, what is significant here is the use of 
the word 'unusual'. This part of the address does injury to Zoora as it sets her aside 
from other women. She is not deemed as either 'mad' or 'bad', the general 
categorisation the courts apply to criminal women, nothing in her actions are seen to 
correspond to the 'accepted' notions of female criminality, thus in short she is seen as 
an 'unintelligible' woman, a woman who does not confonn in any way to the notions 
of femininity which are recognised by the courts, either as a good Asian woman, or a 
58 see Butler J Excitable Speech: The Politics of the Performative [Routledge; London/New York; 
19971 p. 5 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 18 
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bad or mad female criminal, nor indeed notions of woman as passive victim. Not 
only does Zoora not fit the script of a good Asian woman, she also does not fit the 
accetped script of the (white) female criminal. Thus she is interpellated as an 
unintelligible gender. 
The term 'unusual woman' also operates to implicitly censor Zoora's words as she is 
silenced in the sense that her representations cannot be heard by a jury. Hence, 
although her 'voice, via Southall Black Sisters, is heard by the Court of Appeal, she 
is not allowed to tell her story to a jury, to argue that she has a recognised defence for 
her actions. Butler explains how such an utterance operates to censor the addressee: 
"When the subject through its derogatory remarks or representations, works to 
'censor' another subject, that form of censoring is regarded as silencing'. In 
that form, the citizen addressed by such speech is effectively deprived of the 
power to respond, deauthorized by the derogatory speech act by which that 
citizen is ostensibly addressed. Silence is the performative effect of a certain 
kind of speech, where that speech is an address that has as its object the 
deauthorization of the speech of the one to whom the speech act is 
addressed. v961 
Although Butler sees this as the power of the subject, as opposed to the State, in this 
case it can be seen to be a mixture of the two. Here, the subject (as in the Law Lords) 
interpellate Zoora as an unusual woman, and thus the law (the State) steps in to censor 
her story, as an unusual woman cannot be heard. The unusual woman (a gender 
which is culturally unintelligible) exists outside the domain of speakability, as she is 
not a subject, and her abject status is reconfirmed by her inability to speak as '... to 
move outside the domain of speakability is to risk one's status as a subject. 962 
Nevertheless, there is the paradoxical position that, by uttering the phrase 'unusual 
woman' the Court of Appeal also creates a subject position. Thus Zoora is both at 
61 Ibid., p. 137 
62 Ibid., p. 133 
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once abject and subject. Thus it can be argued that the Court of Appeal constitutes a 
new subject position: that of the unusual woman. However, in this instance this 
naming works to maintain the silence of Zoora as the court states: '... we find 
ourselves wholly unable to conclude that the appellant has put forward a reasonable 
explanation for what happened in the court below, ' 63 and thus, on this ground, her 
fresh evidence cannot be admitted. One of the main reasons for this unacceptability is 
that she is viewed as an unusual woman. 
Conclusion 
Zoora Shah remains in prison as a convicted murderer. She is constructed by the 
Court of Appeal as an 'unintelligible gender', a gender who cannot exist, who cannot 
be heard. In particular, two aspects of the judgment work to construct Zoora as an 
unintelligible gender a) the perceived lack of physical evidence and b) the label 
'unusal woman'. In addition, no exceptional circumstances exist in this case which 
allow her conviction to be quashed and a retrial ordered. Zoora remains outside the 
recognised categories which generally lead to a conviction of manslaughter. Zoora's 
unintelligibility relates not only to her inability to adhere to gendered scripts, but also 
to racial scripts, in particular, this was illustrated via a comparison with the cases of 
Sangha 64 and Ahluwalia. 65 In both of these cases, the court noted their profound 
shame and humiliation, which was exacerbated by their culture, a situation which was 
not considered to occur in Zoora's case. Thus it can be seen how the 
(un)intelligibility of gendered scripts and the diversity of 'femaleness' are of 
63 [ 19981 EWCA Crim 1441 para 67 
64 Rv Sangha [1997]1 Cr. App. R. (S) 202 
65 Rv Ahluwalia [ 1993196 Cr. App. R. 133 
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considerable importance in cases involving women who kill, an issue which will be 
considered further in the next chapter. 
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NARRATIVE AND RESIGNIFICATION 
IN THE RE-TRIAL OF DIANA BUTLER 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a close reading of the case of Diana Butler in order to develop 
the examination of identity categories used by the courts in the cases of women who 
kill abusive partners. The last chapter, which scrutinised the Court of Appeal case of 
Zoora Shah, argued that the court constructed Zoora as an 'unintelligible gender', 
which in turn, arguably, substantiated her conviction for murder. This chapter aims to 
develop some of the key arguments made in the close reading of the Zoora Shah case, 
especially how the court's perception of the woman as an intelligible or unintelligible 
gender impacts on the interpretation of the offence for which the woman is convicted. 
In particular, this argument intends to highlight the different constructions used in the 
case of a conviction for murder versus a conviction for manslaughter. Such an 
approach has particular relevance to the case of Diana Butler as she was initially 
convicted for murder, and then on retrial received a conviction for manslaughter on 
the grounds of diminished responsibility. The identification of the court's use and 
acceptance of different constructions of gender enables an evaluation of the fonn of 
justice achieved in such cases, especially those cases in which women are convicted 
for manslaughter. This chapter examines both the Court of Appeal judgment and the 
re-trial, and scrutinises how Diana Butler is given an identity, or placed within an 
identity category by the court; an identity which is negotiated by the defence and 
prosecution lawyers and the judge (but not the jury); an identity which is constructed 
for her which she must internalise in order to achieve some sense of justice. 
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On the 6th July 1996, Diana Butler stabbed Roger Carlin in the back with a kitchen 
knife, during a domestic incident. Roger later died of his injuries in hospital. The 
violence commenced once they had returned home, after an evening out, and consisted 
of Roger physically attacking Diana and also damaging the house. Diana stated to the 
police that he had '... gone ballistic, pulled her hair, hit her head off the wall ...... had 
thrown food out the house. ' and that 'he was smashing the house and hitting me. " 
When the police were called she initially stated (with Roger's agreement) that he had 
slipped and fell on to some glass. Later in the evening she admitted that she had 
stabbed him. These were the facts presented at both the first trial and the retrial. 
However, at the first trial Diana is convicted of murder, whereas at the retrial the 
conviction is for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. This 
chapter argues that this shift is due to the construction of Diana as an 'intelligible 
gender'. 
Initially the focus of the trial is upon the actual incident, the night of the stabbing. 
However, this focus can be seen to shift in the re-trial to encompass wider events, and 
this has a major impact on the construction of Diana's identity. At the retrial, the 
defence produce fresh evidence detailing the violence and abuse Diana suffered at the 
hands of Roger. Furthermore evidence of Diana's relationship with her first husband, 
John Butler, who was also violent, is adduced by both the prosecution 2 and the 
defence in the retrial. In contrast to the Court of Appeal's disbelief of Zoora Shah, the 
trial court accepts Diana's version of events. What is the reason behind this? One 
simple answer is that Diana fitted easily into the category of 'battered woman' or 
1Rv Butler Unreported, July 1999, Durham Crown Court. Notes taken by author at the trial. 
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'domestic violence victim'. There is plenty of evidence that Diana suffered physical 
abuse and unlike Zoora Shah she is seen to have the physical injuries, and this allows 
her to fall into the judicially accepted categories which operate within these cases. On 
another level, however, it can be seen that Diana only fitted into these categories after 
her evidence was accepted. What needs to be examined in this case is the three way 
negotiation which occurs between the defence, prosecution and judge in order to 
construct the defendant, and how the judge, through his authoritative speech, has the 
power to interpellate the defendant. This interpellation 3 is both powerful and 
determining, as it constructs the identity of the defendant from the outside, which is 
then internalised and, for a period of time, fixed by the defendant. 
A number of theoretical arguments will be used in order to provide a detailed analysis 
of the case and the construction of Diana's identity. These are: narrative, 
resignification, materialisation of norms and the formation of the psyche. After these 
terms have been explained, the chapter will then continue to apply this theoretical 
framework to both the Court of Appeal judgment and the retrial. The discussion will 
highlight how the different narratives which are evident in both the appeal and the 
retrial go someway to construct Diana's identity, and how narrative can also be 
2 The prosecution also tried, unsuccessfully, to adduce this evidence in the first trial. 
3 The term 'interpellation' is taken to mean the method in which an individual is brought into social 
existence. As developed by Althusser and then used by Judith Butler, (see Butler J 7he Psychic Life of 
Poewr. Theories in Subjection [Stanford University Press; California; 1997]) a naming or a calling 
provides an individual with a subjectivity and a social identity. It is argued in this chapter that the 
naming - the interpellation - which is provided by the judge is very powerful as it a) determines the 
appropriate offence and b) in cases in which some form of plea-bargaining occurs, has to be internalised 
by the accused in order to be convicted for the less serious offence. 
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subject to a powerful resignification, a resignification which impacts upon the 
construction of Diana's identity to such an extent that she is eventually convicted for 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. 
Narrative 
The notion of narrative as identity is considered by Lois McNay in Gender and 
Agency 4 McNay notes how poststructural notions of identity and subjectivity have 
deconstructed the notion of self '... revealing it be an illusory effect emerging from the 
,5 uneasy suturing of incommensurable discursive positions. She considers that the 
problem with this approach is that subjectivity becomes completely 'free-floating' and 
'lacks historical depth'. 6 This concept of subjectivity, she argues, fails to account for 
the reality that '... some types of identity are more durable than others'. Hence, whilst 
McNay is not arguing that subjectivity is essential and eternally fixed, she is 
suggesting that some forms of identity persist over time and are invested in by 
individuals. She states: '[g]ender identities are not free-floating: they involve deep- 
rooted investments on the part of individuals and historically sedimented practices 
which severely limit their transferability and transformability. 7 Recognising that 
some identities are resilient suggests that a coherent sense of self is not completely an 
illusion, '... but fundamental to the way in which the subject interprets itself in time. A 
4 McNay L Gender and Agency; Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory [Polity 
Press; Cambridge; 2000] 
5 Ibid., p. 17 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p. 18 
8 Ibid. 
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Hence, McNay moves away from a notion of a completely unstable subjectivity which 
is constantly changing and recognises that identity can be durable and lead to a 
coherent sense of self which is not a complete illusion, as it informs how, the subject 
sees itself and it is integral to the individual's construction of identity. Moreover, the 
standpoint adopted by McNay also inteffogates how the individual plays an active role 
in constructing their own identity. In order to explain this position, McNay draws 
upon the Paul Ricoeur's theory of narrative, which specifies that individual and 'meta 
- narratives' are fundamental to a coherent sense of self. This notion of 
identity as 
narrative helps to deconstruct some of the boundaries which have remained intact 
through the poststructural. notion of subjectivity as exclusion, such as '-dispersion 
versus unity; contingency versus fixate and determinism versus voluntarism. '9 A 
narrative notion of identity recognises that subjectivity is subject to radical change 
over time. However, it also argues that the self, through certain narratives, temporally 
fixes its own identity: '... the notion of narrative indicates that constraints are imposed 
from without and are also self-imposed. Individuals act in certain ways because it 
would violate their sense of being to do otherwise. ' 10 
Ricoeur theorises that an individual acquires a sense of self, a sense of a coherent 
identity, through the narration of their experiences: 
"The structure of narrativity demonstrates that it is by trying to put order to our 
past, by retelling and recounting what has been, that we acquire an identity. "" 
9 Ibid., p. 80 
10 Ibid. 
11 Riceour P in Kearney R Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological 
Heritage [Manchester University Press; 1986] p. 21 
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"The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his 
or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity 
of the story that makes the identity of the character. " 12 
This is not to suggest, however, that narration here relates to the notion of narrative as 
used by standpoint feminists, which suggest that women's experiences can reveal the 
'truth' of (gendered) social relations. Ricoeur's theory recognises that individuals 
cannot speak of their experiences directly, they can only be talked about through the 
indirect discourse of narration. Hence, all experience is expressed through narration, 
and experience can only be narrated because it has symbolic meaning. The notions of 
self as idern (sameness) and self as ipse (selfhood) are central to Ricoeur's theory of 
identity as narrative, and it is through the overlapping of these two senses of self that 
identity is formed. Whereas idern identity '... implies permanence in times in terms of 
sameness', ipse relates to a notion of the self as 6 ... constancy through and within 
change'. 13 And it is through narration that the self mediates these two forms of 
identity. Hence, it is through the narration of events that the self maintains a coherent 
sense of self through time and change. 'Narrative is the mode through which 
individuals attempt to integrate the non-synchronous and often conflictual elements of 
their lives and experiences. ' 14 Thus the self has unity '... but it is the dynamic unity of 
narrative which attempts to integrate permanence in time with its contrary, namely 
divcrsity, variability, discontinuity and instability. ' 15 
12 Ricoeur P Oneself as Another [University of Chicago Press; Chicago IL; 19921 pp. 147-8; cited in 
Hughes C "Reconstructing the Subject of Human Rights" Philosophy and Social Criticism (1999) 25(2) 
47-60 p. 52 
13 McNay L Gender and Agency; Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory pp. 87-88 
14 Ibid., p. 133 
15 Ibid., p. 89 
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McNay recognises that there are both personal narratives and ideological or meta- 
narratives. Personal narratives relate to an individual retelling of experiences or past 
events, and recognises that the telling of the 'story' works to construct an individual's 
identity. Hence, whilst examining the Court of Appeal judgment and the evidence 
provided at the re-trial, the personal narratives of Diana and other witnesses will be 
analysed to interrogate the construction of Diana's identity. In this sense, it can be 
seen that Diana does have some role to play in the construction of her identity, as she 
narrates her story. However, what she is permitted to re-tell, and the meaning which 
is attached to the events can be seen to be somewhat outside her control. In addition 
to the rules of evidence which limit certain forms of testimony, the negotiation which 
takes place between the defence and the prosecution also works to constrain and 
reconstruct Diana's narrative of events. 
Meta-narratives are those narratives which are 'culturally sanctioned' and 'form the 
16 
parameters of self-understanding'. McNay offers the example of heterosexual 
norms, which are '... expressed through the narrative of romantic love, marriage, 
reproduction and Fidelity. ' 17 These meta-narratives can be seen to have a certain 
18 durability, a 'historical embeddedness" as they persist even though practices of men 
and women have altered over the years, as evidenced by divorce rates. These meta- 
narratives still have an impact on an individual, they still work to form the 
16 Ibid., p. 93 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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'parameters of self-understanding. ' 19 Moreover, these 'culturally sanctioned 
narratives' create hegemonic identities. In this sense, the notion of meta-narratives 
and culturally sanctioned narratives can be related to Butler's notion of intelligible 
genders as outlined more fully in chapters 2 and 7. Intelligible genders are those which 
support the ideal path of sex, gender, sexual practice and sexual desire. Thus the 
female, femininity, heterosexuality, male, nexus generates certain narratives of 
heterosexual desire and appropriate behaviour, which then work to circumscribe an 
individual's sense of identity. Those unintelligible genders/identities are those which 
interrupt the nexus; those which do not relate to the 'meta-narrative', but at the same 
time create new narratives of identity. When considering Diana's case, meta- 
narratives, or culturally sanctioned narratives operate to give her experience meaning, 
to construct her own narrative of events. Such narratives include the battered woman 
syndrome and narratives surrounding victim behaviour. 
Resignification 
Another issue which will be addressed is how the meaning of a personal narrative, or 
the meaning of an historical event, can be open-ended and subject to change. Butler's 
consideration of the excitability of discourse argues that, as meanings of words and 
actions are not essential or fixed, they can be used in a way which exceeds their 
original purpose. This 'resignification' of a word is generally explained through 
recourse to hate speech. In particular, Butler 20 employs the word 'queer' to expound 
her argument. She states: 
19 Ibid., p. 94 
20 In order to distinguish between Judith Butler and Diana Butler, Judith Butler will be referred to as 
Butler, and Diana Butler will be referred to as Diana. 
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"The revaluation of terms such as queer suggest that speech can be "returned" 
to its speaker in a different form, that it can be cited against its original 
purposes, and perform a reversal of effects. More generally, then, this 
suggests that the changeable power of such terms marks a discursive 
performativity that is not a discrete series of speech acts, but a ritual chain of 
resignification whose origin and end remain unfixed and unfixable. "21 
Butler argues that this resignification is possible due to the 'gap that separates the 
speech act from it future effects. 922 Whereas physical abuse can cause instant injury, 
the violence of speech, through being interpellated by a name for example, is not as 
immediate, as there is always an interval between the utterance and the effect. The 
existence of this interval provides room for the word to be resignified, for it to adopt a 
different meaning, which in time may result in the word having auspicious, as 
opposed to injurious, effects: 
"The interval between utterances not only makes the repetition and 
resignification of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through 
time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualised in 
,, 23 more affirmative modes. 
As the narratives within the court case are provided through spoken testimony they are 
unstable and open to resignification. This in turn enables the events that occuffed to 
take on different meanings. Their effects can be changed from injurious to auspicious. 
The meaning of a historical event, told through the narratives of the witnesses, can be 
returned to its speaker in a different fonn and its effects can go beyond those whch 
were intended. In particular, the notion of resignification will be used in relation to an 
incident which occurred between Diana and her ex-husband, John Butler. 
21 Butler I Excitable Speech p. 14 
22 Ibid., p. 15 
23 Ibid., p. 15 
286 
Materialisation and the Formation of the Psyche 
The theories of narrative and resignification explain how a person's narrative can 
construct their identity and how such narratives can be open to a radical change in 
meaning. The notion of materialisation enables an understanding of how culturally 
hegemonic norms and meta-narratives act in a performative manner on the body of 
individuals, to form the contours of the body and the behaviour of the individual. 
Butler develops the notion of materialization in Bodies that Matter 24 and also in 
25 Excitable Speech. As outlined in chapters 2 and 7, for Butler gender is a 
performance which is enforced by regulatory norms. We perform gender through the 
compulsory repetition of acts and it is through this repetition that sex is materialized 
on the body of an individual: 
"... the regulatory norms of sex work in a performative fashion to constitute 
the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialise the body's sex, 
to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the 
,, 26 heterosexual imperative. 
Butler puts forward this idea of materialization as an alternative to the idea prominent 
in some gender theories which appears to assume that culture imprints on a passive 
surface. 27 In Butler's construction, the notion of matter relates to '... a process of 
materialization that stabilized over time to produce the effect of boundary fixity and 
surface we call matter... 928 as opposed to a 'site or surface'. However, materialization 
is never fully accomplished, but always in process, always incomplete and instable. 
Thus it is through the compulsory repetition of regulatory norms that the body 
24 Butler J Bodies that Matter 
25 Butler J Excitable Speech 
26 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 2 
27 See Ibid., p. 4 
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materialises and also rematerializies, as no two repetitions are the same. In relation to 
this case, the notion of materialization will be used to examine how Diana's personal 
narrative, her dialogues with Roger, and the culturally hegemonic narratives used by 
the courts are internalised by Diana and materialize her body and her actions. Not 
only is Diana's body regulated by these narratives, it is also formed by them. Hence, 
her body in not imprinted upon by this narratives, which a 'constructionist' approach 
may assume, but it is rather formed by them. 
The internalisation of nonns is explained by reference to the psyche, and how the 
subject is fon-ned through the operation of power. Butler argues that, whereas 
common notions of power see it as an external force that imposes upon a subject who, 
weakened through its force, internalises its tenns, power is also fonnative, in that a 
subject is only formed through this process of subjection. It is only through a 
submission to power that the subject is formed: 
"Subjection signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well 
as the process of becoming a subject. Whether by interpellation, or by 
discursive productivity, the subject is initiated through a primary submission 
to power. t*29 
Hence, it is only via submission to regulatory social norms, or responding to a name, 
that the subject is formed, that a subject has social existence. What Butler's analysis 
of the psyche also recognises, however, is that there is the possibility of 
misrecognition, of the power working in a different way: '-when and where the 
28 Ibid., p. 9 
29 Butler J The Psychic Life of Power, Theories in Subjection p. 2 
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discourse through which one is constituted fails to hit its mark. 930 In this sense, when 
Diana is being constructed through discourse or interpellation, there is always the 
possibility of a misrecognition, of the power operating in a manner divergent to which 
it was intended. Hence, the creation of an identity is always unstable and open to 
resignification. 
Whilst tracing the construction of Diana's identity two particularly important aspects 
of her case need to be emphasised. Firstly, the admittance of evidence in the re-trial 
which was not only deemed to be prejudicial by the Court of Appeal but which 
Diana's lawyers in the first trial and the appeal strove to exclude. Secondly, the 
significance of Diana's testimony and how this, in addition to evidence of physical 
assault, enabled the psychiatrists to consider Diana to be suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder. 
Court of Appeal 
31 
Diana's appeal against her murder conviction consisted of five different grounds. 
First, counsel for the appellant argued that evidence of Diana's previous alleged acts 
of violence towards Roger were wrongly admitted; second, that the character direction 
given by the judge to the jury was unsatisfactory; third, that Roger's statement to the 
30 Butler J in Bell V "On Speech, Race and Melancholia: an Interview with Judith Butler" Theory, 
Culture and Society (1999) 16(2), 163-174 p. 164 
31 An appeal is usually concerned with issue of new evidence or the conduct of the trial, as opposed to 
disputing the facts on the case. In the instant case, the appellant was arguing against the conduct of the 
first trial. Therefore, the Court of Appeal is concerned with whether the conviction is unsafe, as 
opposed to whether or not she was actually guilty on the facts presented. 
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nurses: "Why did she stab me? Am I going to die? " should not have been admitted as 
a dying declaration; 32 the fourth ground argued that the judge provided an inadequate 
summing up of the defence of provocation; and finally that the judge misdirected the 
jury as to the meaning of grievous bodily harm. The appeal was allowed on the 
combination of the first two grounds. 
Grounds one and two were considered together by the Court of Appeal, as they were 
considered to be inter-related. At the appeal, Diana's counsel argued that the 
admission of evidence which indicated that Diana was, on a number of occasions, 
violent towards Roger should not have been allowed. This evidence was provided, 
overwhelmingly, by the testimony of Roger's brother, Nigel Carlin, and was sought by 
the prosecution in order to counter a defence of provocation, as the evidence 
potentially indicated that it was Diana, as opposed to Roger, who was the aggressive 
party. Nigel Carlin gave evidence to the effect that in the summer of 1993 Diana had 
hit Roger three or four times around the head one night whilst they were out in a night 
club. Additionally, Nigel also stated that during December 1994 Diana had attacked 
Roger after an argument concerning a necklace, and consequently he received a 
number of 'major' injuries: 'Busted lip, gouges, swollen eye and redness around his 
face. 03 Moreover, Nigel painted Roger to be an unaggressive passive person, who 
was 'meek, mild' and continued to state that he '-wouldn't hurt a fly and I [Nigel] 
32 A dying declaration is what is know as 'Hearsay': 'An assertion other than one made by a person 
while giving oral evidence in the proceedings and tendered as evidence of the facts asserted. ' Keane A 
The Modem Law of Evidence [Butterworths; London; 5ed 2000] p. 246. Generally hearsay is 
inadmissible, however, dying declarations can amount to an exception. 
33 Rv Butler 98/8567IY4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para 15 
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should know. ' 34 The trial judge admitted this evidence, in order to counter a 'false 
impression' of Diana as a passive woman who was '-seeking to persuade an irascible 
man to calm down; irascible and sometimes violent man to calm down. 35 The Court 
of Appeal held that such evidence should not have been admitted. 
In addition, the Court of Appeal also noted that the Diana's counsel did not call for 
4 substantial evidence as to aggressive conduct by the deceased for fear of admitting 
evidence of the alleged attack with a knife on Mr Butler. ' 36 Mr John Butler was 
Diana's first husband. In the first trial the prosecution attempted to adduce evidence 
of Diana's aggressive behaviour towards John Butler, which would substantiate the 
construction of Diana as an aggressive woman. This evidence related to an incident in 
which Diana threatened John with a knife, and then stabbed the knife into a cushion 
which John was holding against his chest. However, the evidence was not adduced. 
This ground of appeal was considered in conjunction with the second: the 
unsatisfactory nature of the character direction provided by the judge to the jury. The 
Court of Appeal judgment illustrates that the trial judge qualified the conventional 
direction to the effect that, if the jury were to accept Nigel Carlin's evidence of 
Diana's past alleged acts of violence, '[they] may feel it would not be right.. to treat 
her [Diana] as a person of good character. 37 The trial judge also stated: 'If you [the 
jury] think that her character has been somewhat tarnished in the past, then of course 
34 Ibid., para 16 
35 Ibid., para 13 
36 Ibid., para 18 
37 Ibid., para 19 
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you cannot give weight to good character, because you do not really think that she has 
one ... $. 
38 The Court of Appeal, however stated: 'Even if [Nigel] Carlin's allegations 
of domestic assaults are true, we are very doubtful whether in the context of this case 
they disentitled this 30 year old woman from having an unqualified good character 
direction. ' 39 
Whilst resolving the character direction issue, Lord Justice Pill also considered 
whether or not it was relevant to direct the jury to consider the history between Diana 
and Roger. The Court of Appeal expressed concern that such an approach may divert 
the jury's attention away from the actual incident Lord Justice Pill cited the case of R 
v Pettman 40 in which the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the history of the 
relationship between the defendant and the deceased gains relevance, in a murder trial, 
when it presents the jury with a clear and coherent picture of the incident in question. 
Moreover, the evidence would not be barred simply because it uncovered the 
commission of another crime, for example, an assault. In Pettman Lord Justice 
Purchas stated: 
"Where it is necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of a continual 
background of history relevant to the offence charged in the indictment and 
without the totality of which the account placed before the jury is incomplete 
or incomprehensible, then the fact that the whole account involves putting 
evidence establishing the commission of an offence with which the accused is 
not charged is not itself a ground for excluding the evidence. 9941 
38 Ibid., 
39 Ibid., para 20 
40 Unreported 2 May 1985 
41 Ibid., see Rv Butler 98/8567/Y4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para 21 
292 
Hence, in relation to the case in question, evidence of the history of violence between 
Roger and Diana will not be rendered inadmissible simply because it illustrated that 
Diana did commit a number of other offences, if the jury would be left with a partial 
and incomplete account in its absence. 
The Court of Appeal judgment highlights that the police, initially, concentrated on the 
recent history, that is those events which occurred in the year of the incident, 1996. In 
the first police interview Diana is asked about any problems she might have had with 
Roger from January 1996, and is also questioned as to whether, in the same time 
period, they had injured one another. In contrast to this, as noted above, the 
prosecution in the first trial had, via the evidence of Nigel Carlin, adduced two 
examples of physical and violent conduct on behalf of Diana, one which occurred 
eighteen months before the incident, and the other which occurred 3 years prior. In 
the opinion of the Court of Appeal, such evidence could not be regarded as falling 
within '... the background of history relevant to the offence charged. P42 This provided 
Lord Justice Pill with another reason to consider the additional character direction to 
be inappropriate. Lord Justice Pill considered these historical events to be '... at best 
of only doubtful relevance. P43 Thus, far from providing the jury with a 'complete and 
comprehensible' account of Diana's actions, such evidence was considered to distract 
the jury's attention in an inappropriate manner from the significant events, that is, the 
night in question. Additionally, the Court of Appeal ruled that evidence of two other 
occasions which had been adduced had little significance to the main issues of the 
42 Rv Butler 98/8567/Y4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para, 22 
43 Ibid., para 20 
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case and 'could only be prejudicial to the defendant', 44 and hence should not have 
been admitted. Therefore, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the focus of the trial 
should remain on the night in question. Evidence of Diana's aggressive behaviour 
towards Roger, and her alleged attack against John Butler, are considered to be 
prejudicial and irrelevant, an outcome which is clearly sought after by the defence. 
These two grounds of appeal reveal interesting presumptions relating to issues of 
female aggression and passivity. The defence's fear of Diana being constructed as an 
aggressive and violent female led them to exclude evidence of the abuse she suffered 
at the hands of Roger. This exclusion suggests that she could not be perceived as a 
legitimate victim if she at any time acted in an aggressive manner towards her abuser. 
This is, to an extent, legitimised by the trial judge's suggestion that if indeed Diana 
was at any point in the past aggressive, the jury would be right to consider that she 
was not of 'good character'. This invokes a binary dichotomy of victim/aggressor, a 
binary which is left intact by the defence at the trial. Such a binary, however, may be 
deconstructed. If victim subjectivity 45 is exposed to be a performance, this recognises 
that there is no natural or innate victim behaviour, thus allowing space for different 
patterns of behaviour to be recognised and, perhaps, accepted. This allows a woman to 
be both at once aggressive and passive, and still be a female victim of domestic 
violence. A legitimate victim need not be a woman who is always passive. Once this 
44 Ibid., para 22 
45 Victim subjectivity is considered here to be an extension of gender as performativity. This is because 
part of the acceptable notions of intelligible gender, within a murder trial, encompasses a female 
defendant acting in a manner which is considered to be intelligible in the sense that it corresponds to 
accepted scripts of victim behaviour. 
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is accepted a defence lawyer would not need to suppress evidence of a woman's 
aggressive or violent behaviour, allowing a different 'truth' of women's response to 
domestic violence to emerge. 
To an extent, the Court of Appeal deconstructs the victim/aggressor binary, as it is 
recognised that even if the allegations of Diana's aggressive behaviour were true, they 
should not have disentitled her from '... having an unqualified good character 
direction. 946 Hence, even if Diana did assault Roger Carlin she could still be 
considered to be of a good character, thus going some way to accepting that a woman 
can be both an aggressor and a victim at the same time. However, the progress made 
by this section of the judgment seems to be somewhat negated by the next comment 
which exposes a different reason for dismissing the trial judge's character direction. 
Lord Justice Pill in the Court of Appeal considered that a good character direction was 
necessary in order to enable the jury to decide between the two different versions of 
events: Diana's and Nigel's. Despite the judge's statement that '... the jury should not 
in this case have been asked to decide, as in effect they were, a sub-issue whose 
resolution in her favour was made a pre-condition of her being treated as a woman of 
good character. ... v, 
47 it can be argued that the connection made between a good 
character direction and the decision as to which version of the story to believe, 
indicates that, if the jury decided that Diana was of good character they would also 
believe her narrative of the events as opposed to Nigel's. However, the contrary is also 
true. Thus if Nigel's 'truth' is to be believed, this then casts doubts upon Diana's 
character and once again the aggressor/victim binary is invoked. Hence, whereas Lord 
46 Rv Butler 98/8567/Y4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para, 20 
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Justice Pill appears to deconstruct the aggressor/victim binary at one moment, in the 
next moment the binary is resurrected. 
This overview of the issue of the character direction and corresponding evidence of 
aggressive behaviour on Diana's part illustrates how the court room is an important 
place of negotiation and a site of struggle for the construction of identity, and how it 
may be that a defendant may have little influence on how she is constructed and 
perceived by the jury and the outside world. What is occurring in this negotiation is a 
struggle over the narration of the events, a struggle over which incidents will be seen 
to be relevant when constructing Diana's identity. However, in this situation, the 
courts and the lawyers are the ones who negotiate the parameters of the narration, and 
thus her identity, as opposed to Diana. Hence Diana plays only a very small role in 
the construction of her own identity. 
At the first trial, however, the defence seemed to do little to negotiate the narrative of 
events which in turn bore upon the construction of Diana. The prosecution clearly 
sought to present a picture of Diana as an aggressive, violent woman who had a 
predilection for stabbing. Due to the fear of the prosecution adducing certain 
prejudicial evidence about Diana, the defence chose not to highlight the abuse she had 
suffered at the hands of Roger Carlin. The fear of Diana being constructed as an 
aggressive woman, led the defence (in the first trial) to play a somewhat small role in 
the construction of the narration of events. The situation is changed, however, at the 
appeal stage, where the defence enters the arena and argues that certain events should 
47 Ibid. 
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not be considered to be part of Diana's 'trial identity'. Her past violent acts should 
not be considered as relevant when constructing the narrative of the fatal incident, 
they are not part of either the night in question nor of Diana's identity. The Court of 
Appeal agrees with this approach, stating that the main focus should be the night in 
question, the other incidents just serve to distort the relevant issues. After quashing 
her conviction for murder, the Court of Appeal orders a re-trial, and the remaining 
discussion will examine the testimony and legal arguments presented in the re-trial. 
What is interesting is the shift which occurs in the strategy adopted by the defence in 
the retrial, and how this results in constructing a 'different' Diana, a Diana able to 
avoid a murder conviction. As opposed to limiting the case to the 'immediate history', 
the defence actually widens the time frame to include evidence of Diana's relationship 
with John Butler. It is argued below that the defence concede to this evidence being 
adduced in order to construct Diana as a victim. The change in direction has the effect 
of changing the construction of Diana's identity. Furthermore, this change in time 
focus, or event focus, is accompanied with a change in the meaning of certain events. 
This indicates that, in addition to words and discourse being open to resignification, 
events or, more accurately, the narration of historical events, are also vulnerable to 
resignification, which in the context of a trial, could result in either a positive or 
negative outcome. 
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The Re-Trial 48 
The re-trial concerning the murder of Roger Carlin commenced on 19 July 1999 at 
Durham Crown Court. From the outset the negotiation and construction of Diana and 
the narrative of events commences. The counsel for the prosecution, in their opening 
statement, compare the amount of alcohol consumed by Diana, as compared to Roger. 
It is noted that Roger had drank 6 pints of lager, whereas Diana had also consumed 6 
pints plus one white wine and soda. This immediately constructs Diana as somewhat 
masculine in nature as, not only does she drink pints, her intake more than equals that 
of her male partner. Such an approach can be seen to be attacking her level of 
femininity, and thus relates to notion of intelligible genders and performativity. As 
with Zoora Shah's dealings with property and fraud, Diana's drinking is used in a 
manner to question her performance as a 'woman' due to her masculine behaviour. 
This in turn affects the likelihood of Diana being constructed as an 'intelligible 
victim', as the two can be seen to be linked. As considered above in relation to the 
Court of Appeal judgment (in relation to aggression) and the Zoora Shah case, 
characteristics which can be classed as masculine distort the continuum of cultural 
intelligibility thus: sex, gender, sexual practice and sexual desire, 49 or: female, 
femininity, heterosexuality, male. As victim performativity can be seen as an element 
of gender perfonnativity, it follows that behaviour which falls outside judicially 
accepted female characteristics restricts the construction of a particular woman as an 
appropriate victim. The performance as a woman impacts on the perceived 
performance as a victim. To be perceived as a culturally intelligible victim of 
domestic violence, a woman must also be a specific type of woman. Moreover, the 
48 To clarify, the order of events are thus: first trial, appeal, re-trial 
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reference to Diana's drinking and the resulting negative construction is also 
compounded with the references which were made with regards her aggressive 
behaviour. This clearly enhances the construction of Diana as masculine, as an 
inappropriate woman. 
Additionally, the opening statement also emphasised that the amount of alcohol 
consumed by Diana was relevant to the defence of provocation. The prosecution 
outlined for the jury the requirements of provocation, emphasising that a) there must 
be a loss of self control on behalf of Diana, and that b) a reasonable and sober person 
[of the same age and sex] must also have lost their self control in those circumstances 
and reacted in a similar manner. With regards to the former requirement, the 
prosecution stated that she had not mentioned losing her self control. In relation to the 
latter requirement, the construction of Diana's actions as those of a drunken individual 
also operate to restrict the likelihood of the jury accepting a defence of provocation. 
Hence, the prosecution's opening statement begins to construct the narrative of the 
historical events and thus Diana's identity. Thus far they have constructed Diana as a 
woman who displayed characteristics incompatible with notions of intelligible gender 
and as a person who perhaps could not fall within the defence of provocation. Such 
notions of Diana are continued throughout the prosecution's case, and set the stage for 
the beginning of the negotiation of her narrative identity. 
The Prosecution's case precedes with evidence from the night in question, which 
draws upon the testimony of a number of friends and paramedics, to establish the 
49 Butler J Gender Trouble p. 23 
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development of events and the nature of the relationship between Diana and Roger. 
All of the witnesses called stated that they had heard shouting from both Diana and 
Roger and banging from their house; and that certain items of food and drink had been 
thrown out of the house. Additionally, a number of witnesses stated the two often had 
arguments and that on the night of the incident Diana was crying and hysterical. 
Throughout the testimony, a number of the witnesses repeated statements uttered by 
both Diana and Roger during the course of the evening. In particular, one of the 
witnesses testified that Roger had said to Diana that she was 'nothing but a slag'50 . 
Here it is useful to look at the work of Lora Lempert in "The Line in the Sand: 
Definitional Dialogues in Abusive Relationships"51 to explore further the ways in 
which abusive language impacts upon the abused woman's perceptions of herself. 
Lempert, in her study of abused women, argues that the dialogues which occurred 
between the abuser and the abused formed part of the narrative through which the 
abused women told their stories and constructed their identity. She argues that the 
women '... constructed new meanings for their experiences and transformed their 
perceptions of self. 952 Lempert recognises that, initially, the women did try to resist 
the names which they are called, which resulted in an ambiguity within the women, as 
they are unsure whether such definitions are correct. This then worked to deconstruct 
50 John Johnson Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. Notes taken by author 
at the trial. 
5'Lempert L "The Line in the Sand: Definitional Dialogues in Abusive Relationships" in Anselm and 
Corbin (eds) Grounded 7heory in Practice [ Sage; London; 1997] pp. 147-170 
52 Ibid., p. 149. The concept of definitional dialogues can be related to the notion of narrative as 
developed by Ricoeur and considered by McNay L Gender and Agency. 
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the women's sense of self. Nevertheless, the terms of abuse '... began to constitute the 
, 53 definitional frames of their worlds... which in turn had an impact on how the 
women behaved, as they would alter their actions or behaviour in order to challenge 
the definitions they were given. Moreover, Lempert notes how the terins of address 
used by the men tended to relate to the woman's perceived inability to perform certain 
stereotypical gender roles, she states: 
"[t]hese accusations were specific gender reductions that impacted negatively 
on the women's own perceptions of their competency in enacting social roles. 
They were attempts to nullify the women's definitions of self as women, 
deconstructing their senses of self and reality ....... 
54 
Lcmpert argues that abusive male partner's definitions of both the woman and their 
relationship become hegemonic, because '[m]en generally have more power than 
women and can frequently enforce their definitions. 55 Such a situation is clearly 
compounded in an abusive relationship and thus '[i]n violent relationships, men's 
views can (and do) become hegemonic. 56 As those perceptions and definitions 
forwarded by the abusive male become hegemonic, they can also be seen to become a 
nonn; a nonn within that relationship. Once considered to be a nonn, these 
hegemonic views thus materialise on the body of the abused woman and therefore 
have a real impact on her behaviour. Such an approach can be seen to be linked to a 
victim performativity. It is arguable that society and the judiciary expect to see a 
certain materialisation of these norms, a certain perfonnance. However, such an 
expectation fails to recognise (or does not wish to accept? ) the uncertainty inherent in 
53 Lempert L "rhe Line in the Sand: Definitional Dialogues in Abusive Relationships" p. 154 
54 Ibid., p. 155 
55 Ibid., p. 149 
56 Ibid. 
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the materialisation of norms, how these norms may materialise in an unexpected and 
unrecognised manner. As recognised by Butler, it is at this moment that agency is 
founded. 57 
In relation to the case in question, although it could be argued that a singular incident 
of name calling ('nothing but a slag') could be insufficient to amount to a dialogue 
which impacts on Diana's construction of herself, what is clear from Diana's 
testimony is that name calling was part of the abuse Roger inflicted upon her. She 
stated that he would call her names such as 'useless', 'fat', and 'ugly', and regularly 
accused her of being unfaithful, stating that she was a 'slag' and a 'whore' and that no 
one would want her. 58 On another occasion, after she had suffered a miscarriage, 
Roger also stated that '... the only thing [she] could breed is little bastards... ', 59 which 
appears to be a reference to her son, Tony, from the previous marriage. It is this latter 
dialogue in particular which can be seen to have had an impact on Diana's definition 
of herself. During her testimony Diana stated that she thought that the miscarriage was 
her fault, that he '-probably was right, I couldn't get anything right. ' 60 This clearly 
illustrates how Roger's definition of Diana has a significant impact on her construction 
of herself, and her ability to be a good or perhaps able woman, a woman who is able 
to bear children. 
57 See Butler J "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism'... 
58 Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. Notes taken by author at the trial. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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Lempert also figures the abused woman's reluctance or inability to report the situation 
to either friends or family as another aspect of these dialogues. Through the 
definitional dialogues which the woman has with the abusive partner and the internal 
dialogues she has with herself to deal with the name calling and the abuse, the woman 
starts to blame herself for the situation and feels a strong sense of shame. Lempert 
argues that '[I]mplicit in not telling is an interpretation of the violence as a violation 
of conventional social intercourse. 61 She suggests that the women involved had, in 
addition to being susceptible to the offensive tenns used by their partner, '... accepted 
without question the cultural ideologies of love and family that constructed the wife as 
responsible for well being in the private sphere of the home, 62 thus the women 
blamed themselves for the abusive relationship, as they perceive themselves to be 
unable adequately to maintain a peaceful family life. Moreover, they also expected 
other people to blame them for the abusive relationship, and hence decided not to tell 
anyone. Lempert illustrates this with the following quote: 
"... I felt that I was hiding. I felt like I was kind of hiding in a sense from those 
guys [her friends]. I didn't want to call them and tell them how horrible 
everything was. And what was really going on. I think I was ashamed of my 
staying in it and ashamed that it was going on in my life. This is something 
that doesn't happen. Happens to other people. And those people are people 
you never associate with of course because they are drug addicts and the total 
,, 63 down and out losers. 
A major issue in the retrial was the new evidence which was presented by the defence, 
generally through Diana's testimony. Although it is clear from certain statements 
made by her counsel in the Court of Appeal that there was evidence to the effect that 
61 Ibid., p. 160 
62 Ibid., 
63 Ibid. (Respondent 23) 
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Roger had been aggressive and violent towards Diana, her testimony in the retrial 
went much further, outlining in detail the verbal, physical and sexual abuse she had 
suffered. Such details were not disclosed at the first trial. As with Zoora Shah, the full 
extent of the abuse she suffered did not transpire until after she was convicted for 
murder. Whilst in prison for the murder of Roger, Diana sent her psychiatric nurse a 
letter detailing the abuse she suffered. The letter commenced: 
"Enclosed are the dark secrets that have haunted me for so long. Please help 
me to come to terms with them, if possible help me to talk about them and 
realise why I allowed it all to go on for so long... Please help. PS: Please show 
,, 64 them to no one. 
Additionally she stated that she felt '-weak, worthless, solid material, no man will 
want me again. 65 This indicates a feeling of shame, and suggests that she also 
blamed herself for the abuse. This is further accentuated by statements in her 
testimony. After outlining an incident after she had been raped by Roger, Diana stated 
that she felt that it '... must have been [her] fault. t66 She felt that no one would 
believe her if she told them the truth, believing that everyone would see her as she saw 
herself and blame her for 'allowing' him to treat her in such a manner. Furthermore 
she stated that '[e]veryone saw him [Roger] as a gentle man. 67 This clearly 
corresponds with the feelings of the abused women in Lempert's study. Hence, it can 
be seen that the dialogues which take place between the abuser and his victim and her 
internal dialogues operate to have the effect of silencing the woman, due to her 
feelings of shame and self blame. As a report in The Independent remarked: 'Diana 
64 As reported in The Independent October 3 1999 p. 7 
65 Ibid. 
66 Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. Notes taken by author at the trial. 
67 Ibid. 
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Butler: so ashamed of the sexual violence that she had suffered at the hand of her 
partner that she failed to mount a credible defence at her trial for murder. ' 68 
The unfortunate issue is the level of mistrust which tends to be levelled towards 
women who choose not to tell anyone about the abuse they suffered. This is very 
clearly evidenced in the Zoora Shah trial, as the Court of Appeal had so little faith in 
her version of events they refused to let her adduce the new evidence. Again, as with 
the Zoora Shah case, a campaigning group became involved with Diana's case after 
she had been convicted for murder. Justice for Women, who work on a number of 
domestic abuse homicide cases, helped to publicise the plight of Diana, and also 
helped her to come to terms with the abuse she suffered. The defence at the trial were 
very careful to emphasise that Justice for Woman had merely offered support, and had 
not in any way had an effect on what she said. The role of support and campaigning 
groups in such cases can be seen to be vital. Through helping the woman to come to 
tenns with the abuse suffered, they also enable her to speak out about the violent 
relationship. In this sense, it can be seen that they form an important part of the 
abused woman's construction of her narrative. Through the support received from 
Justice for Women and her psychiatrist, Diana was able to provide an account of what 
happened to her. Diana's account amounts to a significant narrative as it, potentially, 
can effect the conviction she is likely to receive. Hence, when we are considering the 
narrative of the historical events, and the construction of Diana's identity, it is 
important to recognise the role played by groups outside the judicial process. Their 
involvement can be seen to be an important part of the construction process, as in this 
68 The Independent October 3 1999 p. 7 
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case they enabled Diana to provide a redress to the narrative constructed by the 
Prosecution in the first trial and supplied the basis for the defence's negotiation of her 
identity. 
What needs to be examined, however, is why, in contrast to Zoora's case, Diana's new 
version of events were so readily accepted by the court and the psychiatrists. What 
transpired throughout the re-trial was the abundance of evidence of abuse suffered by 
Diana. This was witnessed by her friend Susan Willey who had seen, prior to the 
night in question, bruises and marks on Diana, including marks around her neck. Lyn 
Whitehurst had also seen Diana with her arm in plaster shortly after she had confided 
in her that Roger was having an affair. Diana's sister also testified that Roger had 
been very jealous and possessive and that he had dominated Diana. Evidence of abuse 
on the night in question was provided by a Doctor who testified that she had a number 
of injuries, including bruising on the face and body, and a sore and tender patch at the 
back of her head, all of which were consistent with indiscriminate hitting and kicking, 
consistent with Diana's version of events. Additionally, there was also evidence 
provided in the police interviews that Diana was on anti-depressants whilst she was 
with Roger, and that on one occasion she had taken an overdose and had had to have 
her stomach pumped. Thus, in contrast with Zoora's case, there was plenty of evidence 
of abuse and evidence of depression which suggests that Diana amounts to a 'battered 
woman' or an 'intelligible victim'. 
When comparing Diana's and Zoora's cases, the existence of evidence of both 
physical abuse and psychological problems are just two of the issues which need to be 
highlighted. Additionally, the issues of race, ethnicity and culture need to be 
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considered in order to examine their impact on the notion of an intelligible victim. In 
Zoora Shah's case the Court of Appeal considered that there was no suspicious 
bruising which amounted to evidence of abuse. In this situation, I argued that the 
court considered the body of the woman to tell the truth of her situation. In Diana's 
case there was clearly plenty of evidence suggesting that she was a victim of abuse. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that some of this evidence was provided by a professional, 
a doctor, which is undoubtedly considered to be a powerful and acceptable source of 
evidence. However, as argued in the last chapter by reference to the case of Tara 
Mary Fell '69 evidence of physical abuse is, by itself, insufficient to categorise the 
woman as a 'battered woman. What is necessary is the evidence of psychological 
injury. In Diana's case, evidence of psychological injury is provided by her statement 
to the police and by her court testimony. Furthermore, a psychiatrist for the defence 
was also to testify that she was suffering diminished responsibility when she 
committed the act. The case was, however, concluded before this evidence was heard. 
These two factors clearly construct Diana as both a battered woman and an intelligible 
victim. 
One issue which is not addressed in any detail in Diana's trial, however, is the fact 
that, like Zoora, Diana did not reveal the 'truth' of her situation until after the trial. 
Diana did not tell anybody about the full extent of the abuse she suffered at the hands 
of both John Butler and Roger Carlin, until she was convicted for murder. In Zoora's 
case, the Court of Appeal were quick to raise of issue of race and ethnicity when 
considering Zoora's silence, in contrast, no question of race, ethnicity or culture is 
69 Rv Fell [200012 Cr. App. R. (S) 464 
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raised in Diana's case. Although it is without doubt that Zoora's ethnicity had an 
impact on how she reacted to the abuse, it is clear that the Court of Appeal actually 
used her culture in a negative manner when constructing Zoora as an 'unintelligible 
gender'. The Court of Appeal uses Zoora's ethnicity as another standard or norm 
against which her behaviour is judged. In Diana's case, however, no question of how 
a white woman would have reacted is raised. The different approaches adopted in the 
two cases clearly illustrates that differences between women make a real difference in 
their cases and how they are judged. Although it could be argued that race, ethnicity 
or culture was not an issue in Diana's trial, this is to wrongly assume that how she 
reacted was not affected by such factors. As Butler recognises, when examining 
intelligible genders, gender and race and ethnicity should not be considered as 
individual and separate elements of subjectivity. All gender is raced/ethnic and 
indeed all race and ethnicity is gendered. Butler argues that these 'identifications' are 
,... invariably imbricated in one another, the vehicle for one another. 70 Gender is 
always raced, there is no 'neutral gender', as it were, there is no gender which is not 
also constructed through scripts of race, ethnicity and culture. 
However, whilst Diana is only looked upon as a 'woman', Zoora is only ever seen as 
an 'Asian woman', her difference becomes her identity. This argument does not lead 
to the conclusion that Zoora's ethnicity should, therefore, be disregarded, as this is as 
hannful as the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal. Indeed the different hurdles 
faced by an Asian woman need to be recognised. A problem arises, however, when 
these differences are used against women, as opposed to aiding an understanding of 
70 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 116 
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their predicament. In Zoora's case her race, ethnicity and culture appear to amount to 
another set of standards or norms to which she must adhere. Zoora's unintelligibility 
relates not only to her inability to conform to 'gender norms' but also to ethnic and 
racial norms. Such a position is not adopted by the court in Diana's case. Once there 
is evidence that Diana was physically abused and was mentally unstable, she amounts 
to an 'intelligible gender'. In Zoora's case, however, the Court of Appeal fail to 
recognise that an 'intelligible victim' is always a racial and an ethnic category. 
To summarise, the narrative of the historical events relevant to the trial shifts from the 
first trial to the re-trial, as evidence of the verbal, physical and sexual abuse she 
suffered at the hands of Roger Carlin is presented. Her relationship with Roger 
provided moments of 'definitional dialogues' through which her conception of herself 
and her identity shifted. These dialogues also operated in such a way so as to prevent 
Diana from bringing such narratives into the first trial. However, through the 
involvement of other actors, other definitional dialogues can be seen to be at work, 
which enable Diana to reconstruct her sense of self and identity to such an extent that 
she is able to speak about the abuse suffered. Hence her 'true' narrative of events 
transpires, and this is then developed during the trial by the defence lawyers, during 
their negotiations with the prosecution. 
VictinVAggressor or Both? 
As discussed above, part of the appeal was against evidence adduced by the 
prosecution which outlined Diana's acts of violence towards Roger. Such incidents 
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were also adduced at the re-trial7 1 and Diana admitted to two incidents when she was 
violent towards Roger. Firstly, she adn-ýitted hitting Roger in an incident over a chain 
which an ex-girlfriend had given him, and secondly she admitted to throwing an 
ashtray at Roger during an argument which had knocked him unconscious. 
Additionally, in the first trial, the prosecution sought to adduce evidence of an 
incidence which took place between Diana and her former husband, John Butler., In 
fear of this, the defence at the first trial failed to introduce certain violent incidents 
committed by Roger. The defence, and the Court of Appeal, clearly held the opinion 
that such incidents were not in anyway relevant to the case, but would, on the 
contrary, distract the jury from the important issues. 72 Alternatively, it is clear that 
such evidence could also persuade the jury that Diana was a violent woman who was 
capable of murder, thus, understandably, the defence wished to exclude it. What 
occurs at the retrial, however, is an entire reversal The testimony of both the 
prosecution and defence witnesses describes a number of incidents in which Diana 
was violent towards Roger. Furthermore, John Butler is also called as a prosecution 
witness. Hence, the retrial appears to include that evidence which the appeal wished 
to exclude. This evidence clearly has the potential to construct Diana as an 
'unintelligible victim'. She was clearly not a passive participant in the abuse and was 
at times rather aggressive. What needs to be examined here is how the defence deals 
with this evidence, and how the defence negotiate these events in order to change their 
meaning. It can be seen that the events undergo a resignification which present a 
different narrative, a narrative which reverses their prejudicial nature and enables 
Diana to be presented as an intelligible victim. 
71 Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. 
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The relationship between Diana and John Butler is first mentioned in the defence's 
cross exarnination of Susan Willey. 
73 Willey provided details of two incidents which 
she had witnessed. Firstly, she remarked that, one night after they had been out 
drinking, John had dragged Diana by her hair: 'He [John] had gone home and then he 
came back to our house wearing only his underpants. He dragged her by the hair 
saying: "it's time for home. ", 74 The second alleged assault involved John throwing 
Diana down the stairs, an incident which the witness overheard. Additionally, the 
witness commented that after the event Diana was covered in bruises, bruises she tried 
to hide One could consider such this to be a strange move on behalf of the defence. 
By questioning the witness on these events, this opens the door to the 'knife' incident 
which the defence were so careful to avoid in the first trial. 
After this evidence has been received, both the prosecution and the defence make 
representations before the judge (but in the jury's absence) as to whether or not the 
evidence of John Butler should be admitted. Such evidence includes the 'knife 
incident'. The Crown argues that it is relevant on four grounds: similar fact; 75 
provocation; lack of intent; and diminished responsibility, (the latter three are the 
defences forwarded on behalf of Diana). Significantly, the prosecution state that they 
72 Rv Butler 98/85671Y4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para 20 
73 Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. 
74 Ibid., Notes taken by author at the trial. 
75 Similar fact evidence could be defined as '... evidence of disposition to behave in a particular way... ' 
See Keane A, The Modem Law of Evidence p. 459. It amounts to evidence which indicates that the 
accused had previously acted in a manner similar to that alleged on another occasion. 
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will use it to argue against the defence that when she stabbed Roger she was suffering 
from diminished responsibility, suggesting that it was an habitual response, not a 
consequence of depression. In contrast, the defence proceed along the lines similar to 
their approach in the Court of Appeal, that the evidence is prejudicial and that: '... it 
will take the jury away from the central issue in this case. 76 However, as noted by the 
prosecution, it was the defence's decision to examine the relationship between Diana 
and John Butler. Following the Judge's comment that '... it would be artificial to 
exclude it', 77 the defence state: 'We are tom in our position. We can gain by its 
introduction but there is much we could lose. That is the balance. '78 The judge 
proceeds to admit the evidence, concluding that, although it may possibly be 
prejudicial, '... it must have been a striking experience in her life. It must have some 
effect psychologically, ' and thus that 'it is no impairment to the defence. 79 
Hence, in contrast to the opinion of the Court of Appeal, such evidence is considered 
by the re-trial judge to be part of the relevant narrative. Such an approach was clearly 
precipitated by the defence, as they chose to introduce evidence of Diana's 
relationship with John, which seems to amount a reversal of the arguments presented 
to the Court of Appeal. The evidence which they sought to exclude in the Court of 
Appeal is exactly that which they now wish to rely upon. This appears to be a strange 
strategy. However, a sentence uttered by the judge offers some explanation: '... it 
76 Rv Butler 9818567/Y4 unreported Tuesday 8 December 1998 para 20 
77 Rv Butler Unreported, 19-23 July 1999, Durham Crown Court. Notes taken by Author at the trial. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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must have some effect psychologically. 80 In the first trial, the defence did not 
forward a defence of diminished responsibility. Although there are no statements to 
this effect, it appears that this was due to the absence of evidence which suggested 
that Diana suffered long tenn abuse. Now such events are to be detailed, the defence 
is able to construct a different narrative of events, present a different picture of Diana. 
The focus moves from the night in question, to the entire relationship. Moreover, the 
jury will not only hear of Diana's violent conduct, but also of the abuse she suffered at 
the hands of Roger. In order for a defence of diminished responsibility to succeed, 
Diana had to be, at the relevant time, suffering under an defect of reason, or 
depression. As will be illustrated below, the defence use the relationship with John to 
strengthen their argument that she was, when she stabbed Roger, suffering from 
diminished responsibility. The meaning of the incidents which occurred between 
John and Diana no longer operate to construct her as a woman who has a predilection 
for stabbing men, but as a woman who was depressed. The narrative meaning of her 
relationship with John undergoes a resignification. Hence, it is here that we see a 
negotiation between the defence and the prosecution which alters the narrative of 
events, which consequently alters Diana's identity. The negotiation took place 
through the legal arguments presented to the judge, who was placed to decide whether 
or not such evidence should be presented. Hence, the narrative of events is, 
eventually, decided by the judge, a decision which Diana has to accept. In such a 
manner, her identity is constructed by the court, through the negotiation between the 
defence and the prosecution. Diana does have a role to play in the construction of her 
identity, however, as it is through her testimony that the relationship between herself 
so Ibid. 
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and John is resignified. The speech of the prosecution through John's testimony is 
returned with a different meaning. Here we can see how the 'excitability of discourse' 
also applies to narrative statements. The prosecution had one purpose for John's 
testimony: to present Diana as a woman who is capable of stabbing men. The purpose 
of the narrative goes beyond its original purpose, and returns in a different form. Its 
resignification undermines and subverts its original aim. 
As intended by the Prosecution, John Butler 81 testifies that his relationship with Diana 
was violent, emphasising that Diana was on many occasions the aggressor. He 
provides an outline of the knife incident, but states that he cannot remember the 
events leading up to the stabbing. His memory also lets him down when questioned 
by the defence as to a number of alleged incidents when he inflicted violence upon 
Diana. Overall, he constructs the relationship as violent and stonny, but locates Diana 
as the main aggessor. 
The relationship between John and Diana is further analysed by the defence through 
the testimony of Diana, who outlined a number of violent incidents which occurred 
between herself and John. These incidents included being punched in the stomach 
whilst pregnant with his child; raped; and hit around the head with a chair. In relation 
to the 'knife incident, ' she stated that this occurred after he had dragged her out of 
Susan Willis' house by the hair (as mentioned in Susan Willis' testimony). When 
they arrived home she stated that he had tried to strangle her, firstly with his hands, 
81 Ibid. 
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and then with a broom handle over her throat. During this incident John also stated 
words to the effect that she would only leave him 'feet first. ' 82 
By introducing this evidence, Diana widens the narrative of the events, especially her 
use of the knife towards John Butler. This evidence is then utilised by the defence 
lawyers to explain her actions towards Roger. The evidence is used to construct a 
different identity for Diana. By drawing upon similarities between her relationship 
with John and her relationship with Roger, in particular the abuse she suffered, they 
construct her as a woman who 'has been a battered woman for nine years. ' 83 Through 
changing the focus of the trial, by focusing on her previous relationship and the whole 
of the relationship with Roger, the defence are able to resignify a number of narratives 
surrounding her actions towards both John and Roger. The events are 
recontextualized and are given very different meanings. 
The likelihood of achieving a successful defence of diminished responsibility is 
undoubtedly increased by constructing Diana as a battered woman. As noted by the 
judge, the incident with John must have had a psychological impact on Diana. The 
defence have used this incident to argue that, due to the abuse she suffered at the 
hands of John, she became depressed when her relationship turned violent with Roger, 
especially as she considered him to be her 'knight in shining armour', 84 the one who 
had saved her from John. The fact that the relationship with John was used to help the 
defence is especially illustrated by the final questions put to Diana by the defence: 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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'Did John Butler physically and sexually abuse you? Yes; Did Roger Carlin do the 
same? Yes. '85 Such an approach was given credence by Diana's interview with the 
police, during which she stated: 'I did not mean to do it, he kept smashing the house 
up and hitting me. I have been through this before and did not want to go through it 
again. ' 86 This enabled Diana's aggressive behaviour to be explained: she was at times 
violent towards Roger but this was because she had suffered similar abuse at the 
hands of John. She was only ever aggressive because she was a battered woman who 
suffered psychological problems. Although his may appear to deconstruct the 
victim/aggressor binary, I would argue that on the contrary it leaves it very much 
intact. This is because a woman's aggressive or violent behaviour can only be 
understood if it is part of her mental instability. 87 Without the evidence which 
demonstrated that Diana was a 'battered woman for nine years', suffering from the 
post traumatic stress disorder, her violent behaviour would, arguably, have been used 
to construct Diana as an 'unintelligible gender'. 
Hence, it can be seen that the evidence upon which the defence relies is, to an extent, 
the same evidence which formed the basis of their appeal and which the Court of 
Appeal agreed should not be submitted as it would have the consequence of 
distracting the jury. In the retrial, however, after negotiating with the prosecution as 
to the relevance of such evidence, the defence use this evidence in a manner which 
repudiates the meaning which it is given by the prosecution. It is recontextualized and 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 However, as noted in chapter 6, if she is too aggressive she may amount to an 'unexceptional 
woman'. 
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resignified to such an extent that it supports the defence. The extent to which such an 
approach is successful is illustrated by the opinion of the judge and the crown's 
psychiatrist after hearing Diana's evidence. 
After hearing the evidence, the crown psychiatrist altered their opinion and agreed that 
she was, at the material time, suffering from diminished responsibility. Furthermore, 
the Judge called both the prosecution and the defence into his chambers and suggested 
to the prosecution that they would not be able to attain a murder conviction. 88 
Consequently, the prosecution agreed to accept a plea of manslaughter on the grounds 
of diminished responsibility; an outcome which the judge considered to be in the 
public interest. The plea was then put to the jury, who found Diana guilty of 
manslaughter. Hence it can be seen that the word of the judge provides a powerful 
end to the trial. He suggests (compels? ) the prosecution to accept a plea of 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. His utterance ends the 
negotiation and presents both the defence and the prosecution with an identity for 
Diana, an identity which, in order to avoid a murder conviction Diana has to 
internalise. Moreover, this identity has to be fixed for a certain amount of time, as the 
sentencing is postponed until October of that year. In the interval time, it is ordered 
that Diana will have to visit a consultant psychiatrist and the prosecution suggest that, 
for the protection of the public, when deciding the sentence the Judge should take into 
consideration the views of the psychiatrists. Hence, it can be seen that Diana is 
constructed as a battered woman during the trial, a woman who is suffering from 
psychological problems. Furthermore, it can be seen that another 'trial' occurs during 
317 
the time interval between the trial and the sentence: a trial which involves an inquiry 
into Diana's identity. Before an appropriate sentence is passed Diana has to remain in 
this identity for a number of months, her identity has to be fixed. This can be related 
to the notion of narrative as it suggests a kind of promise on behalf of Diana. As 
Ricoeur states: 
"Keeping one's word expresses self-constancy that, far from implying temporal 
changelessness, meets the challenge of variation of beliefs and feelings. 89 
"Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or 
herself so that others can count on that person. "90 
She promises that, although other aspects of her identity may change over the 
intervening time, she can be relied upon still to be a 'battered woman'. She can be 
counted on to be this identity, and thus invests in this identity, and it brings meaning 
to her future actions. Adopting this approach indicates that Diana's identity becomes 
temporally fixed. Although it is not completely fluid and unstable, it is not 
permanently fixed and unchanging. It could be questioned here whether the 
psychological effects of being a battered woman are temporary or permanently fixed. 
As recognised by Ricoeur, the individual's identity is constructed through a 
combination of idem (sameness) and ipse (selfhood). What is clear is that Diana must 
remain a 'battered woman' for at least a number of months, until she is sentenced. 
88 This information was given to the author during a conversation with the defence barrister and Justice 
for Women. 
89 Ricoeur P "Self as Ipse" in Johnson B ed Freedom and Interpretation: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
1992 [Basic Books; New York; 1993] p. 106 cited in Hughes C "Reconstructing the Subject of Human 
Rights" pp. 51-52 
90 Ricoeur P Oneself as Another p. 118; cited in Hughes C "Reconstructing the Subject of Human 
Rights" p. 52 
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More importantly, she must remain what the court recognises to be a battered woman 
until she is sentenced. However, it is not possible to state with any degree of certainty 
whether the psychological effects she suffered will remain a constant feature of her 
identity orjust have a temporary effect. It could be argued that, as Diana moves away 
from this time in her life, and develops new relationships, different definitional 
dialogues will operate in order to change her sense of identity, and she will no longer 
see herself as a 'battered woman'. 
The assertion that the Judge has the 'power' to end the negotiation of Diana's identity, 
and present this identity to Diana as her only option for social existence, is not, 
however, to state that he is the sovereign originator of this power. On the contrary, 
the judge is created by the power he appears to wield. Additionally, the Judge, only 
has power through the force of repetition. He is not the owner of that power, as Butler 
explains: '[a]s one who efficaciously speaks in the name of the law, the judge does not 
originate the law or its authority; rather he 'cites' the law, consults and reinvokes the 
law, and, in that reinvocation, reconstitutes the law. 91 Moreover, as recognised 
above, the assumption of a norm or the intemalisation of an identity which creates the 
psyche, is always unstable, subject to a different operation or a misrecognition. Thus, 
whereas an identity is presented to Diana which she seems compelled to assume, there 
always remains the possibility that the identity may shift; may be subject to alteration. 
The importance of this point is to recognise that there is the possibility of creating 
different, more auspicious identities which, although they may come to light in the 
court room, they are to a certain extent created outside the legal arena, as they are 
91 Butler J Bodies that Matter 
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formed by a different repetition. It is not the law that creates this identity, but the 
women who interrialise a given identity and repeat it in a slightly different way. 
Conclusion 
The chapter provides a detailed account of the role of identity in the case of Diana 
Butler. The construction of Diana's identity is traced through the three different 
stages of her judicial encounter: the first trial, the appeal and the retrial. In particular, 
attention was paid to manner in which her identity was negotiated by the prosecution, 
the defence and the judge. In order to examine how Diana's identity was negotiated 
and constructed a number of theoretical arguments were examined and applied: 
narrative, resignification, materialisation and the formation of the psyche. The notion 
of narrative was adopted in order to explain how personal and 'meta-narratives' work 
to construct an individual's identity. The extent to which such narratives can undergo 
an auspicious change in their meaning and impact, was examined via the concept of 
resignification. The concepts of materialisation and the formation of the psyche 
illustrated how narratives and norms operate in a performative, manner on the body 
and how identity becomes internalised. 
During the three way negotiation, narratives work to give Diana a sense of self, and 
these narratives are constructed by her own testimony and the testimony of others. 
Furthennore, these narratives are also subject to resignification, a resignification 
which is vital to the defence as it works to constitute Diana as an 'intelligible victim'. 
However, although Diana internalises the identity constructed via the judicial process, 
and is also required to remain in that identity until sentencing, it is here that the 
possibility of new identities emerge. As the power which forms the subject can at 
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times 'miss its mark', there is always the possibility of generating new, more 
auspicious identities. Although the identity constructed via the judicial process 
represents Diana as an 'intelligible gender', this is not to say that this is also an 
auspicious identity, or an identity which can be considered to be socially just. In 
particular, one has to query why it was necessary for the defence to have to rely upon 
and resignify Diana's relationship with her ex-husband John in order for her to be 
considered to be an intelligible victim. 
In relation to the thesis, this chapter develops the argument by illustrating the 
overwhelming importance of the construction of identity, and how an abused 
woman's identity is by no means completely fixed before the trial commences. 
Throughout a trial, a woman will undergo a number of interpellations and 
resignifications, and find that she has little, if any role, to play in how she is 
constructed. At the most, her own testimony will amount to a narrative which aids the 
construction of her identity. However this is still strategically negotiated by the 
prosecution, the defence and the judge. 
The cases of Zoora Shah and Diana Butler illustrate how identity is constructed 
through the judicial process and how culturally hegemonic norms operate to develop 
intelligible and unintelligible identities. These two cases take the focus away from a 
male/female comparative approach: where a woman who kills is compared to a man 
who kills his wife, and allows differences between women to be fully recognised and 
dealt with. Furthermore, this approach also enables those cases in which women 
receive a manslaughter conviction to be scrutinised and compared with those cases in 
which a murder conviction is passed. The notion of intelligible gender/victim was 
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used in order to theorise the differences between a murder and a manslaughter 
conviction. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
"Sometimes we reach the right outcome in law, but for the wrong reasons. A 
defendant and her lawyer may not care how they obtain an acquittal, but we in 
the academy should care. " 1 
This statement is made by Joshua Dressler in relation to the perceived increase in the 
number of women in America and Canada who are acquitted on the grounds of self 
defence when they have killed their abusive partners in non-confrontational 
circumstances. The success of self-defence in such situations has, he argues, 
invariably been due to the application of the battered woman syndrome. Dressler 
cautions that this approach may lead to '... a coarsening of our attitudes about human 
life, and perhaps even the promotion or condonation of homicidal vengeance. 2 The 
sentiment of his concem regarding the manner in which an outcome is achieved, 
however, relates to one of the main arguments of this thesis. Whilst analysing cases of 
women who kill their abusive partners I argue that attention needs to be paid to the 
reasons behind the outcome of a case. I have argued that this is permitted by moving 
away from a concern with a form of 'legal justice', which tends to be primarily 
concerned with the outcome, to a concern with 'social justice', a model of justice 
which enables the construction of a woman's identity in the cases to be evaluated. 
Hence, an outcome may be just, in that a conviction for manslaughter is achieved, but 
it may be achieved by injudicious reasons: not because the woman responded to a life- 
threatening situation, but because she corresponded to the prevailing gendered 
regulatory scripts and was thus constructed as an intelligible gender, which may have 
1 Dressler J "Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining 
Respect for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters" in Shute S& Simester A. P Criminal Law 
Theory: Doctrines of the General Part [Oxford University Press; Oxford; 20021 pp 259-282 p. 262 
2 Ibid., p. 262 
323 
negative connotations, for example being a passive victim who suffers some form of 
mental disorder. Moreover, the thesis also drew particular attention to the importance 
of differences which exist between women and examined how they impact upon the 
perceived intelligibility of a woman. In order to investigate this hypothesis, this thesis 
has examined cases of women who kill their abusive partners through a new 
theoretical framework developed from Judith Butler's queer theory 3 and Iris Marion 
Young's concept of social justice. 4 Such an approach enables the construction of 
identity within the law to be subjected to scrutiny and also emphasises that differences 
between women need to be recognised. In particular, the thesis has focused upon 
racial and ethnic differences via a close reading of the Zoora Shah case. 5 
The thesis has argued that work which has previously considered the plight of women 
who kill their abusive partners has overwhelmingly tended to adopt a comparative 
approach, in that a comparison is drawn with the legal treatment of men who have 
killed their partners. 6 This comparative approach tends to argue that women receive 
different treatment to men by the criminal justice system, and that women are much 
more likely to be convicted for murder than a man. Additionally, I argue that a 
comparative approach draws upon a notion of legal justice, which is concerned with 
equal outcomes, treating like cases alike. 7 Undoubtedly, such an approach has been 
significant and effective in highlighting the legal treatment of women who kill. 
However, it fails to adequately scrutinise why certain women are convicted of 
3 Butler J Gender Trouble; Butler J Bodies that Matter; as discussed in chapter 2 
4 Young IM Justice and the Politics of Difference; as discussed in chapter 3 
5 Chapter 7 
6 See Chapter 1 
7 See Chapter 3 
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manslaughter, whilst others are convicted of murder. Moreover, it has a tendency to 
assume that the categories man and woman are internally homogeneous, and therefore 
pays little, if any, attention to other differences which may have had a significant 
impact on the outcome of the case. 
This interest in the differences which exist between women, and the importance of 
how an outcome is achieved, led to the adoption of a theoretical framework which is 
developed from the theories of Judith Butler and Iris Marion Young. Chapter 2 traced 
the development of queer theory, emphasising the dangers involved in uncritically 
using the category woman. The existence of important differences between women 
has led to a deconstruction of the category woman, and an interest in how this 
category is constructed. In particular, this thesis has drawn upon Butler's notions of 
gender as performativity and of intelligible genders. These concepts are based upon 
the premise that gender is discursively constructed. For Butler, gender identity is 
constituted via repeated performances and, in order to be considered as culturally 
intelligible, these performances must adhere to socially regulated scripts. The 
performance of the script creates the identity. The other significant element of 
Butler's work relates to her argument that identity categories are never purely 
descriptive, but rather produce the identity which is named. Moreover, such identity 
categories are always based upon exclusions. The category always fails to represent 
all those it purports to represent. Hence the term 'woman' is a normative regulatory 
ideal which creates identity. In particular, these concepts have been invoked in 
chapters 6,7 and 8. These chapters provide a detailed examination of the construction 
of identity in a number of cases involving women who kill their abusive partners. 
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In addition to the concepts of intelligible genders and gender as performativity, the 
thesis also draws upon Young's concept of social justice, which is discussed in 
chapter 3.1 have argued that the adoption of Young's social justice not only 
encourages a move away from a solely comparative approach, thus recognising the 
existence of differences between women, but also permits an evaluation of the manner 
in which a manslaughter conviction is achieved, and the court's construction of a 
woman's identity. Chapter 3 also recognised the tension which potentially exists 
between adopting a deconstructive, queer theory approach to identity, which appears 
to argue against the use of identity categories such as 'woman' and 'battered woman', 
and the application of Young's social justice which promotes the role of social groups 
in creating their own positive identity. Such an approach appears to clash with 
Butler's argument that identity categories are always fractious and based upon 
exclusions. Moreover, that they also amount to normative regulatory ideals which 
tend to have unforeseen effects. Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 3, Butler has 
recognised that the use of identity categories may actually be politically efficacious, 
and hence could still be used despite their negative connotations. However, Butler 
cautions that such identity categodes should be subjected to constant scrutiny. 8 
The element of Young's theory which holds significance for this thesis, and can also 
be, I argue, reconciled with Butler's theoretical positions, is her notion of cultural 
imperialism. As noted in chapter 3, Young's theory of social justice precedes from 
the premise that the notion of justice as equality, (which is, within this work, taken to 
represent legal justice) is based upon a logic of impartiality which denies difference. 
This denial of difference has the effect of othering those within society who fail to 
8 Butler J Bodies that Matter pp. 221-222 
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correspond with the impartial ideal. Young develops a model of social justice which 
recognises five faces of oppression and aims to allow differences to be positively 
recognised. Cultural imperialism is identified as one of the faces of oppression, and 
corresponds to the ideal of impartiality, as it is concerned with how the identity of 
dominated social groups is represented as universal. The dominant group present 
their own characteristics as universal and superior and thus denigrates the different 
identity of diverse social groups. Moreover, inferior social groups tend to find that 
they are provided with an identity by the dominant group and arc frequently rendered 
invisible by this construction. Overall, the thesis maintains the necessity of appealing 
to a certain norm, Young's social justice, in order to enhance the work of Judith 
Butler and to provide some framework within which the construction of a particular 
identity can be both scrutinised and limited. Significantly, Young's conception of a 
social group, and the recognition that a particular group should be able to construct 
their own identity, provides a space for the voices of marginalised groups, whose 
experiences may have otherwise been ignored. Moreover, it can also be argued that 
the certain conditions of social justice are a necessary precondition in order for legal 
justice to be obtained. Legal justice, in the sense of treating like cases alike, can not 
be achieved when the identity of some defendants is constructed in a manner which 
can be considered to be socially unjust, and when certain socially unjust 
circumstances exist which render cases 'unlike'. 
This issue of identity construction is of central importance to the thesis. The thesis 
commences from a postmodern perspective that the law is a gendering practice, in that 
it creates subjectivity and identity, as opposed to merely reflecting existing identity 
categories. Cultural imperialism occurs when a women is defined from the outside by 
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a dominant group. I argue that cultural imperialism and intelligible genders are 
related, as the notion of intelligible genders relates to the existence of social/gendered 
scripts which must be adhered to in order for an individual to be recognised as a 
subject. Within the cases of women who kill, cultural imperialism takes place when 
the judiciary construct a woman's identity in accordance with the existing gendered 
(and racial) scripts. The women are constructed from outside, provided with an 
identity. In particular, this was emphasised in chapter 8, which considered the case of 
Diana Butler. I argued that her identity was constructed via a three-way negotiation 
which occurred between the defence, prosecution and the judge. Diana herself played 
an very minor role in constructing her own identity in this legal setting. By adopting 
this perspective it can be seen that the law both at once achieves a just result and also 
perpetuates an injustice, due to the culturally imperialistic manner in which her 
identity is constructed. 
The analysis of the law's construction of identity is contained within chapters 6,7 and 
8. In addition to drawing together the main arguments which have be made in relation 
to the law's treatment of women who kill their abusive partners, chapter 6 provides an 
examination of twelve Court of Appeal cases which were a mixture of appeals against 
convictions (generally murder convictions) and appeals against sentence where the 
women were convicted of manslaughter. The overview of these cases highlighted a 
number of issues. Firstly, that judges and juries arc increasingly willing to convict 
women of manslaughter, whether this be on the grounds of provocation or diminished 
responsibility, the latter appearing to be slightly preferable. Secondly, there still 
remains a continued reliance upon medical evidence and expert testimony. In the 
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majority of the cases such evidence was used to argue either in favour of a 
manslaughter conviction, or a reduced sentence. 
One of the main concerns of the chapter was to examine the application of Butler's 
notions of performativity and culturally intelligible genders to a number of Court of 
Appeal cases. I argued that the notions of a female slow bum anger and the battered 
woman syndrome potentially amount to 'idealized expressions of gender', 9 and thus 
can amount to normative regulatory ideals against which women are judged. This is 
due to the recognition that identity categories are never purely descriptive, but also 
constitutive, and thus produce that which they name. Butler cautions that against those 
'regimes of truth that stipulate[] that certain kinds of gendered expressions were found 
to be false or derivative, and others true and original. "O Hence, both the court's 
construction of womanhood and those constructions which have been forwarded in 
order to assist the plight of women who kill their abusive partners can be seen as 
culturally imperialistic, as they have the potential to represent some identities as 
'true'. And any such identity may problematic reinforce the matrix of compulsory 
heterosexuality. However, the chapter also noted that the battered woman syndrome 
is not a stable identity category. In particular, this argument was made in relation to 
those cases which were dealing with an appeal against a custodial sentence. I argued 
that any woman who kills her male partner potentially amounts to an unintelligible 
gender, as such actions contravene existing gendered scripts. However, the law has 
developed to recognise that some women who kill are not unintelligible, provided 
certain 'exceptional circumstances' exist. Generally, such exceptional circumstances 
9 Butler J Gender Trouble p. viii 
10 Ibid. 
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amount to suffering from some form of mental illness or displaying certain aspects of 
the battered woman syndrome. Nevertheless, it was recognised that mental illness or 
the battered woman syndrome did appear in the majority of the cases before the Court 
of Appeal, however, not all of the appeals against sentence were allowed. I argued 
that this was due to the fact that certain women were not 'sufficiently exceptional' due 
to the existence of other characteristics or circumstances which could not be 
reconciled with the battered woman syndrome, as they fell outside the exclusive 
definition. Such 'exceptional circumstances' - in particular being too aggressive or 
drinking too much - can be seen to be the exclusionary foundations upon which the 
battered woman syndrome is based. However, instead of seeing this as calling for the 
end of using the battered woman syndrome, I argue that it can been seen in a more 
positive light. As the syndrome will always amount to a partial description, whose 
existence depends upon a repetition, these 'unexceptional circumstances' may lead to 
the development of different, and perhaps more auspicious, identity categories. As the 
syndrome continues to fail to provide a 'complete and unified representation' such 
'subversive performances' present an opportunity for transformation. As argued by 
Butler, the possibility of 'new meanings' and 'political resignification' stems from the 
failure of an identity category to '-fully describe the constituency they name... '. " 
As some women will fall outside the battered woman syndrome category, this 
provides the possibility for new meanings to be developed. In particular, the chapter 
drew attention to the women whom were deemed to be too aggressive and/or 
alcoholic. Such women, however, also displayed elements of the battered woman 
syndrome, and thus threaten the stability of the syndrome, and open up the possibility 
of different identity categories. Moreover, as the syndrome only exists via repeated 
11 Butler J Bodies that Matter p. 191 
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performances, new identities may be created outside the court room, when the 
syndrome is repeated in different ways. These developments will, undoubtedly, not 
happen instantaneously. However, as the law continues to deal with such cases 
opportunities will arise. Indeed, this can perhaps be seen in the treatment of such 
&unexceptional women'. The law does not construct them as murderers, but instead 
marks their contravention in a more subtle manner, by passing a custodial sentence. 
The consideration of the law's demarcation of intelligible and unintelligible genders is 
further analysed in chapter 7 which provides a close reading of the Zoora Shah case. 
Moreover, the chapter also pays particular attention to other regulatory ideals which 
affect the cultural intelligibility of a woman who kills her abusive partner. In 
particular, the chapter focuses upon the regulatory scripts of race and culture, and 
argues that these should not be seen as separate scripts which run alongside the script 
of gender, but in contrast be seen as 'vehicles' for one another. Gender is always 
raced and race is always gendered. Such an approach is not, however, recognised by 
either the Court of Appeal nor the defence team. In contrast gender and race are 
perceived as completely discrete identity categories. In arguing that the Court of 
Appeal construct Zoora as an unintelligible gender, and thus she remains convicted of 
murder, I focused in particular upon three issues a) the perceived lack of physical 
evidence, b) the court's construction of Zoora as an 'unusual woman' and c) her 
perceived inability to conform to racial as well as gendered scripts. This last point 
was illustrated via a comparison with the cases of Sangha 12 and Ahluwalia. 13 The 
chapter also argued that the use court's use of the phrase 'unusual woman' could be 
12 [ 1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 202 
13 [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
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seen as a form of hate speech, as it amounted to an important interpellation which 
served to silence Zoora and reinforce her subordinate position. 
Zoora's case is also considered in chapter 8 which draws attention to the differences 
which exist between Diana Butler and Zoora Shah in order to account for the law's 
acceptance of Diana's new version of events, which, similar to Zoora, were not 
revealed until after the conviction for murder, and the rejection of Zoora's. Such an 
analysis is based upon the existence of racial and ethnic differences, and illustrates 
how such differences have a major impact on the law's treatment of such women. As 
opposed to Zoora, Diana was not questioned as to why she failed to tell anybody 
about the abuse she had suffered until after she was convicted for murder, whereas in 
Zoora's case significant emphasis was placed upon the fact that Zoora was surrounded 
by other Asian woman, other subalterns, and hence her silence became 
incomprehensible. Such an issue had no place within Diana's trial. 
Overall, chapter 7 serves to illustrate how the demarcation between intelligible and 
unintelligible genders and the range of differences between women are of undeniable 
importance when analysing the law's treatment of women who kill their abusive 
partners. 
Chapter 8 further develops the examination of the construction of identity and turns to 
a number of theories through which to analyse the issue of intelligible genders and the 
law's treatment of Diana Butler. In particular, the chapter draws upon the notion of 
identity as narrative, as developed by Lois McNay, 14 and Butler's ideas relating to 
14 McNay L Gender Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist Social Theory 
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resignification, materialisation and the formation of the psyche. Diana Butler was, at 
first instance, convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal quashed her conviction for 
murder and on retrial she was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of 
diminished responsibility. Both the Court of Appeal judgment and the retrial is 
scrutinised in order to uncover the constructions which succeeded in Diana being 
convicted of manslaughter at the retrial, as opposed to murder. I argue that Diana, at 
the end of the trial is subjected to a very powerful interpellation, the intemalisation of 
which leads to a manslaughter conviction and that her identity is constructed via a 
three way negotiation between the judge, defence and prosecution. Diana herself only 
play a very small role in the construction of her identity. 
In relation to the concept of identity as narrative, I argue that Diana's identity is 
created through the retelling of her experience, via her spoken testimony, and this 
experience is given meaning by existing 'meta-narratives'. These 'meta-narratives' 
can be seen to be 'culturally sanctioned narratives' which create hegemonic identities 
and intelligible genders or victims. Such existing narratives can be seen to be the 
battered woman syndrome and discourses surrounding victims of domestic violence. 
It is through such narratives that Diana is given a role in creating her own identity. 
However, what Diana is permitted to tell is not only constrained by the rules of 
evidence, but also by the negotiation between the judge, defence and prosecution. 
Plus, I argue that Diana has little control over the meanings which are attached to her 
testimony. 
One of the vital issues considered in the chapter relates to the resignification of 
testimony in order to illustrate how the defence succeed in constructing Diana as a 
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victim, after she was arguably constructed as an aggressor. Indeed, I suggest that a 
great deal of the defence's efforts relate to placing Diana on the victim side of the 
victim/aggressor binary. Particular attention is paid to the approach of the defence 
and how, in the retrial, Diana is constructed as a victim via using evidence which they 
paradoxically tried to keep outside the legal arena in both the first trial and the Court 
of Appeal. This evidence related to a violent incident which occurred between Diana 
and her first husband, John Butler. I argue that this incident is given an entirely 
different meaning in the retrial and suggest that this can be seen to be due to the 
excitability of discourse, and how the speech (testimony) can be returned to its 
speaker in an entirely different form, thus opening up possibilities for transformation. 
To conclude, chapter 8 shows the demarcation between intelligible and unintelligible 
genders or victims, and how cases remain trapped inside the victim/aggressor binary 
despite the fact that some women, such as Diana Butler, could be more accurately 
constructed as being both a victim and an aggressor. The chapter also illustrates how 
the identity of the battered woman is constructed by the law and how the court room 
is a site of struggle over the meaning of her identity. I argue that Diana is subjected to 
a powerful interpellation, which must be internalised in order for a 'legal justice' to be 
achieved. However, I argue that this 'just' outcome is caught up within cultural 
imperialism, as she is defined from the outside in accordance with hegemonic norms 
relating to battered women and victim behaviour. Although in this case the 
resignification operated in order to bring Diana in line with existing cultural 
regulatory scripts, it nevertheless illustrates how resignification may work in other 
cases and how testimony is unstable and subject to change. 
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Overall, this thesis has argued that the murder/manslaughter and the 
custody/probation distinction in cases involving battered women can be seen to be 
significantly based upon the unintelligible/intelligible gender distinction, and how a 
construction as an intelligible gender in these cases relates to Young's notion of 
cultural imperialism, thus highlighting how a seemingly just outcome can also be 
unjust. Moreover, the thesis has argued that social and cultural factors in addition to 
gender are exceptionally significant when considering the construction of a woman's 
identity. In addition to 'gendered scripts' there are also, for example, racial and 
ethnic regulatory ideals which impact upon the perceived intelligibility of a woman. 
have argued that the battered woman syndrome has become an 'idealized gendered 
expression', with little attention paid to differences amongst women, but noted that, as 
opposed to abandoning the concept entirely, thought needs to be given as to how the 
identity category could be subversively transfonned. 
On a wider point, the thesis has emphasised that the law plays an important role in the 
construction of identity, and has argued that there is some political necessity for 
retaining certain identity categories. However, there are three significant limitations 
which need to be recognised. Firstly, the identities created will always be partial and 
based on exclusions, and hence will never be able to accurately represent those it 
purports to represent; secondly the identities created are never simply descriptive, but 
normative and thus form regulatory scripts; and thirdly, the identity may have 
unforeseen effects. It is therefore, important that the creation and use of any identity 
category is subjected to a constant deconstruction and for the law to be self-reflective, 
and to recognise its own limitations. As discussed in chapter two, this approach 
draws upon Butler's notion of 'double movement', which allows the use of an identity 
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category, but at the same time sees it as '... a site of permanent political contest. ... ' 
and recommends '... perpetually ... interrogat[ing] the exclusions 
by which it 
proceeds. "' 
15 Butler J Bodies that Matter pp. 221-2 
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